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FROM WAR TO PEACE 
George Melnyk
The friendly image of a larger-than-life Mickey Mouse has 
turned into the deadly image of a vaporizing bomb cloud 
during the last two years because of the American invasion 
and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq has the second 
largest confirmed reserves of oil in the world after Saudi 
Arabia. The United States is the largest consumer of oil in 
the world. Not only does Iraq have an enormous storehouse of 
oil, it also has the “cheapest production costs in the world, at 
about a dollar a barrel.”2 This cost of production is one-sixth 
of production costs in the United States. With Saudi Arabia 
INTRODUCTION
An American bomb cloud
in full sunlight
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firmly in the U.S. camp, an independently minded state with 
grandiose plans like Iraq under Saddam Hussain posed a threat 
to U.S. geopolitical ambitions in the region. With Texas oil 
interests deeply embedded in the current Bush administration, 
what could be viewed theoretically as a match made in heaven 
has turned into a reality made in hell.
There are four key concepts in the title of this book. The 
first is “Canada,” the second is the “new American empire,” the 
third is “war” and the fourth is “anti-war.” The United States 
and war are one link, while Canada and anti-war is the second 
link. Ever since September 11th, 2001, when the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were 
attacked, there has been a major struggle to win over Canadian 
public sentiment to either a pro-war or an anti-war position.3 
The pro-war side has painted its position as one of unfettered 
friendliness to the United States and support for its global 
campaign against its enemies. In the past two years, the United 
States has invaded and occupied two countries – Afghanistan 
and Iraq – one with the support and involvement of Canada 
and the other without. Imperialism works through military 
occupation, and it is today’s unrivalled American military 
strength that is fuelling the new imperialism. The question is 
what is Canada’s role in this new imperialism and what are the 
consequences of involvement or non-involvement in war for 
Canadian society?
This book is an examination of this contentious issue from 
the perspective of the anti-war side of the debate. When Iraq 
was under attack and the world displayed a near-unanimous 
condemnation of the invasion and its justification, anti-war 
sentiment was global and very loud. For example, more than 
200,000 Montrealers marched against the war in March 2003. 
Even in the right-wing, pro-American oil centre of Calgary 
over five thousand citizens marched in the largest anti-war 
demonstration that city had ever seen. This outpouring of 
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anti-war sentiment was unable to stop the invasion. Opposition 
from major European allies, especially France, and from a 
ringing chorus of foreign governments was unable to stop the 
invasion. With the U.S. and British invasion and occupation a 
fait accompli and the United States trying to drag the UN into 
recreating Iraq in a manner suited to the United States, the 
tone of global opposition has softened as various governments 
position themselves around the energy banquet table and seek 
a return to “normal” relations with the U.S. superpower. The 
establishment media suggests that the new prime minister, 
Paul Martin, will turn Canada into a staunch ally of the U.S. 
war machine, unlike Jean Chrétien, his predecessor.4
There is little likelihood that future invasions of small 
weak states by the United States can or will be stopped. After 
the Iraq experience, when most of the world stood against the 
United States and yet failed to stop the invasion, Canadians 
should not be asking themselves how the United States can be 
prevented from continued imperialist expansion and its now-
realized ambition of global hegemony. Instead, Canadians 
should be asking themselves how Canada can remove itself 
from the imperial equation by embracing the anti-war side.
When Canada refused to join the United States and Great 
Britain in its falsely justified aggression, Canada stood with the 
world community in voicing opposition to what has become 
the new imperial world order of the twenty-first century. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States 
became the world’s sole hyperpower, and with that power came 
a renewed U.S. military aggressiveness that went far beyond 
the usual machinations of the Cold War (exceeded only in 
Vietnam) or the geographic limits of the Monroe Doctrine, in 
which Central and South America were U.S. fiefdoms. Other 
than Europe (an ally) and the two regional powers of Russia 
and China with their limited spheres of influence, the world 
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remains open to unilateral U.S. control and, if necessary, 
occupation.
Canada has not been shy about supporting the United 
States in its military campaigns ever since 1991, when it 
participated in the Gulf War. This was followed by the use 
of Canadian airpower against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the use 
of ground troops in Afghanistan in 2001–2003 in support of 
American objectives. In the 1990s Canada was part of the 
new militarism, whether under the guise of Security Council 
approval or as a member of NATO, and it continues to be a 
military adjunct of U.S. ambitions in a very real and costly 
way to the Canadian taxpayer. This is particularly true of 
Afghanistan, where Canada is supplying several thousand 
occupying troops (termed “peacekeepers”) under the banner of 
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.5 The 
refusal to participate in the invasion of Iraq was a departure 
from this basic thrust. The implications of that refusal and 
how it came about and what the refusal means for Canada’s 
future is the core of the fifteen essays presented in this book. 
The authors, who come from a variety of backgrounds 
– academic, activist, and political – speak out of a Canadian 
experience and understanding that is still very much in process 
as the new American empire unfolds before us. The authors 
support the peace option for Canada over the war option, 
and they explore the ways in which Canada can maintain an 
independent foreign policy in the midst of an unparalleled 
push for imperial power.
The push for empire is cloaked in the reactionary, U.S.-
originated “clash of civilizations” argument that claims that 
Islam, especially in the Middle East, is the enemy of the West 
and must be subjugated because it is a threat.6 Just as godless 
communism was the monstrous other of the Cold War for U.S. 
capitalism, so now a new religious and ideological enemy has 
been created to replace the former. The new fear of “terrorists” 
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(read Arabs) has replaced the old fear of “communists,” but it 
is the same old fear-mongering. The “us versus them” universe 
created by war, scape-goating, and political lies such as those 
that justified the invasion of Iraq (supposed weapons of mass 
destruction and links to terrorism), none of which have been 
shown to be true, is precisely the universe that the authors in 
this collection oppose.7 They want Canada to play a role in 
helping the Iraqi people in their search for peace, democracy, 
justice, and freedom from occupation.

The book is divided into three main sections and an 
afterword. The first section is titled “Thinking” and is meant 
to allow readers to gain a critical perspective on the history 
of Canadian, American, and Iraqi relations. The first essay by 
Douglas Roche, a senior Canadian parliamentarian, long-time 
peace activist and foreign development critic, and author of 
numerous books on international issues, outlines in a clear and 
forceful manner the choice that Canada needs to make if it 
is to maintain an unbiased international presence. Next, the 
role of the Canadian and North American media in creating 
the Middle Eastern “Other” is explored with chilling insight 
by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael of the University of Calgary. 
These scholars identify the anti-Muslim bias of the media as 
one of the major stumbling blocks to peace. Philosopher Trudy 
Govier of Calgary, the author of a best-selling text on critical 
thinking, a work on social trust, and most recently a critical 
look at the events of September 11 (A Delicate Balance: What 
Philosophy Can Tell Us About Terrorism) exposes the lack of 
logic at the core of the arguments used to bolster violence as an 
appealing solution to international conflict. Liberal member 
of Parliament Colleen Beaumier and her assistant Joyce Patel 
provide a detailed history of the humanitarian crisis caused 
by a decade of UN sanctions, which helped to devastate the 
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Iraqi economy and impoverish its once prosperous people. The 
section concludes with an analysis by University of Regina 
adjunct professor of human justice Jim Harding, who takes 
a long, hard look at the ideological underpinnings of the new 
American empire and what the Bush Doctrine of U.S. military 
invincibility means for Canada.
The second section, titled “Acting,” provides perspectives 
by those actively involved in opposing the war on Iraq. It 
documents their peace activism, beginning with Dr. David 
Swann of Calgary, who offers an autobiographical account of 
his fact-finding trip to Iraq in 2002, just prior to the invasion. 
His moving account is followed by the passionate voice of the 
Very Reverend Bill Phipps, former moderator of the United 
Church of Canada, who presents his reflections on how faith 
stands in the forefront of global peace activism. Donn Lovett 
provides a fascinating insight on how one very ordinary 
Canadian citizen was able to move diplomatic mountains to 
further the peace option. He also explains what he and others 
are trying to accomplish in Iraq today by creating institutions 
of civil society. Dr. Arthur Clark of the Department of Clinical 
Neuo-sciences at the University of Calgary and founder of the 
Dr. Irma M. Parhad Programmes for peace and international 
understanding at the University of Calgary makes a lucid 
argument for greater individual citizen responsibility in 
opposing war and upholding international law. Dr. Robert 
Hackett of Simon Fraser University is a scholar on media and 
democracy and former co-director of NewsWatch Canada. 
His essay outlines the basic corporatist structure of North 
American media and suggests strategies for finding alternative 
news sources that provide counter-establishment perspectives 
on peace and democracy. The section concludes with Canadian 
studies professor George Melnyk’s argument that the United 
States has created a paradigm of endless war in which it seeks 
and expects Canadian complicity. He concludes his essay with 
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a call for a Canadian boycott of U.S. products, services, and 
visits in order to help wean Canadians from their dependence 
on the United States.
The final section, titled “Observing,” offers three 
international perspectives on the Canadian dilemma of peace 
versus war. The section begins with former U.S. Marine Scott 
Ritter’s account of his experiences as the UN’s chief weapons 
inspector in Iraq during the 1990s and his view of Canada’s 
role in the inspection process. Ritter is best known for his 1999 
book Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis, which was followed by 
War with Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want you to Know 
(2000). His insider’s account raises questions about Canada’s 
commitment to its peacekeeping role in the inspection process. 
His essay is followed by a comparison of Mexico and Canada’s 
reaction to war and invasion. The refusal of both countries to 
participate suggests to Dr. Hussain, professor of international 
studies at the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City, 
that there may be increasing grounds for Mexican/Canadian 
cooperation in international affairs.  Dr. Satya Pattnayak, 
associate professor of sociology and director of Latin American 
studies at Villanova University, sees the unilateral approach of 
the United States as unrivalled from an international balance 
of power perspective. He discusses how this reality limits 
Canada’s desire for seeking solutions to international conflict 
through a multilateral approach.
The final word belongs to Mel Hurtig, a prominent 
Canadian nationalist, who provides an epilogue for the book. 
He points out how the economic imperatives of NAFTA, the 
Bush administration and its representatives, the continentalist 
interests of Canada’s business elite, the uncritically pro-
American Canadian media and the Official Opposition have 
come together to wage war on an independent foreign policy 
for Canada. Unless the economic knot that ties Canada to the 
United States is loosened, he argues, the pro-American war 
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editorializing of these sectors will continue to restrict Canada’s 
commitment to multilaterialism in international affairs.
The American and British occupation of Iraq and its 
appointment of a puppet government has been revealed as 
simple, old-fashioned imperialism. For example, the U.S.-
appointed Iraqi Governing Council has announced that it was 
opening up the country to foreign investment by privatizing 
the whole of the state-owned Iraqi economy, other than oil.8 
The announcement was described as “ a free-market economic 
laboratory, with levels of foreign ownership and privatization 
never before seen in the Arab world.” 9 The privatization is 
being engineered by a U.S. firm that received a $US80 million 
contract to do the work. Privatization includes the foreign 
ownership of Iraq’s national banks, a move welcomed by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, key 
agents of U.S. capitalist expansionism.10 Meanwhile, life for 
the people of Iraq remains oppressive, chaotic, arbitrary and 
unpredictable, and very dangerous.
Because of Canada’s intense economic ties to the United 
States and its continued participation in international entities 
like U.S.-dominated NATO, the pursuit of a peace option in 
an era of increased U.S. aggression is a profound and disturb-
ing challenge for Canadians who oppose war. And there are 
more war clouds on the horizon. The U.S. paradigm of end-
less war, growing out of its unchallenged military domination, 
point to more U.S.-initiated wars in the future. The cost in hu-
man lives and national infrastructures will continue to grow as 
U.S. missiles, bombs, bullets, and artillery shells rain down on 
innocent women and children and poorly armed opponents. A 
U.S. peace activist who served as a “human shield” in Iraq dur-
ing the American invasion remembered her week as a volunteer 
in a Baghdad hospital after the bombing had stopped:
It’s just sobbing doctors, because there was so much death, 
so much horror.… It was just death after death after 
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death. From babies to old men and women, the whole 
range. Amputees. Arms gone, legs gone. Children filled 
with shrapnel from cluster bombs.11
If this is the scenario from one relatively short invasion, the 
outlines of a new imperialism involving many wars is truly 
frightening. The peace option is now needed more than ever, 
and its promotion as a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy 
is something that will require the hard work, dedication, and 
humility of many Canadians.
I leave my readers with two images. The first is a CTV news 
broadcast on 8 November 2003 that showed American soldiers 
placing plastic bags over the heads of suspected insurgents so 
they could not see and could barely breathe. This kind of action 
by occupying forces, once condemned, is now considered 
normal and does not even raise an outcry. The second image is 
of a pile of books in a remaindered section of an independent 
bookstore at about the same time as the television broadcast. 
The book was published earlier in 2003 and contained poems 
by Canadian writers opposed to the war. The books were 
being sold at a deep discount. It is so easy to forget, to turn to 
other matters, to get on with our lives. In his foreword to The 
Common Sky, Alistair MacLeod wrote: “Throughout recorded 
history, it has often been the responsibility of the writer to 
speak out against the monstrosity of war.”12 The contributors 
to this book, like the poets, have responded by taking their 
responsibility for peace seriously. Let us hope many Canadians 
will continue to participate in this noble, but difficult 
struggle.
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THINKING: CANADA’S INVOLVEMENT 
IN AMERICAN WARS
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THE U.S. OR THE UN: 
A CHOICE FOR CANADA
Senator Douglas Roche
On 19 March 2003, U.S. President Al Gore called 
together his National Security officials to decide whether 
war would be necessary in Iraq to cleanse the country of 
weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces, deployed in 
Kuwait and offshore, were poised to attack. The UN 
Security Council was in almost continuous session. The 
latest reports of the UN inspection team, headed by Hans 
Blix and Mohammed elBaradei, were being scrutinized. 
Russia, France, Germany, and China, all heavyweights 
in the Security Council, were insisting that the inspection 
process – though rebuffed at first by Saddam Hussein 
– was working. Eighty-four professional inspectors had 
conducted 500 inspections at 350 sites in Iraq and turned 
up no evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Six smaller 
states on the Security Council, Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, 
Guinea, Cameroon, and Angola, were sending signals 
to Washington to show restraint and give the inspection 
process more time. Pentagon officials warned that the 
decision on whether to go to war could not be deferred any 
longer.
President Gore looked around the room before speak-
ing. All eyes were on him. “If the Security Council will 
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not authorize military action, the United States will not 
strike,” he said. “But we will insist that the UN double the 
number of inspectors in Iraq. We will comb every square 
inch of the country.” The augmented inspection process 
continued for another month. No weapons of mass destruc-
tion or any facilities to produce them were found, but the 
Security Council decided to leave inspectors inside Iraq for 
the next several years. The United States stood down its 
forces.
“Rather than spending money on war, let’s put more 
money into all the UN processes,” President Gore told 
his cabinet shortly after the Iraq crisis. “Let’s show the 
world the United States wants to strengthen the rule 
of law.” In quick order, the U.S. Senate ratified the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol 
on the environment. The Gore Administration signed 
onto the International Criminal Court and pledged that 
it would never put weapons of any kind in space. President 
Gore himself instructed his arms control and disarmament 
negotiators to fly to Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing 
to press the other Nuclear Weapons States to commence im-
mediate negotiations on a ten-year plan for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons.
The President found time for a one-day visit to 
Ottawa. The Prime Minister escorted Gore into a cheer-
ing House of Commons. “Thank you, Canada,” President 
Gore said as he began his speech. “Your constant work to 
shore up the United Nations as the most important instru-
ment for peace in the world, your professional scientific and 
political work for verification methods, your unwavering 
commitment to the use of your armed forces for peace-
building have been an inspiration to the people of the 
United States and indeed the world. Canada is the kind of 
neighbour the United States cherishes.” The parliamentar-
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ians were on their feet, yelling “Gore, Gore, Gore!” Svend 
Robinson, M.P., darted from his seat to present the U.S. 
President with a red rose....
Zzzttt!
That abrupt sound you just heard was my alarm clock going off. 
Rudely awakened, my dream shattered, I got up to face another 
day in the cold, real world of politics. The United States was 
cheering President George W. Bush (it was Bush, after all, not 
Al Gore, who emerged from the Florida debacle with a U.S. 
Supreme Court-backed claim to the presidency) for having 
liberated Iraq from the demonized Saddam Hussein. Kofi 
Annan was expediting humanitarian aid to Iraq and struggling 
to have the UN play a central role in the reconstruction of the 
country. “The feeling of global insecurity has seldom, if ever, 
been greater than it is today,” he told the Security Council. 
“We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the development of 
international relations.” The Arab world, relieved that Saddam 
Hussein was gone, wondered if the United States would strike 
again.
In Canada, two back-to-back debates took place in the 
House of Commons: one, on a motion sponsored by the 
Canadian Alliance, calling on the House of Commons to 
apologize to the United States for offensive comments made by 
some of its members and to reaffirm that the United States is 
“Canada’s closest friend and ally,” and the other, on a motion 
sponsored by the government, reaffirming the government’s 
decision not to participate in the Iraq war, and restating “the 
unbreakable bonds of values, family, friendship and mutual re-
spect that will always characterize Canada’s relationship with 
the United States.…”
It is a hallmark of Canada’s obsession with Canada–U.S. 
relations that, at the very moment the world is agitated with 
the United States for trampling on international political 
and legal systems, Parliament is focusing on not hurting U.S. 
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feelings. Unbreakable bond or not, Bush cancelled his planned 
visit to Ottawa.
The UN or the U.S.
The world is at a turning point in history, brought on by the 
United States and its assertion that a pre-emptive attack on 
Iraq in order to change the leadership regime was justified. 
This sea-change in international relations, for this is what it is 
when the world’s most powerful state adopts a policy to depose 
governments it finds unfavourable, has opened a void that will 
be filled by one of two scenarios: either the world will be run 
by international law, centring in the UN system, or it will be 
run by the United States, by far the strongest military power 
ever seen.
Let it be said at the outset that the Government of Canada 
did the right thing when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stood 
up in the House of Commons two days before the U.S. and 
U.K.-led coalition launched its attack on Iraq, and said: “If 
military action proceeds without a new resolution of the 
Security Council, Canada will not participate.” Eight months 
earlier, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade had crafted a memo, which Foreign Affairs Minister 
Bill Graham took to Cabinet. The memo foresaw that the 
Bush Administration was determined to oust Saddam Hussein 
with or without United Nations’ approval. Whether the 
UN inspection process, resumed after Resolution 1441 was 
adopted, found anything or not, the United States was going to 
war. The memo recommended that, absent UN authorization, 
Canada stay out of the war. Prime Minister Chrétien had no 
trouble with this advice. Skeptical of U.S. intentions, but wary 
of giving offence to a trading partner that is like an elephant 
in the Canadian living room, Chrétien accepted the memo. 
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Nor did he have much trouble with his Cabinet, although the 
embassy in Washington was warning of dire consequences if 
Canada did not support the United States.
But Chrétien then made a mistake. He thought that, 
although it threatened war, the United States would not 
actually launch an attack without any evidence of Iraq 
producing weapons of mass destruction. Chrétien’s logic led 
him to believe he could finesse Canada’s public position so that 
it would never have to actually say no to the United States. 
A full-fledged communications strategy, making clear the 
reasons for Canada’s principled position, was never invoked. 
When the final hours loomed and Chrétien realized the United 
States was indeed going to war, he quickly put together a short 
statement that he used to answer the lead question in Question 
Period.
Public opinion in Canada at first gave substantial support 
to the prime minister’s position. But as the war progressed, a 
rally-round-the-troops feeling took hold in Canada, mirroring 
increased support for the war in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. On White House orders, U.S. Ambassador 
to Canada Paul Cellucci publicly complained about Canada’s 
demurral, and then it became known that Canada had some 
thirty armed forces personnel serving on an exchange basis 
with U.S. and UK forces who were caught up in combat 
operations, even if from a distance. Suddenly, the Canadian 
stand did not look so principled. And when a few members of 
the Liberal government made none-too-flattering comments 
about U.S. leadership (Bush was called a “moron” and a “failed 
statesman,” and Americans were damned as “bastards”), the 
right-wing press in Canada turned on Chrétien for damaging 
Canada’s pre-eminent international relationship. Canada–U.S. 
relations were wrecked, they intoned. Chrétien did his usual 
dance in Parliament – and now the Canada–U.S. relationship 
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has once again become the preoccupation of Canadian foreign 
policy.
The Pitfalls of Unilateralism
While Chrétien has been hard-pressed to stave off domestic 
attacks on his reluctance to fall in line behind U.S. policy in 
Iraq, the fallout from the American invasion, which is turning 
out to be a crash-course for the Pentagon in peace-building, is 
showing the wisdom of his position more and more. Though 
the U.S. military has proven very effective in toppling Saddam 
from power and winning the war, faced with a devastated Iraqi 
infrastructure as a result of the much celebrated “shock and 
awe” campaign, a lack of functioning state institutions, and a 
colossal power vacuum created by the exit of the all-powerful 
Baath party, it has been markedly less successful in winning 
the peace. In confronting all these challenges, the military has 
also been faced with an ongoing guerrilla campaign conducted 
by Saddam loyalists and others that has resulted in an ongoing 
string of American casualties.
Faced with falling troop morale and increased costs of 
occupation estimated at $4 billion per month (double initial 
projections), the United States has been forced to reach out 
to the international community for help. However, traditional 
U.S. allies have been reluctant to commit money or troops so 
long as the United States refuses to cede additional authority 
to the UN. (While the UN was given a supporting role under 
Security Council Resolution 1483, passed in May, 2003, the 
U.S.-led coalition retained responsibility for security and for 
the administration of reconstruction contracts.) International 
calls for a stronger UN role have been echoed by prominent 
Iraqi civilians, who argue that its neutrality gives the UN 
added legitimacy.
 18   Canada and the New American Empire    19  The U.S. or the UN: A Choice for Canada
In his customarily wise and calm manner, Kofi Annan 
sized up the dilemma the United States found itself in:
I think that the message that comes through loud and 
clear, given reactions of other Member States, is that 
multilateralism is important for many States around 
the world, that for many States the United Nations is 
important, that the imprimatur of the United Nations 
– the legitimacy the United Nations offers – is important. 
I think that this is a very clear message, particularly for 
those who thought that the United Nations was dead and 
had no influence. I must admit to you that I did warn 
those who were bashing the United Nations that they had 
to be careful, because they might need the United Nations 
soon.1 
Canada–U.S. relations in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq reflect Canada’s perceived need to continue to support 
the primary role of the UN in authorizing the use of force to 
settle disputes, while at the same time avoiding antagonizing 
the Bush administration and risking devastating economic 
consequences. Immediately following the launch of the 
invasion of Iraq, Washington said it was “disappointed” with 
Canada’s refusal to participate. Facing ongoing trade disputes 
with the United States over softwood lumber, the mad cow 
crisis, and a steep decline in summer tourism revenues over 
the outbreak of SARS in Toronto, Chrétien carefully avoided 
criticizing American policy in Iraq.
There is clearly a growing concern among Canadians 
about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Polls revealed in 
June 2003 that only 63 per cent of Canadians viewed the 
United States favourably, down from 72 per cent a year earlier. 
The feeling was mutual, as the percentage of Americans who 
viewed Canada favourably dropped to 65 per cent from 85 per 
cent in 2002. Hostility towards the United States rose even 
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more dramatically in other states, particularly in the Muslim 
world. Growing concerns about the validity of U.S. and British 
intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs have only fuelled this 
growing resentment toward the United States, and Bush and 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair faced calls for a comprehensive 
investigation into charges that they may have deliberately 
manipulated information to justify war.
While other states have cited the need for a further 
UN resolution before peacekeepers can be sent, Canada’s 
reluctance appears to be at least in part the result of an over-
extended military, strained to its limits by the deployment 
of a large force to Afghanistan in the summer of 2003. To 
show its support for the United States (and the Iraqi people), 
Canada has committed some $100 million to aid in the 
reconstruction of Iraq. Furthermore, concern over relations 
with the Bush administration led the government on 30 May 
2003, to agree to begin negotiating its participation in the U.S. 
missile defence program. This came after putting off formal 
consultations for years amid concerns that the program could 
destabilize international security, in part by leading to the 
weaponization of space.
The handling of the Iraq war has clearly knocked Canada 
off balance in its longstanding juggling act trying to keep the 
U.S. and UN balls in the air at the same time. This juggling 
act is known in the trade as the internationalists vs. the conti-
nentalists. They are struggling anew for control of Canadian 
foreign policy. The UN route or the U.S. route? Which shall 
Canada follow? The question is not new, but the circumstances 
are, since U.S. dominance now threatens to emasculate the 
UN, which for Canada has always been a prime outlet for its 
foreign policy.
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The ‘Balance’ Strategy
There are many memoirs and analyses of the Canada–U.S. 
relationship emphasizing the historical difficulty for Canada 
to maintain a distinct foreign policy while living beside an 
economic giant which, given the chance, would smother 
Canada in a benign embrace. The cross-border disputes over 
fish, beef, lumber, wheat, and a host of commodities are legion. 
Canada’s economic and environmental dependence on U.S. 
good will toward us is certainly not new, as the long dispute 
over acid rain illustrated. The good will was substantially 
drawn upon in getting the U.S. Senate to agree to “fast track” 
negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement – which otherwise 
reluctant senators agreed to because Canada had agreed to 
test U.S. cruise missile delivery systems over its territory. The 
increasing integration of the two countries’ defence industries, 
making Canada unduly dependent on U.S. technology 
and equipment and the policy decisions that underpin this 
production, also illustrates the integral relationship.
U.S. administrations made it very clear throughout the 
Cold War that they expected Canada’s support on security 
policies. Canada allowed cruise missile testing, softened its 
call for a nuclear test ban, and supported the U.S. invasion 
of Grenada and Panama, not out of conviction, but because 
of U.S. determination. Prime Minister Trudeau’s 1983 peace 
initiative was doomed from the start through the derision of 
U.S. officials. U.S. antipathy to new approaches to human 
security has continued to constrain what should otherwise 
be Canadian promotion of the kind of international security 
regime that Canadian values have long espoused.
Canada supported its neighbour in 1991, when the United 
States pushed the UN Security Council into authorizing mili-
tary action against Iraq. When, without a UN mandate, the 
U.S.-led NATO bombed Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, Canada 
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played the faithful ally. So Canada is not above sublimating its 
UN values. But when the second Iraq war loomed, ostensibly 
over the issue of inspections but in reality to depose Saddam 
Hussein, Canada balked. No specific UN mandate, no war for 
Canada.
The “balance” strategy is embedded in Canadian foreign 
policy. The 1995 document, Canada in the World, spells it 
out:
The Government agrees that Canada intensify its efforts 
to advance the global disarmament and non-proliferation 
regime…. The United Nations continues to be the key 
vehicle for pursuing Canada’s global security objectives…. 
As an active member of NATO and a net contributor to 
overall Alliance Security, as a friend and neighbour of the 
United States and its partner in NORAD … Canada 
balances its Alliance obligations with its disarmament and 
non-proliferation goals.2
The “balance” argument presupposes that the United States 
will at least stay on an even keel. But the Bush Administration 
has plunged the United States into a new era in which domina-
tion is its clear goal. This domination is, of course, marketed 
as the route to peace for the world. The peace foreseen by 
the hard-right ideologues driving the Bush agenda is based 
on overwhelming military and economic power. This is the 
very kind of “Pax Americana” that President John F. Kennedy 
warned the American people against in 1963. But because the 
Bush Administration has been able to sell at least some of the 
world on the idea that the UN cannot keep the peace, the 
United States has presented itself as the new saviour.
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U.S. Policy on Nuclear Weapons
The National Security Strategy, which calls for pre-emptive 
attack against an opponent the U.S. Administration deems 
threatening, and the Nuclear Posture Review, which asserts 
that nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone of U.S. 
military doctrine, have turned upside down both the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime and the very processes of interna-
tional law.
The United States may still be a member of the United 
Nations, but it has turned its back on the multilateral world 
body. The Bush Administration has contempt for the UN. 
This ugly trait reveals itself in many global security issues but 
none more so than in the thorny questions surrounding the 
future of nuclear weapons.
The promises the United States made when the Non-
Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995 
– to participate actively in the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons – have become worthless. Under the guise of nuclear 
disarmament initiatives made in the Moscow Treaty of 
2002, the United States is retaining huge stocks, developing 
a new nuclear weapon, deflecting criticism for rejecting the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and rushing ahead with the 
development of a missile defence system, which many experts 
argue can only lead to the weaponization of space. The Nuclear 
Posture Review establishes expansive plans to revitalize U.S. 
nuclear forces, and all the systems and doctrines that support 
them, within a New Triad of capabilities that combine nuclear 
and conventional offensive strikes with missile defences and 
nuclear weapons infrastructure. The NPR assumes that nuclear 
weapons will be part of U.S. forces for at least the next fifty 
years. Ten U.S. senators, led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
of Massachusetts, have expressed “grave concern” about the 
widened U.S. rationale for the use of nuclear weapons.
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Faced with a constantly modernizing U.S. nuclear arsenal 
and new high tech systems of which missile defences are only 
one part, existing nuclear weapons states are likely to retain 
their nuclear stocks. And more states, seeing that nuclear 
weapons are the true currency of power, may follow India, 
Pakistan, and Israel’s recourse to acquiring nuclear weapons. 
The controversy over North Korea’s missile testing shows how 
precarious the non-proliferation regime is. The danger of a 
nuclear catastrophe grows.
That catastrophe may well be set off by terrorists. 
Immediately after September 11, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan went to Ground Zero in New York and said that, as 
horrible as the destruction was, it would have been much 
worse had the terrorists used nuclear devices. He called on 
nations to “re-double” efforts to implement fully the relevant 
treaties to stop the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction.
It is the lack of an enforceable convention to shut off the 
development and production of nuclear weapons and fissile 
materials that has resulted in the new risk of nuclear terrorism. 
There has been resolution after resolution at the UN for a 
Nuclear Weapons Convention; the resolutions actually pass 
with handsome majorities (although Canada has never voted 
in favour). Public opinion polls throughout the world show 
that people heavily favour the abolition of all nuclear weapons. 
But the United States and the other nuclear weapons states 
refuse to enter such negotiations, so determined are they to 
preserve their nuclear power. Now the world faces not only the 
traditional prospect of a nuclear war between states but the 
use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists who steal, or are given, 
nuclear materials. In this new age of suicidal mass terrorism, 
the threat of attacks using weapons of mass destruction has 
grown exponentially. Virtually all experts on the subject say 
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it is not a question of whether a massive attack will occur, but 
when.
The new U.S. policies have brought the world to a new 
moment regarding nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States 
has introduced the world to the Second Nuclear Age, and 
Russia is following quickly on U.S. heels. Instead of progress 
towards elimination, we are seeing the dismantling of the non-
proliferation regime, constructed so laboriously over the past 
three decades. NATO is caught up in this dismantling. And 
so is Canada.
Canada’s Nuclear Ambiguity
Foreign Minister Bill Graham is well aware of this new 
dilemma. It was Graham, after all, who chaired the 
Parliamentary Committee that, in 1998, recommended that 
Canada press NATO to review its nuclear policies. A review 
was started but it came to naught. Six NATO countries, 
Belgium, Greece, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and 
Turkey, which are classified as non-nuclear, actually have a 
total of 180 tactical U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on their 
soil. When the New Agenda Coalition3 submitted a resolution 
to the UN in 2002 calling for these tactical nuclear weapons 
to be included as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction 
and disarmament process, Canada abstained. However, in a 
courageous move, Graham authorized a yes vote on a New 
Agenda omnibus resolution, which reaffirmed the Thirteen 
Practical Steps for nuclear disarmament adopted at the NPT 
2000 Review. Canada was the only NATO country to vote in 
favour of the new resolution.
Canada would like to see the world rid itself of nuclear 
weapons. There is no doubt of that. But the government allows 
itself to remain in an incoherent posture: wearing its NPT 
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hat, Canada subscribes to the elimination of nuclear weapons; 
wearing its NATO hat, Canada stays loyal to NATO’s insist-
ence on the retention of nuclear weapons. The contradiction 
of Canada’s nuclear weapons policies going in two opposite 
directions at the same time is the direct result of Canada’s sub-
servience to U.S. nuclear polices. This ambiguity was clearly 
depicted by Project Ploughshares, a leading analytical NGO, 
which said:
Nearly sixty years after the advent of the nuclear age, 
Canada still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy 
toward nuclear weapons. The Canadian government rules 
out acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear 
proliferation, and asserts that “the only sustainable strat-
egy for the future is the elimination of nuclear weapons 
entirely.” But it also supports the continued possession of 
nuclear weapons by its allies, participates in a nuclear-
armed alliance, and endorses NATO’s plan to retain nu-
clear weapons “ for the foreseeable future.” The Canadian 
government continues to state that the defence of Canada 
must rely on the “nuclear umbrella” that the United States 
and other NATO allies have unfurled above this country, 
and it continues to provide both physical and political sup-
port for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while 
the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nu-
clear weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat 
those same weapons as a useful – even necessary – element 
of Canada’s defences and those of its allies.4
Now, as a result of U.S. policies, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
– the centrepiece of Canadian policy – is unravelling. A policy 
that was justified as “balanced” is now facilitating the collapse 
of the NPT and the undermining of the UN. Each day, the 
warning of the Canberra Commission, organized a few years 
ago by the Government of Australia, rings more true: “The 
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possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant 
stimulus to others to acquire them.” Jayantha Dhanapala, 
former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament 
Affairs, calls the gulf between declarations and deeds in 
nuclear disarmament “alarming.”
In this suddenly more perilous international system, what 
can Canada do?
A New International Initiative
The Canadian Pugwash Group, the Canadian branch of 
the international Pugwash movement, which won the 1995 
Nobel Peace Prize for its work on nuclear disarmament, has 
recommended that Canada launch what would be the nuclear 
equivalent of the “Ottawa Process” on landmines. Just as the 
initiative of the Government of Canada, in calling for an 
international conference, led to the Anti-Personnel Landmines 
Treaty, so too an international conference could put a world 
spotlight on a principal recommendation from the Final 
Document of the NPT 2000 Review: “… the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the 
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”5
An international conference on nuclear dangers is the origi-
nal idea of Kofi Annan. He needs a credible state to host it. In 
holding such a conference, to which all the governments of the 
world would be invited, including India, Pakistan, and Israel, 
which do not belong to the NPT, the Government of Canada 
would contribute greatly to strengthening the role of the UN 
in nuclear disarmament. Such a concerted effort would ad-
vance another important Canadian objective: strengthening 
the legal regime that underpins the multilateral system. This 
concentrated attention on the objective of nuclear disarmament 
– the elimination of nuclear weapons – would re-focus the at-
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tention of the public in a truly constructive way. If Sweden 
can sponsor a new International Commission on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, headed by Hans Blix (an action announced 
in July 2003), why cannot Canada sponsor an international 
conference to review its findings?
Advancing such a policy may well incur the displeasure, if 
not the hostility, of the United States. But Pugwash argues:
It must be explained that the object of the policy is not 
to counter the U.S., but to advance Canadian interests 
in breaking out of the incoherent posture we and NATO 
are now in, and also to save the legal regime for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. It is entirely proper for a 
friendly neighbour to point out to the U.S. that its nuclear 
weapons policies must implement legal commitments.6
Naturally, no one conference can by itself resolve the nu-
clear weapons crisis. The work of implementing all Thirteen 
Practical Steps must go on. But the conference would be 
a method of stimulating renewed international energy. 
Canadian leadership at this moment would be realistic as well 
as courageous.
It is the new extreme actions of the United States that 
render Canada’s “balance” approach outdated. Canadians 
must understand how deeply the terrorist attack of September 
11 has affected the American psyche. It has produced a fortress 
mentality and a new conviction that only the United States 
can enforce international law and order. The right-wing core 
of the Bush Administration is using this fear of terrorism to 
undermine the UN; it wants to render it toothless, to reduce it 
to a global welfare agency carrying out the orders of the United 
States. This destruction of the UN’s primary role to maintain 
peace and security in the world will pose the gravest challenge 
to Canadian foreign policy in the history of Canada–U.S. 
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relations. The struggle inside Ottawa – about which way to go, 
with the United States or the UN – will be fierce.
A continued attempt to maintain a “balance” will paralyze 
Canada’s foreign policy over the security issues that are at the 
core of the UN. To keep the Bush Administration happy, 
Canada will have to swallow its values. The new Conservative 
Party will be glad to see this happen and so will the right-wing 
press. They do not share the values of the UN system as the 
heart of law and order in the new world. They want more of 
“Pax Americana.” These voices are very loud in Canada and 
constantly inhibit politicians and government officials who 
would like to uphold UN values.
The composition of the Cabinet and the assessment of the 
situation by Canada’s prime minister will determine whether 
Canada will stand up for UN values or cozy up to the United 
States for the sake of good relations. Lester B. Pearson made 
his choice for the UN. Brian Mulroney stayed with the United 
States. Jean Chrétien has tried to be both an internationalist 
and a continentalist. Now the spotlight falls on Paul Martin. 
An astute and highly experienced politician, Paul Martin’s 
inclinations may well be to put a foot in both camps. But the 
Bush Administration will test him early on – to determine if he 
is “with us or against us.”
Martin will inherit a new team of managers installed in 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
immediately after the U.S.-Canada fallout from the Iraq war. 
The instructions they received were to get the relationship back 
on track. The continentalists argue that Canada simply cannot 
afford to have the United States mad at it. The internationalists 
argue that Canada cannot effectively cede its sovereignty to the 
United States and still remain a country. Who does Canada 
need more: the United States or the UN? The resolution of 
that agonizing question will not be done by the managers but 
by the prime minister himself.
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Paul Martin brings to office the internationalist credentials 
inherited from his father, Paul Martin Sr., one of the great 
“international” Canadians of the past. He also understands the 
continentalist argument well and, as a former finance minister, 
knows where Canada’s bread and butter lies. Although Martin 
was somewhat reluctant to make his policy preferences clear 
while Chrétien was still prime minister, a speech delivered 30 
April 2003 entitled “Canada’s Role in a Complex World” does 
give some clues. In the speech, Martin adopts the cautious 
approach favoured by Chrétien and characterizes the crisis 
over Iraq as a failure “of the international community to 
forge a shared consensus,” sidestepping the crucial role of the 
United States in preventing any consensus from emerging. 
Other speeches have revealed Martin’s support for Canadian 
participation in the U.S. missile defence program, and his 
willingness to engage the Canadian military in operations 
outside of the authorization of the UN Security Council, when 
such operations are based on Canadian values. However, he 
has also shown his support of UN initiatives to end the worst 
forms of poverty and declared a willingness to take account 
of the opinions of caucus, some of whom oppose Canadian 
participation in missile defence, when formulating policy. As 
prime minister, Martin will be forced to more fully expose his 
position on this essential debate between the continentalist 
and internationalist approaches.
This will not be just a struggle for Ottawa mandarins, 
the Liberal caucus, or even the prime minister to sort out. 
This struggle will be for the soul of Canada. It will play out 
directly on the steps Canada takes – or does not take – to build 
the conditions for enduring peace in the world. Kofi Annan 
believes that the world has entered a “crisis of the international 
system,” and wants this debated by world leaders. In this 
debate, Canada’s vision must go far beyond Canada–U.S. 
relations and analyze anew world values for peace. Nothing in 
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our past will equal the importance of the looming showdown 
on values. The public will be deeply involved, and future 
elections may be fought on the issue. The future foreign policy 
of Canada will become domestic policy of the highest order.
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CANADIAN MASS MEDIA AND THE 
MIDDLE EAST
Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael
In a recent study on the Canadian media’s portrayal of 
Muslims and Arabs in Canada and the Middle East following 
the terrorists attacks in the United States on  September 11th, 
and the subsequent U.S. “war on terrorism,” we were amazed 
by the sheer volume of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and anti-
dissent materials and opinions contained within mainstream 
media.1 Long-standing Canadian commitments to democracy, 
multiculturalism, tolerance of dissent, and multinational 
efforts for the maintenance of peace and security seemed to 
have been abandoned in the emotive response to September 11. 
However, the bias may be more systemic than that, as coverage 
of Iraq in the main press reflects similar stereotypes and bias. 
An example is an article in CanWest Global’s National Post 
on 14 April 2003, by Mark Steyn, stating that, as a result of 
American involvement, “Iraq will be, at bare minimum, the 
least worst governed state in the Arab world, at best, pleasant, 
civilized and thriving.” Many such core stereotypical images 
were found in the Canadian press justifying war against Iraq.2
It is generally understood that a main function of the news 
media is to inform the public about current events in the world. 
The role of informant, however, is not neutral. The media 
filters information about current events through an ideological 
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matrix. Media bias and self-censorship arise from internalized 
pre-conceptions, pre-selection of the “right-thinking” people, 
and the adaptation of reporters and commentators to the 
realities of ownership constraints based on corporate and 
political centres of power.3 This paper explores the nature 
of the filter that informs the media’s coverage of the Middle 
East.
The Canadian media relies heavily on its American 
counterparts for acquiring and reporting news, as well as on 
global newswire services like the British Reuters, the French 
Agence France-Presse, and the American Associated Press and 
United Press International. These four news agencies account 
for more than 80 per cent of international news. The two 
American wire services in particular, while they operate 
internationally, remain subject to American organizational 
and political pressures.4 Thus, foreign news content in the 
Canadian press is, more often than not, a reproduction of 
the American news wires and reports from the New York 
Times, The Los Angeles Times, Cox News, Knight Rider, and 
Scripps Howard. Dependence on foreign news content can 
be attributed to the insignificant presence of the Canadian 
press in foreign countries. This becomes critical when 
American foreign reports cover regions in which the American 
administration has a strong interest, such as the Middle East. 
In this situation the Canadian consumer receives an almost 
unadulterated American version of the event depicted as fact 
and reality.5 The production of news is never value-free; news 
does not just happen; ideas and pictures represent reality 
through an interpretive lens that filters information through 
a preset paradigm.
The journalist reduces a complex and unmanageable 
reality into a story or news material according to tacitly agreed 
upon rules, and in so doing, he or she communicates the core 
context of the pre-conceptions, prevalent ideas and the implicit 
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assumptions of the larger society, or a particular sector of that 
society. The core context, here, refers to the paradigm setting, 
its place in reality, and the implicit values and the attitudes it 
promotes.6 Through its reliance on American news services, 
Canadian coverage of foreign affairs implicitly promotes 
American foreign policy objectives. For example, in covering 
the 1982 and 1984 elections in El Salvador, the Canadian 
media portrayed the elections in essentially the same terms as 
the American press. In reporting the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
the Globe and Mail, and the Toronto Star depended largely on 
the American news services and missed the opportunity to 
report on the Canadian angle of the revolution.7
In 2003 the American government strictly controlled the 
media coverage of the war in Iraq by sponsoring “embedded” 
journalists to follow the “coalition of the willing” forces. This 
is evidence of an American policy directly affecting the ability 
of foreign states, in this case Canadian, to report the war. 
According to one Canadian reporter, journalists from states 
that opposed the war were denied access to the war zone. 
The military command referred to independent journalists 
as “unilaterals,” while “embedded journalists [were] given 
exclusive access to the war.” In an online essay for the CBC, 
“unilateral” reporter Paul Workman argued that, by “keeping 
‘unilateral’ journalists out of Iraq, the Americans have succeeded 
in reducing independent reporting of the war, and I believe 
this was exactly their plan from the beginning.”8 Of course, 
there is little Canadian news agencies could do to change the 
policy of the American and British military. Considering that 
the only journalists with access to the war were “embedded” 
journalists picked by the Pentagon, the world relied on two 
sorts of coverage: the “embedded” journalists with access 
and those reporting on the war from a distance. The CBC 
reported that there were a thousand reporters, producers, and 
technicians from around the world who were not allowed into 
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Northern Kuwait or Iraq to report on the war and were forced 
to do their work from Kuwait City. This means that Canadian 
news coverage relied on the official narrative, with limited 
opportunity or ability to provide alternative interpretations 
or questions about the war’s development. This was seldom 
mentioned or debated in the Canadian reportage of the war.
Exacerbating this, the Canadian mass media has 
progressively moved towards concentration in conglomerates. 
Media barons argue that, as mass media fall into fewer hands, 
monopoly media markets emerge with more money to invest in 
quality reportage and more power to withstand pressure from 
advertisers who might wish to exercise editorial influence. This 
is contrary to the core arguments in favour of a free press, which 
maintain that competition breeds choices that are threatened 
by mergers and acquisitions. A free press is designed to allow 
for the expression of divergent views about single events or 
issues, and this helps to ensure that the news media can 
never be exploited for a private purpose. However, whatever 
the argument for or against media conglomerates, the fact is 
that the media are the gatekeepers of information, and what 
passes through these gates enters into the public consciousness 
and becomes part of the collective memory. It follows that 
the more avenues that are open to diverse representations of 
news, the more media, as an institution, will represent diverse 
values and dissenting views within a multicultural society.9 
Furthermore, the news media serves as a representation of 
the truth, meaning that the more these representations are 
streamlined into one or two acceptable interpretations, the 
more there is a limitation of the ability for public debate and 
discourse, two necessary activities for a viable democracy. A 
centralized and concentrated media has the effect of limiting 
the public space available for individuals to question what they 
see in the media, and consequently define for themselves the 
world around them: the cornerstone of a healthy democracy.
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The concentration of Canada’s mass media is evidenced 
in several communication empires. The major players are 
CanWest Global, Bell Globemedia, Rogers Communications 
Inc., Quebecor Inc., and Le Groupe Videotron. A focus on 
the first two illustrates the pitfalls of media concentration. The 
Asper family owns 45 per cent of CanWest Global. CanWest 
Global has operations in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Ireland. In July 2000, CanWest signed a $3.5-billion 
deal to purchase a Hollinger-owned controlling interest in 
the Southam newspaper chain, including all of its newspapers, 
magazines, and Internet assets. The Hollinger acquisition gave 
CanWest overlapping television and newspaper coverage in 
twenty-five out of twenty-six markets, with a 35 per cent share 
of the Canadian advertising market. The purchase included 
15 metropolitan papers and 126 community newspapers. 
The group covers TV broadcasting that reaches 94 per cent 
of English-speaking Canada and engages in other related 
information activities like radio, TV production, advertising, 
distribution, and multimedia.10
Following this CanWest acquisition, professor David 
Spencer, an expert on newspaper history, said that the deal had 
serious implications for democratic discourse and added that 
he was convinced that there was a need for strong counter-
voices to behave much like a parliamentary opposition to keep 
“those folks on their toes, and we just do not have it.”11 In 
an operating system of free presses, these voices are supposed 
to be coming from alternate news services and mediums. 
The late Mr. Asper, former executive chairman of CanWest 
Global Communications, expressed candidly his opinions on 
a number of issues in the weekly program Eye on Media. Mr. 
Asper found his critics “blind, one eyed critics”; “CTV has gone 
out of its way to slag and smash and denigrate Global”; “CBC 
is dangerous, has become a state within a state and should be 
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expunged”; and the “CRTC must be reformed because license 
renewal is utterly archaic.”12
The other media giant is Bell Globemedia, based in 
Toronto. Bell Canada Enterprises owns 70 per cent, while 
the Thomson family has the other 30 per cent. Much like 
CanWest, it encompasses national commercial TV, multimedia, 
national newspapers, and Internet services. CTV is the largest 
commercial television network, with wholly owned stations 
covering 80 per cent of the Canadian market. Bell Globemedia 
also owns CTV specialty channels that slice out as much as 
half of the Canadian market, in addition to the Globe and 
Mail, which is the nation’s largest newspaper. This media giant 
employs four thousand people and generates some $4.3-billion 
revenue, most of it through the Bell Canada arm.13
Concerns about homogenization of news were voiced “loud 
and clear” as a result of the duopoly of the Canadian media 
system. An October 2001 survey, conducted by the University 
of British Columbia, on the impact of ownership on content 
looked specifically at CanWest Global and Bell Globemedia. 
The results of the survey are indicative, though not conclusive, 
because the survey compared only the National Post 
(newspaper) and Global National (TV channel) from CanWest 
with the Globe and Mail (newspaper) and CTV News from Bell 
Globemedia in a relatively short collection period of only four 
weeks (between October and November 2001). Nevertheless, 
the study indicated that there was more cross-promotion and 
convergence of news among the properties of CanWest Global 
than among those of Bell Globemedia.14
The findings might not be surprising because the factor of 
proprietorship in CanWest bears significantly on policy, content, 
and reportage. The late Mr. Asper, by his admission, was a “hands-
on” owner. News reporting reflects not only pre-conceived ideas 
and values but also the implicit assumptions of what is “normal” 
in the cultural setting of the reportage and the professional 
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communication environment. Mr. Asper, unlike Bell Canada, 
was vociferous about his views on the culture of the Middle 
East, the Israeli–Palestinian problem and about his pride in 
supporting Israeli policies and passionately decrying its critics. 
News coverage in his papers reflected his views and reinforced 
his policy of news convergence to get his message across 
amongst the Canadian public.
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC) serves as the national regulator of 
the telecommunications industry. In July 2003, it called for 
comments on a list of fifteen proposed new ethnic satellite 
channels to be offered in Canada before approving the licenses. 
The application for Al-Jazeera, the Arab news channel based 
in Qatar and broadcast to North America from Rome, caused 
the most controversy. The Canadian Jewish Congress, through 
its president and head of the Quebec region branch, referred 
to the station as “Osama bin Laden’s bullhorn to the world,” 
arguing that it is “virulently anti-Semitic and racist, and likely 
to contravene Canadian law.” Writing in the Globe and Mail, 
John Doyle concludes:
It would be best if we could all judge for ourselves. There 
are laws that govern broadcasting and there are hate laws 
in Canada. If Al-Jazeera is available here, as it should 
be, it can be measured against those laws and its carri-
ers in Canada punished if those laws and regulations are 
broken.15
While Al-Jazeera certainly holds different interpretations of the 
world, specifically the war in Iraq and the “war on terrorism,” 
this should not be cause for alarm in a multicultural and open 
society. This hesitation is perhaps a signal that alternative 
viewpoints have become less acceptable in the mainstream 
Canadian mass media market. CanWest Global journalist 
Les MacPherson echoed the calls of the Canadian Jewish 
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Congress, claiming, “Al-Jazeera is blatantly anti-American 
and anti-Israel.”16 To take only the “anti-Israel” claim: the 
Israel–Palestinian conflict is a difficult and emotional issue and 
is certainly not settled. Large sections of Canada’s population 
remain committed to the idea of Palestinian liberation. 
Certainly Canada can handle differing interpretations of the 
current violence in the region. In addition, Al-Jazeera provides 
an alternative source for world news and representations of the 
truth that a healthy democracy depends upon.
In sum, the Canadian mass media provides the primary 
interpretation, not only of the events that take place in the 
world, but also of issues that are critical to consensus. Mass 
media operates as a cultural guide to norms and understandings, 
and it is through these that enemies are defined for the public. 
Examples of critical matters defined by the mass media are: 
the right to power, legitimate use of violence, illegitimate 
opposition to order, and accepted hierarchies among nations. 
Within Canadian media, references to the war in Iraq 
have tended to unilaterally defend the American war while 
discrediting its opposition by labelling those participating in 
Iraqi resistance as “Saddam loyalists,” “terrorists,” “Baathists,” 
or those “opposed to freedom,” as President Bush likes to 
say. The wholesale acceptance by Canada’s biggest news 
conglomerates of these loaded terms limits the ability for 
Canadians to foster alternative and independent viewpoints 
of the situation in Iraq. The media engineers consensus on 
the basis of the global media narrative. However, Canadian 
newspapers are so absorbed into the global narrative that, 
during the hostage-taking crisis in Beirut in the later 1980s 
and early 1990s, they paid less attention to the Canadian than 
to the American and British hostages.17
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Middle East Reportage 
in the Canadian Media
Although Canada has never been an imperial power, 
nor a colonizing force, it inherited the British legacy of 
inter-cultural power discourse that is commonly referred to as 
Orientalism. The fact that Canadian society is premised on 
multiculturalism does not obviate an ingrained bias that views 
Canadians as having British values and customs while allowing 
immigrants to celebrate their past culture on certain occasions, 
in a formalized manner, after which everyone goes back to the 
normal way, or the British way.
Burdened by the persistence of British ethnocentrism, most 
Euro-Canadians tend to identify themselves by contrast with 
non-Euro-Canadians, like the Native people and immigrants 
that constitute the “other” from the Canadian self. The “other” 
is an imaginary category that is built from stereotypes that 
maintain the status quo without factual reference to the actual 
identity of the imagined “other.”18
The inter-cultural discourse between a powerful colonizer 
and a powerless colony underlies the concept of Orientalism, 
which necessarily emerged and became normal during the 
era of Imperialism in the nineteenth century. The roots of 
Orientalism go back centuries, from the epoch of the Crusades 
and onward. Europeans, in writing about the Middle East and 
its formative force, Islam, in the thirteenth century, combined 
wholly inconsistent passages, even extremes of accuracy and 
inaccuracy for amusement, instruction, and controversy. Even 
the best-informed minds in that period failed to discriminate 
between reliable and unreliable sources, combined conflicting 
material, and sometimes preferred the poorest.19 The writings 
on Islam spread the idea that Islam was “a religion of outward 
forms, the virtuous actions of Muslims were vain, and 
they could not avail to salvation because in the mediaeval 
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consciousness Islam was not as edifying as Christianity.”20 The 
Christian medieval canon on Islam survived the Enlightenment 
and passed to the age of colonization and imperialism to form 
a congruent and neat underpinning of the power discourse 
in Orientalism that characterizes the cultures of Europe and 
North America.
The essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and 
practice are premised on an inherited set of past structures 
that were secularized and reformed by disciplines such as 
philology, which in turn were modernized and naturalized 
substitutes for the supernaturalism of medieval Christian 
understanding. The Christian religious paradigms of human 
history, encounters with the Muslim east and destiny, were not 
expunged from Orientalist texts. The religious patterns were 
simply redeployed and redistributed in a secular framework. 
First, colonization brought geographic expansion that 
augmented the biblical frame of reference. Second, there was a 
historical self-confrontation, which meant that understanding 
Europe meant also understanding the objective relations 
between Europe and its previously temporal and cultural 
frontiers. Third, character-designation, as a physiological-
moral classification gathered power. In the nineteenth century 
it became a genetic type that enhanced moral generalization. 
In this way, it became possible to refer to the Oriental in his 
“primitive state,” “backward” conditions, or “violent” spirit, 
and furnished a creative and unflagging source of stereotypes 
that posited the West in a superior position and sustained that 
myth into the new millennium.21
The popular image fashioned by Orientalism of the “dirty 
Arab,” amply illustrated with the unphotogenic image of 
Yasser Arafat, competes in the media with the more photogenic 
image of Saddam Hussein, who personified the uncivilized, 
unscrupulous, immoral, and sadistic character of “the dirty 
Arab.” In American discourse on both the Palestinian-Israeli 
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conflict and Iraq, these images are used in the place of a serious 
analysis of the context of violence and conflict. In the lead-up 
to the American invasion of Iraq, for example, the portrait 
of Saddam Hussein was overtly used by the White House 
to obfuscate the unilateralism versus multilateralism debate 
raging in the Security Council. These images also reverberated 
in Canadian newspapers. In this Orientalist polemic and 
imagery, the Arab, the Middle East, and Muslims in general 
are fixed as transgressors of peace and security in an otherwise 
civilized world of law and order.22
The structure and development of Orientalism took place 
in the world of European academia and then passed to North 
America. As such, the concepts and the associated imagery of 
the “other” versus “us” has pervaded North American culture 
at various levels through the vehicle of the mass media. The 
media “raided the cupboard of Orientalism for alimentation, 
picking up old prejudice and bits of morbid information” in 
their pursuit of engineering consensus amongst people whose 
receptive pre-disposition derives from a British cultural legacy 
of superiority and bias.23 The media employ stereotypes that 
derive from structured concepts of Orientalism and continue 
to define an image of the “other,” that sustains a self-image of 
superiority.
During the expanded “war on terror” and the American-led 
war in Iraq, similar terms describing the people of the region 
remained pre-eminent. Specifically, following the declaration 
of victory by U.S. President George W. Bush, the Canadian 
media began referring to those resisting U.S. occupation 
as “suicidal Arabs,” “insurgents,” “terrorists,” “Baathists,” 
and “the kind of savages the allies are fighting.” Clearly, the 
language used is not unbiased. Similarly, although Canada was 
not a party to war and opposed it diplomatically, Canadian 
media referred to the U.S.-led military force as the “allies” or 
“coalition forces” and preferred the term “nation-building” to 
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occupation. Furthermore, the media presented an image of 
Iraq centred on the image of Saddam Hussein: brutal, corrupt, 
dictatorial, and inhumane. The images of Saddam’s numerous 
and opulent palaces ran beside pictures of the “looting” Iraqis, 
and, following the assassinations of Hussein’s sons, the media 
became obsessed with the use of bounties to gain the assistance 
of local Iraqis. Referring to “post-Saddam Iraq,” the media 
consistently used the terms “de-Baathification,” “Iraqization of 
the new Iraq,” and “grinding war of pacification” and adopted 
the term “hunting” to describe the war’s new techniques. 
While it would be unfair to argue that the Canadian media 
did not participate in a wider debate about the occupation of 
Iraq, the debate was centred on how long, or simply how, to 
occupy the country, avoiding the larger questions of its legality 
and morality.
Thus we find basic clusters of thematic stereotypes about 
the Arabs, the Middle East, and Islam that came into more 
intensive circulation after the rise in oil prices in 1974 and 
following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Basic stereotypes 
are the core reservoir of images that the mainstream media 
(including their affiliates of “experts” and pundits) use to 
generate specific rhetoric for a specific event. Stereotyping 
functions as an ongoing cementing of the legitimization 
process of the ideological structure and simultaneously justifies 
a certain policy drawn to deal with any given event. In doing 
so, the analytical context of the event, as well as different or 
oppositional views, are usually omitted or slighted. The public 
is generally left with one resonating dominant discourse from 
the media.24 In 1986, the stereotypical cluster of themes that 
framed mass media references to the Arabs, Islam, and the 
Middle East – all cognitively linked – were observed to be as 
follows.25
 1. The representation of Arab Muslim states in the 
Middle East as networks of terrorists; and terrorism 
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as congenital and unrelated to political conflict, or 
long-standing grievances derived from prior violent 
intervention;
 2. The reduction of Islamic discourse to extremist fun-
damentalist doctrines advocating political violence 
and repression of human rights;
 3. The dissociation of outbreaks of violence in the 
Middle East from their historical and political 
context, associating these with ethnic and religious 
diversity;
 4. The association of civilization and democracy in 
the Middle East with Israel, while neglecting its sys-
tematic violation of human rights, Security Council 
resolutions, and international law;
 5. The equation of Arab opposition to Israel with anti-
Semitism.
Combinations and permutations of these themes constructed 
the mainstream media portrayal of events in the Middle East, 
adding in time more evocative images to the imaginings of 
Orientalism. In addition to the ‘fabulously wealthy barbaric 
Arab,’ there emerged the ‘sex maniac with penchant for white 
slavery’ and the ‘naturally predisposed terrorists.’ The media 
employ such evocative phrases to build the frame of reference 
in which the Western audiences internalize the essence of the 
Arabs and their culture. The intermingling of the stereotypes 
generates the understanding that violence in the region is 
linked to the nature of Islam and its adherents; this image 
in turn dovetails into the Arabs as indolent, oversexed, and 
brutish sheiks who misused their oil wealth in the pursuit of 
worldly pleasures and/or fanatical power. This exposition of 
the Arabs is frequently juxtaposed against the technological, 
cultural, and intellectual superiority of the West.26
A kaleidoscope of the same stereotypical themes has been in 
place for more than two decades. However, after the tragedy of 
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September 11 when the American media’s rallying cry (which 
the Canadian media echoed) became one of war on terrorism 
and terrorists, these stereotypes were overtly legitimized by 
those with power and authority to set public discourse. While 
the U.S. or Canadian media are not monolithic, dissenting 
views from the main Orientalist discourse are few and usually 
buried in the avalanche of consensus-manufacturing articles 
and op-eds. For example, right after September 11, Eric 
Margolis, an internationally syndicated columnist who writes 
in the Toronto Sun, was invited by “Bynon” on cable channel 
49 (Prime Time) to talk on the event. Based on his knowledge 
of Afghanistan, he maintained that neither the resources of 
Osama bin Laden nor the tribal mentality of the Taliban could 
have orchestrated such a sophisticated act. He was not invited 
back.
In the wake of 9/11, the mainstream media accepted 
the U.S. government’s version at face value and voluntarily 
censored any critical investigation of the event. Such absence 
of scrutiny underlines the impact of the media propaganda in 
filtering information to the public and blocking the process 
of public scrutiny. In contrast, in Europe there has been more 
than one attempt to raise penetrating questions about the 
validity and authenticity of the evidence presented by the U.S. 
government.27 The contrast became manifest in the Security 
Council debates over the passage of a resolution to sanction the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq. Contrary to its usual alignment with the 
United States on Middle East policy, and to the chagrin of the 
United States, Canada was an active participant in the debate. 
The Canadian public broadcasting service (CBC), both radio 
and television, provided a forum for the public airing of all 
stakeholders in the debate to enlighten the Canadian public 
fully on the issues involved and their multifaceted implications. 
However, this kind of scrutiny has not carried over to the post-
invasion situation in Iraq. Like Afghanistan, events in Iraq are 
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detached from their context and from policy. To illustrate my 
point, we quote from a recent email sent by a colleague:
I talked this morning to my sister [in Baghdad] for about a 
half hour. She told me stories you cannot believe. She wept 
and was so demoralized. Being a doctor and a humanist, 
she felt that she would never see such a thing done by any 
occupier. American troops going to houses, throwing people 
out, pillaging, stealing, and shooting if they feel like it! 
Abu Dhabi, Al-Jazeera, and other TV and radio stations 
reported on these. She said even their reports are very 
unusual as they state it in the most blatant terms.
There has been a virtual blackout in North America of any 
critical news stories coming out of Iraq. The core context for 
the war remains, unquestioned and unscathed: that the U.S.-
led war in Iraq is a war of liberation and a democratic mission to 
bring peace and freedom to a troubled region. Through design 
or circumstance, the Canadian news media have forgone their 
responsibility to Canadians to be a critical, responsible, and 
independent window to the world.
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THE JOHN WAYNE FALLACY: HOW 
LOGIC CAN HELP US LOSE OUR 
FAITH IN VIOLENCE
Trudy Govier
Among the many factors that contribute to our acceptance of 
war and violence is bad logic. This claim may seem surprising, 
in the light of other notorious causes of political violence such 
as greed, competition for power and domination, racism, social 
inequality, and imperialism. Feelings of fear, humiliation, 
resentment, and revenge are also powerful factors; so too 
are religious differences and value disagreements about 
justice, democracy, and freedom. Many factors influence 
our acceptance of the recourse to physical violence, but in 
all this, our reasoning matters too. It plays a central role in 
the arguments we use to justify policies and actions. There 
is an abundance of careless argument and faulty logic in our 
reflections about physical violence. Not only do leaders and 
pundits use and repeat bad arguments when seeking to justify 
violence to the public, members of the public often swallow 
the discourse uncritically, reproducing the fallacies with fatal 
effect.
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The John Wayne Fallacy1
A major problem with our thinking about violence is the 
highly unrealistic nature of expectations about what it can 
accomplish. Among the many sources of this error is the fact 
that our expectations come more from dramatic narratives 
than from life itself. Think, for instance, of western movies. 
Plots are structured around a competition between the Good 
Guys and the Bad Guys. As these stories are told, the Bad 
Guys, who are truly and fully bad (no ambiguities here), have 
caused some sort of problem that has to be solved. A quick and 
efficient solution is needed. The Good Guys will have to win 
a victory over the Bad Guys in a violent struggle, after which 
they will eliminate the Bad Guys, preferably by killing them 
off. The physical violence of the struggle makes for drama 
and excitement, and the victory of the Good Guys provides 
a satisfying and tidy end to the story. In a typical final scene, 
the Good Guy, in the person of John Wayne or some similarly 
masculine type, stands victorious holding his rifle at his side. 
Or he strides triumphantly off into an orange and pink sunset 
– the implication being that he is leaving a much better world 
behind him.
It’s a stark struggle between Good and Bad and the moral 
of the story is clear: the Good are entitled to use physical vio-
lence against the Bad and they can win a moral victory, and 
solve a serious Problem when they do. That’s conflict at the 
movies.
The basic dichotomy between good and bad or good and 
evil needs to be questioned – and we’ll come to that point later. 
But first let’s scrutinize the tidy ending. The narrative ends at 
the point of victory, when the conquering hero has supposedly 
made his world happy and safe. But in real life – as distinct 
from the movies – there are serious after-effects when physi-
cal violence is used.2 War, terrorism, and violent revolution 
 52   Canada and the New American Empire    53  The John Wayne Fallacy
are notoriously painful in appalling ways. People are killed 
and injured, usually in strikingly large numbers, and many 
suffer terribly. The resentment and hatred in survivors propels 
quests for retaliation and revenge; thus violence has a decided 
tendency to provoke more of itself. Needed facilities for water, 
sewage, medical treatment, schools, and power generation are 
disrupted, with the result that millions of vulnerable people 
lack necessities of modern life. Physical and cultural environ-
ments are seriously damaged. Economies are shattered. The 
people who live through all this are real human beings, not 
characters on a screen.
John Wayne and the other heroes of violent drama never 
have to clean up after the struggle. Movies never show the great 
masculine heroes removing debris, treating the sick and in-
jured, rebuilding hospitals, schools, highways, and bridges, or 
restoring power lines and factories – much less facing tasks of 
reconciliation so that coexistence becomes possible. Dramatic 
narratives have form, form that is lacking in life itself. People 
write narratives and among their narratives are these standard 
scripts, which move to a tidy ending and omit the mess of re-
construction. In the real world, violent struggles do not end 
neatly. The aftermath of violence is nearly always a situation 
in which injured, frightened, starving, and furious people try 
to cope with dislocation and hunger while warding off attacks 
from the victorious.
Forgetting about the aftermath might be all right if you’re 
writing scripts, but it’s desperately misleading if you’re think-
ing how to resolve a serious political conflict. The John Wayne 
fallacy occurs when we assume life will be like the movies and 
infer that once the militarily victorious party has triumphed, 
there will be no further problems. The faulty comparison and 
its implication that the aftermath is nothing make violence 
look good. Media coverage of conflicts tends to contribute to 
the John Wayne fallacy, because when the drama and excite-
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ment of the physical adventure end, coverage stops.3 Rarely if 
ever do we read reports about grieving relatives, struggling 
doctors and teachers, UN peacekeepers trying to monitor wob-
bly borders, shaky ceasefires, and devastated hospitals. Just a 
little common sense should tell us that killing and generalized, 
authorized mayhem will produce an awful mess in physical 
and human terms. But there is little to encourage us to reflect 
on such facts and much to distract us. So we don’t reflect. It’s 
a big mistake.
False Dichotomies
False dichotomies are another aspect of stereotypical narratives 
of conflict. A dichotomy, of course, is a binary opposition; 
a false dichotomy is what you get when you treat such an 
opposition as purely and simply binary, even though it’s not.4 
To see this, think of some binary contrasts: good/evil; friend/
enemy; beautiful/ugly; fat/thin. In dichotomous thinking, 
what is good is not bad and what is bad is not good. He who 
is friend is not enemy, and he who is enemy is not friend. It all 
seems trite, but reasonable. Call these oppositions contraries.5 
We couldn’t get along without contraries because distinctions 
are essential for language and logic. But contraries can be 
problematic in some deep ways, because we so easily turn 
them into contradictories. We begin to think of the binary 
oppositions as exhaustive, when they are not. Take “beautiful” 
and “ugly,” for example. Obviously, many people and many 
things are neither beautiful nor ugly, but something in between. 
The same can be said of “fat” and “thin” and – to more closely 
approach the situation of conflict – “friend” and “enemy.” Your 
friend is not your enemy and your enemy is not your friend 
– but many people are neither friend nor enemy. To believe 
otherwise is to engage in paranoiac thinking and step along a 
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route to insanity. For all these contrary predicates, there is an 
important middle range of indeterminacies, borderline cases, 
and ambiguities.
We too easily distort spectrum concepts so as to omit that 
middle range. We use our concepts to mark the extreme ends 
of the spectrum and neglect to consider the substantial middle. 
President George W. Bush’s statement, shortly after the attacks 
of September 11th, that “you are either with us or with the 
terrorists” is a classic example of a false dichotomy. It was a 
rhetorical attempt to structure the world into Good and Evil, 
leaving honest intellectuals and skeptics no place to stand.
The idea that the Bad Guys are worse than Bad, being, 
in fact, Evil, and even members of an Axis of Evil, supports 
an especially insidious polarization. The term “evil” is so 
strong that we are highly unlikely to accept that it has any 
application to our own side. (“I might have a fault or two, I 
might have done some bad things on occasion, I might have a 
few flaws of character, sure; but I would never actually be evil 
– and the same is true for my group and my nation. Mistakes 
maybe, sins occasionally, but evil? Never.”) The rhetoric of the 
Bush administration implies a dangerously distorted picture 
of a world polarized between good and evil. Not only do the 
theological overtones of the flawed logic suggest a need for a 
Crusade or Holy War, the emotional overtones of the word 
“evil” are strong enough to create enemies by themselves. 
In fact, the defence analyst Gwynne Dyer explained North 
Korea’s nuclear threats in just this way, interpreting them 
as a result of that country’s shocked anger at suddenly being 
made a member of an “axis of evil.”6 Stark and exaggerated 
dichotomies of good and evil, friend and enemy, can polarize 
reality as well as thought. When we think in false dichotomies 
of either/ors, we over-simplify and fail to consider the neither/
nors – instances of ambiguity, complexity, indeterminacy that 
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for various reasons fall in the middle of spectrum we have 
severed into two poles.
False dichotomies don’t always concern our classifications 
of people and things. There are plenty of false dichotomies 
regarding action and policy. In this context, false dichotomies 
take the form of failing to consider alternatives. People, 
including even many well-educated policy analysts, are so 
ready to assume we face the stark choice between responding 
with violence and doing nothing at all. “Well what are you 
going to do? Just sit there?” people will ask, expecting and 
hoping that the critics of violence can provide no answer. They 
assume that if we reject violence, we will do nothing at all.
But the argument based on omitting alternatives is a kind 
of manipulation. Alternatives do exist. It’s not true that we 
had a choice between authorizing war on Iraq and doing 
nothing. That false dichotomy neglects such alternatives as the 
prolonged and intrusive presence of international inspectors in 
Iraq or the exiling of Saddam Hussein from his country. The 
same can be said of the manipulative warning in February 2003 
that members of the UN Security Council faced a stark choice 
between supporting the U.S. position on Iraq and making the 
United Nations irrelevant to issues of international security. In 
this case, the false dichotomy structured a threat.
Our Side Bias
The situation of the United Nations points to another subject: 
unilateralism on the part of the United States.7 This, you 
might say, is far from a matter of reasoning. Doesn’t such 
unilateralism find its sources in power? More specifically, the 
unparalleled military, economic, and cultural power that make 
the United States the world’s only remaining superpower? And 
the culture and history of the United States, which contribute 
 56   Canada and the New American Empire    57  The John Wayne Fallacy
to its quite particular sense of its historical uniqueness and 
special destiny? You could ask what reasoning and logic have 
to do with all this. I think that question can be answered 
because making an exception of your own case is a form of 
inconsistency or bias in favour of your own side. Unilateralism, 
which is tremendously tempting, especially for the powerful, is 
a pronounced expression of a partisan bias. We can call it “our 
side bias.”
So far as war and violence are concerned, the temptations 
of our side bias arise from the fact that the devastation wrought 
by violence is obvious and severe when we experience it on our 
side, but less obvious and (apparently) not severe at all when 
we impose it on them. The three thousand deaths from the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, were 
deplorable, awful, and painful – and were understood and 
publicized as such. The destruction was costly and horrendous, 
and we heard about that. But killings by American and other 
forces in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere receive 
relatively little attention in most western media. We feel pain 
in our own bodies, not in others; we live our lives in our own 
countries, not those others; our media cover our interests, and 
not those others. To sit in a bomber is one thing; to sit under a 
bomb, another. Thus, our side bias is likely to seem natural to 
many people.
In October, 2001, Tony Blair travelled through the Middle 
East in an effort to persuade a number of Middle Eastern lead-
ers of the justifiability of bombing Afghanistan as an element 
of the “war against terrorism.” Blair was surprised to find that 
many leaders did not follow his reasonings on the topic of jus-
tifying violent responses to conflicts. They didn’t classify sui-
cide bombers as terrorists; in fact, they didn’t even think these 
attackers were committing suicide. They were martyrs and 
heroes. Blair, who failed to understand that double standard, 
seemed to feel no doubt about preaching according to a double 
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standard of his own. To him, bombing by a state, even with re-
sultant deaths of innocent civilians, would clearly be properly 
authorized and legitimate, whereas, in contrast, explosive at-
tacks by non-state agents killing innocent civilians were clearly 
deplorable and merited the terminal epithet, “terrorism.” Thus, 
double standards abound. In this context, Blair’s was a bias in 
favour of states and against non-state agents.
The case of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq provides 
an even more powerful example of our side bias. Assume, as 
is plausible, that it is dangerous and seriously wrong for a 
nation to use weapons of mass destruction. Assume, as is also 
plausible, that any nation could at some point have leaders who 
could make risky and unwise decisions. The conclusion would 
seem to mandate generalized disarmament: it is dangerous for 
any nation to possess weapons of mass destruction. In the fall of 
2002 and the winter of 2003, there was an enormous amount 
of discussion about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
– whether there were any, whether they were hidden, whether 
and how they had been destroyed, whether inspectors were 
finding any. Long speeches were given; maps and drawings 
were provided; satellite pictures were analyzed; Britain’s MI5 
plagiarized a graduate student paper and Colin Powell, in 
turn, copied from them; inspectors submitted huge reports; 
Iraq submitted a twelve-thousand-page document about the 
state of its weapons.
No such weapons have been located. There was intense 
criticism on the point, both in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom. Queries were raised about the quality of 
the intelligence reports and the reliability of those, inside and 
outside government, who had expressed their firm conviction 
such weapons existed in large numbers, were a threat to the 
world, and legitimated the attack on Iraq. The situation seems 
to have involved a mix of sloppy evidence-gathering and 
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reasoning, absence of critical thinking, self-deception, and 
deception and manipulation of others.
In the context of our side bias, what is noteworthy here is 
that virtually nothing was said about the possession of weapons 
of mass destruction by the United States, Britain, France, and 
other nuclear powers. The whole debate illustrated a double 
standard between the West and the Others; this was pernicious 
selectivity, an especially clear case of our side bias. Any human 
beings, anywhere, could be killed or maimed by weapons of 
mass destruction: biological, chemical, or nuclear. Human life 
on earth could be terminated by nuclear weapons. Any human 
being has a warrant to be worried and a right to protest these 
weapons; it’s a universal. The second dimension of universality 
is that these weapons are threatening and dangerous in any 
hands and in any country. The United States could have a rash 
leadership ready to act prematurely and place the peoples of this 
earth in great danger, in order to pursue what it understands as 
its own interests. Weapons of mass destruction are an appalling 
threat in the hands of Saddam Hussein and in the hands of 
George W. Bush or any other leader. It is an enormous and 
multi-faceted problem – not, incidentally, a problem likely 
to be overcome by killing the Bad Guys. And it is a general 
problem, not a problem restricted to Iraq and North Korea and 
some other “evil” regimes. To think that only their weapons of 
mass destruction are problematical, while ours are necessary 
and safe amounts to an egregious form of our side bias.
False Analogies
To list all the errors of reasoning connected with our thinking 
about violence is not possible here, but one more form of 
reasoning deserves special attention: arguing by analogy. 
In principle, this approach should have something to offer 
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because the teachings of history could hardly be applied in 
any other way. In practice, though, arguments from historical 
analogy are often shockingly weak. The all-time favourite 
strategy is to enlist the assistance of Hitler, who is compared 
to a contemporary demonized leader. Because war was needed 
to defeat Hitler, it’s claimed that, in virtue of the analogy, 
we also need war in the current case. Pretty well everybody 
agrees about Hitler and the need for a war against him, so 
critics of contemporary militarism can be made to look very 
naïve and very bad when they are portrayed as defenders of the 
“appeasement” of 1939. A moment’s thought should suffice to 
show that this is propaganda, not serious analysis.
But more recent analogies are problematic too. All too 
often, a complex situation of the past is summed up in a kind of 
“nutshell” description, telling us what lesson history supposedly 
taught in that case.8 Then, on the cavalier assumption that the 
present situation resembles this past one, the supposed lesson 
is applied to the present. In the case of Iraq, it is often argued, 
based on the bombings of Serbia/Kosovo by NATO forces in 
1999 and Afghanistan by the United States and Britain in 
2001, that bombing from a height can defeat a regime and 
bring something better, with few or no deaths to “our side.” 
Supposedly, these military campaigns were successful; thus 
– or so the reasoning goes – the same kind of success may be 
anticipated in Iraq. These precedents were cited as supporting 
the claim that bombing Iraq might be a good way to establish 
a better regime in that country and the even more ambitious 
claim that such a regime change could begin the building of 
a more democratic Middle East. The analogies are weak here, 
and the arguments entirely implausible.
First of all, both in the case of Serbia/Kosovo and in 
the case of Afghanistan, the nutshell summary of “success” 
is just plain incorrect, The situation for human rights in 
Kosovo after the 1999 war has been deplorable. Over fifty 
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thousand international personnel are involved in running the 
territory; there are many acrimonious disagreements between 
Kosovan Albanians and peacekeeping personnel; thousands 
of revenge attacks have occurred; and Serb and gypsy women 
require the escort of international peacekeepers to do their 
grocery shopping in safety. The question of whether Kosovo 
will gain independence from Serbia and Montenegro is still 
unresolved. More than four years after the “success” of this 
campaign, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade warns that the area is too dangerous to 
be a suitable destination for Canadian travellers. In Serbia, 
Milosevic, a nationalist and undemocratic leader who had 
sponsored ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, was 
defeated in election polls on the basis of a non-violent electoral 
campaign. He was not defeated as a direct result of NATO 
bombing.9 As for Afghanistan, some two years after the defeat 
of the Taliban regime and the much-advertised establishment 
of law and democracy in that country, there is little rule of 
law. Warlordism, corruption, and chaos prevail, and in some 
village areas, families who send their daughters to school are 
threatened with punishment by death. In the meantime, funds 
for reconstruction, promised by many countries after the defeat 
of the Taliban, have not been provided by the international 
community. Taliban and al-Qaeda forces are regrouping in 
some areas to stage guerrilla attacks and the Karzi government 
survives only with considerable protection from international 
forces. Due to opposition by the United States, there are 
no peacekeeping personnel outside the Kabul area. As with 
Kosovo, it’s a gross understatement to say that bombing 
“succeeded” in bringing a better order to Afghanistan.
The nutshell premises on which analogy arguments from 
Kosovo and Afghanistan are erected are simply false. Far from 
being a sensible application of sensitive historical analysis to 
contemporary problems, such arguments amount to careless 
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coffee shop analysis at best and manipulative propaganda at 
worst. And clearly, the similarities between Iraq and these 
other places is superficial in any event. Even if it were true that 
bombing had “worked” against Serbia and then Afghanistan 
under the Taliban regime, those cases wouldn’t support a 
prediction that it would “work” against the solidly entrenched 
and resource-rich regime of Saddam Hussein.
The Overall “Justification” of Violence
In their most general form, arguments to justify violence have a 
common structure, one that is quite simple. First, there is a just 
or morally defensible goal that we must reach by some means 
or other. Second, by using physical violence as a means, we can 
arrive at that goal. Third, no other means will get us there. 
From these premises, we arrive at the conclusion that physical 
violence is justified “as a last resort.” Now there is nothing 
fallacious in principle about arguments of this general type. 
They need not involve any erroneous reasoning in moving from 
the premises to the conclusion. Rather, the problem with such 
arguments is that we are far too ready to accept the premises.
Our side bias tends to make us indulgent in judging our 
own goals. Often, motives are mixed and goals are confused. 
In the case of Iraq, President George W. Bush shifted from a 
rhetoric of “weapons of mass destruction,” to “regime change,” 
to “Iraq helped al-Qaeda and other terrorists and has to be 
stopped,” to “We’re beginning to build a more democratic 
Middle East.” In the meantime, his critics and even some of his 
supporters were convinced that access to oil and ensuring his 
own re-election were major motivations. Prime Minister Tony 
Blair shifted his public rhetoric from “security against attack 
by this evil tyrant” to “moral need for protection for human 
rights in Iraq.” If violence is going to be justified as a means 
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of reaching a morally respectable goal, we have to know what 
that goal is. We also have to know that it is morally defensible. 
These conditions were simply not met in the case of the Iraq 
war. That’s the first problem with the general argument for 
attacking Iraq.
The second problem comes with the premise that physical 
violence will actually “work” in the sense that it will get us to 
the goal we seek. It often doesn’t, and we too often dismiss that 
fact because we ignore what happens in the aftermath. (This is 
where John Wayne comes in.) 10
Now, we arrive at the third premise, to the effect that there 
is no alternative means towards our goal except that of physical 
violence. It’s rarely true if it ever is: this sort of premise gets 
much of its superficial plausibility from the false dichotomy of 
doing something violent or doing nothing at all.
I’m convinced that better logic would make us more 
cautious about the use of violence in response to political 
conflict. A little skepticism could save a lot of lives. Fallacies 
and careless reasoning are not unique to the topic of violence, 
but in contexts of war, terrorism, and other forms of political 
violence, professed justifications deserve our most rigorous 
attention. Because the destruction and suffering they legitimate 
are so horrendous, they must be scrutinized carefully: lives are 
at stake.
Notes
 1 I have invented this name; though the mistake is common, this is 
not a fallacy of the textbooks.
 2 There are, of course, movies that are “western” in the sense of 
dealing with early western U.S. history and its conflicts but are more 
subtle and nuanced. What I have in mind here is the standard script.
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 3 The Iraq war of 2003 may turn out to be an exception in this 
regard. If so, we can only hope that salutary lessons will be learned 
from the coverage.
 4 A dichotomy may be false for different reasons. The alternatives 
presented may not be exclusive; they may not be exhaustive; 
they may be neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Furthermore, these 
conditions may exist for different reasons. I suspect that some of 
the logical distinctions between such cases (ambiguity, failure of 
a category to apply at all, category applying in some respects but 
not others, ill-founded category, for instance) may be of interest in 
conflict situations. However, the matter cannot be pursued here. 
 5 This distinction is explained in Chapter Seven of the fifth edition of 
my text, A Practical Study of Argument (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
2001).
 6 Gwynne Dyer, lecture, 5 March 2003, University of Calgary. 
Relying on reports from David Frum, the Canadian speechwriter 
who was the original author of the “axis of evil” phrase, Dyer 
claimed that North Korea was included almost arbitrarily. It was 
assumed that anything that counts as an “axis” needs more than two 
members and it would be impolitic to have only Muslim countries 
on the “axis.” According to Dyer, North Korea reacted with shock 
and horror to being included, and the political struggles between 
it and the United States were greatly aggravated by the polarized 
rhetoric of evil. 
 7 As noted (and decried) by many commentators, including some 
prominent ones within the United States, this unilateralism has  
nuances, and subtleties and understand that no situation can 
provide an uncontroversial recipe for handling another. This is 
not to say that history should be irrelevant to policy, only that the 
specious analogies that are so often exploited in public debate are 
highly unreliable guides to policy.
 9 For a brief discussion of what caused the fall of Milosevic, see Gene 
Sharp, “Serbia’s Struggle for Freedom,” Peace Magazine (October–
December 2001): 81–20. I discussed this account in my essay, 
“Power,” in A Delicate Balance: What Philosophy Can Tell Us about 
Terrorism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002).
 10 This essay was first written in February 2003 and revised in the 
spring and summer of that year. During this period it became 
increasingly clear, and was admitted even by insiders in the United 
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States, that planning with regard to “the peace” and the need to 
reconstruct after the violence of war had been grossly inadequate. It 
became glaringly obvious that winning a short-term military victory 
was far easier than rebuilding an ordered working society in the 
aftermath. 
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THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION 
OF U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONS
Colleen Beaumier, M.P., and Joyce Patel, M.A.
In prosecuting the war on Iraq, the United States and its allies 
have failed to garner a significant degree of legitimacy from 
the international community. Various Western governments, 
legal scholars, and citizens of the world have opposed the war, 
challenging the thesis that a military invasion both satisfies 
standards of international law and serves the interests of 
the Iraqi people. Debate over justification for the invasion 
continues. However, this debate will not be explored at 
great length in this paper. Rather, this paper addresses the 
humanitarian consequences of U.S.–Iraqi relations. In doing 
so, the analysis proceeds by placing the humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq within a historical context, highlighting the cumulative 
effect of U.S. policies toward Iraq. The paper argues that the 
U.S. invasion and occupation is but one stage in the overall 
process that has led to a humanitarian crisis. The humanitarian 
crisis that has visited Iraq for many years and the subsequent 
toll the invasion has taken on its population should not be 
understood as a single policy or imperative but must be seen as 
a continuation of strategies coloured by a doleful lack of vision 
and an abiding neglect for the Iraqi people.
It is important to note that the Iraqi situation did not sim-
ply result from the actions of a single government. While this 
may be true, and many governments played a role in shaping 
 68   Canada and the New American Empire    69  The Humanitarian Dimension of U.S.- Iraq Relations
the humanitarian nightmare in Iraq, this paper will focus on 
U.S. policy. The focus is neither arbitrary nor representative of 
an overt bias against U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the empha-
sis on the United States demonstrates that the current crisis 
in Iraq is not simply the product of an evil dictator. Rather, 
the current situation is another stage in the development of 
U.S.–Iraqi relations.
Moreover, because the Bush administration represents the 
central proponent of a military invasion, it is instructive to 
examine the current policy within a historical context. The 
purpose is to show that the United States has rarely been driven 
by a concern for humanitarian issues and does not seem to be 
deviating significantly – notwithstanding the rhetoric coming 
from the Bush administration – from this characterization 
with its current invasion of Iraq.
Genocide Sanctioned: U.S.–Iraq Relations 
before the Gulf War
In the 1980s, the United States and Iraq were allies in a 
war against the radical Islamic government in Iran. Saddam 
Hussein exhibited the same brutal tendencies then but was 
considered manageable by the United States. In fact, President 
Reagan sent then special envoy Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad 
to solidify the alliance and testify to Saddam Hussein’s “mod-
eration” relative to the Iranian regime.
The U.S. administration knew Saddam Hussein possessed 
chemical weapons and that he used these weapons against Iran 
and later against his own Kurdish populations. Despite the 
fact that Iraq contravened international law and was arguably 
responsible for genocide in Halabja, it continued to receive 
support from the United States in the form of “dual-use” 
equipment such as helicopters and chemicals. Most notably, 
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the Reagan administration, while publicly denouncing these 
actions, nevertheless blocked the Prevention of Genocide Act 
and failed to punish Iraq substantively for its violations of 
the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, to which Iraq was a 
signatory.
In calling for regime change, the Bush administration 
used the accusation of Saddam Hussein having gassed his 
own people. This is true. Hussein’s regime did attack the 
Kurdish villages in northern Iraq in 1987–88. However, what 
is unclear is the responsibility that the United States bears 
by virtue of its continued support for the Iraqi regime (part 
of the U.S. support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War). The fact 
that the United States provided Iraq with billions in loans and 
agricultural and export credits during the 1980s is a matter 
of public record. What is striking is its continued support 
even after the Kurdish massacre. The public condemnation 
of Iraq by the United States, following Halabja, was followed, 
paradoxically, with an increase of U.S. economic support that 
continued to bolster Iraq’s weapons program. Humanitarian 
issues, clearly, did not occupy a central concern for the Reagan 
administration.
The pertinent question remains: why did the United States 
support Saddam after he committed these atrocities? It seems 
clear that during the 1980s Saddam Hussein’s regime served 
salient U.S. economic and military interests in the region. Iraq 
was engaged in a war against the radical Islamic government 
of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. The United States feared an 
Iranian victory that could lead to the spread of radical Islam 
jeopardizing the strategically important and oil-rich Gulf 
states. In addition, severing economic ties with Iraq was seen as 
economically detrimental to American business interests and 
ultimately not a politically prudent objective for the Reagan 
administration. Rather than overtly inditing the Reagan ad-
ministration as directly responsible for the genocide against 
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the Kurds, a more circumspect analysis argues that the United 
States played a tacit role in sanctioning the actions of Hussein’s 
regime by not explicitly punishing his use of chemical weap-
ons. This tacit support of Hussein’s actions amounted to a real 
and present humanitarian crisis in the form of genocide.
Several lessons can be drawn from these incidents that 
have a direct bearing on humanitarian concerns. First, 
despite a tangible humanitarian crisis in the form of genocide, 
the United States did not intervene because this would 
undermined its own self-interests, and, secondly, since it 
allowed Iraq to commit massive atrocities, Hussein possibly 
calculated that any incursion into Kuwait would be met 
with similar inaction on the part of the United States. What 
Saddam Hussein did not realize is that an invasion of Kuwait 
would not be countenanced because it directly affected U.S. 
interests in the region.
The Gulf War and the Era of Sanctions
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was met with a UN-countenanced 
military campaign in January 1991. The immediate impact 
of the Gulf War was some fifty to one hundred and twenty 
thousand military deaths and four to fifteen thousand civilian 
deaths. In addition to deaths, injuries, and displacements, Iraq’s 
economy, infrastructure, health system, and environment were 
adversely impacted. The Gulf War was a humanitarian disaster 
for the Iraqi people, who endured intense bombing and then 
had to survive in a depleted economy. Further, the war caused 
the collapse of Iraq’s once-independent civilian economy. The 
imports-dependent industrial base was severely affected as 
imports rapidly became unavailable. The destruction of Iraq’s 
oil industry resulted in a fall in GDP, and this in turn led to 
a decrease in investment and reconstruction. After ten years 
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of sanctions, over 70 per cent of civilian industrial enterprise 
became obsolete or operated at a much-reduced level. A once-
large and well-trained technical and professional class was 
reduced to dependence on the state. With 60 to 75 per cent 
of the workforce unemployed and inflation rates rampant, the 
Iraqi population became dependent on handouts for survival.
The social effects of this devastation included the 
development of an underground economy, increases in 
smuggling and the sex trade, as well as child labour and 
begging. Like children, women suffer in a unique way as a 
result of military conflict. Before the 1990s, Iraq was a leader 
in the Arab world in promoting education and employment 
for women. The Gulf war resulted in widowhood, rising 
unemployment, and a widening educational gap that adversely 
affected the status of Iraqi women, in particular rural women. 
An important indicator of socio-economic health is a country’s 
infant mortality rate. Immediately before the Gulf War, infant 
mortality in Iraq fell to 65 per thousand live births, better than 
the average in the developing world at 76. By 1998 that number 
rose to 103, with an under-five mortality rate similar to Haiti, 
Uganda, Senegal, and Yemen. By 2000, the UN Human 
Development Index ranked Iraq’s development level 126th out 
of 174. A study conducted by Harvard University estimates 
child and infant mortality increased more than threefold in 
1991. These indicators are striking, given that Iraq had been a 
fairly urbanized and technologically developed country.
Before 1991, Iraq was a modern, urbanized society with a 
developed infrastructure, a steady economy, and good levels of 
health and education. The Ahtisaari UN report suggests that, 
after the Gulf War, Iraq was relegated to a pre-industrial era. 
Iraqi infrastructure (already significantly damaged as a result 
of an eight-year conflict with Iran) was further decimated after 
1991. Although the civilian infrastructure was left intact after 
the Iran-Iraq War (with the exception of the Basra region), the 
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economy was severely weakened. The Gulf War resulted in the 
destruction of civilian infrastructure and the Iraqi economy. 
Prior to the Gulf War, one Iraqi dinar was still worth US$3.30. 
In 2002 one Iraqi dinar was worth one-thousandth of that 
amount. The devastating toll on infrastructure included the 
destruction of roads, bridges, and railroads. In addition, water 
purification systems, sewage treatments, electricity grids, and 
the oil industry were also destroyed or significantly depleted. 
Iraq’s water and sanitation system was dependent on electricity, 
which purified and pumped water. As a result of the Gulf War, 
Iraq’s electrical capacity was destroyed. Water treatment plants 
in large cities such as Baghdad and Basra were destroyed result-
ing in “a public health crisis” caused by raw sewage dumped in 
the river system.
The World Health Organization described Iraq’s medical 
facilities and capabilities prior to the Gulf War as first-class. As 
a result of the war, the Ministry of Health was destroyed and 
communications and transportation were disabled. Damaged 
civilian infrastructure (electricity, water, and sanitation sys-
tems) led to the re-emergence of infectious diseases such as 
cholera; typhoid, measles, and diarrhoea. This was exacerbated 
by a real decline in family income, which contributed to an 
increase in levels of malnutrition. The devastating impacts on 
a highly mechanized, electricity-dependent Iraqi society are 
examined by Eric Hoskins in the book War and Public Health 
(1997). According to Hoskins, the destruction of telecom-
munications and transport coupled with shortages of medical 
supplies and equipment led to devastating health consequences 
for Iraqis. The delivery of essential medicines and primary and 
preventable health care were interrupted. As health care pro-
fessionals fled, the effectiveness of the health care system was 
further diminished.
In addition to the social, economic, and health effects of 
conventional warfare, the use of chemical and biological weap-
 72   Canada and the New American Empire    73  The Humanitarian Dimension of U.S.- Iraq Relations
ons during the Gulf War had a lasting environmental impact 
on Iraq. The massive aerial bombing destroyed chemical and 
biological factories that dispersed toxins into the environment. 
This had both respiratory and carcinogenic health effects. 
Further, landmines and burning oil wells destroyed the en-
vironment, killed animals, and contaminated water and soil. 
The use of depleted uranium and its effects on people and the 
environment are a matter of some controversy. However, the 
fact remains that Iraq is facing high levels of cancers and birth 
defects previously unseen in the region.
Sanctions: The Foundation for an Enduring 
Humanitarian Crisis
The Gulf War set the groundwork for a sustained sanctions 
regime that would have a long-term impact on the people 
of Iraq. In response to its invasion of Kuwait, the United 
Nations Security Council imposed punitive measures, in 
the form of comprehensive sanctions, on Iraq. Under these 
sanctions, all imports into Iraq (except medical supplies) and 
all exports from Iraq were prohibited. The rationale informing 
the sanctions regime was premised on the assumption that 
a sustained policy of restrictive sanctions would ultimately 
cripple the Iraqi regime. This argument, however, conflicted 
with the reality of the Iraqi situation. Sanctions did not 
cripple the regime but in fact enabled Hussein to consolidate 
his power. The former UN Assistant Secretary-General and 
humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq argued that sanctions 
contributed to the consolidation of the state and reduced the 
chances for the emergence of an opposition. In political terms, 
the Iraqi people were not “liberated” by a sanctions regime 
but instead were hampered from effectively revolting against 
an oppressive government. Those in favour of the current 
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invasion of Iraq openly recognized that the sanctions regime 
did not curtail Saddam Hussein’s power and have used this 
fact to launch a more coercive approach in the form of military 
action. The only empirical consequence of the sanctions that 
cannot be denied is that the Iraqi people, not the regime, were 
weakened.
Since 1990, there has been a severe deterioration in the 
standards of living and degradation of the Iraqi economy with 
grave consequences for Iraqi society. Chronic malnutrition 
has affected every fourth child in Iraq under five years of age. 
The infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world. 
Only 41 per cent of the population have regular access to clean 
water and 83 per cent of all schools need substantial repairs. 
In essence, sanctions must be viewed within this historical 
context. The sanctions regime was imposed on an already 
crippled nation. Twelve years of sanctions have contributed 
to a humanitarian crisis reflected in the death of one million 
Iraqis, nearly 60 per cent children. It is estimated that some 
five to six thousand children died every month in Iraq as a 
result of sanctions.1
In 1998, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and Director 
of the UN Oil-for-Food Program, Denis Halliday, resigned 
in protest over the sanctions program. In 2000, Hans von 
Sponeck, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator who replaced 
Mr. Halliday also resigned in protest. That same year the head 
of the UN World Food Program in Iraq, Jutta Burgahrdt, 
also resigned. Previously, Scott Ritter resigned from the UN 
weapons inspecting team (UNSCOM) because he argued the 
United States was utilizing the weapons inspections in order to 
maintain the sanctions regime and not as a way of disarming 
Saddam Hussein.
If the sanctions were not effectively limiting Hussein’s 
power, why were they not lifted? There is clearly no easy 
answer. Even asking the question implies that Western 
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governments refused to recognize the devastation sanctions 
were causing on the Iraqi people. Simply decrying that the 
troubles of the Iraqi people are wholly the responsibility of the 
Hussein regime avoids the role Western governments played in 
failing to search for alternatives to sanctions. No such objective 
was pursued, and when the harmful consequences of sanctions 
became evident, those in favour, like Madeleine Albright, the 
U.S. ambassador to the UN, callously argued that it was worth 
it.
The Oil - for -Food Program
After the Gulf War, the international community responded to 
the humanitarian crisis with Security Council Resolution 986 
(1995). The resolution was “a temporary measure to provide 
for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people” through the 
Oil-for-Food program. The Oil-for-Food program permitted 
Iraq to sell oil in exchange for “medicine, health supplies, food-
stuffs and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.” 
The amount of oil Iraq was able to extract was subsequently 
raised, and this translated into resources for humanitarian 
purposes.
On the surface, it appeared that the negative effects of 
sanctions were mitigated by the Oil-for-Food program. Food 
production increased, childhood mortality, which increased 
after the war and under sanctions, declined, and malnutrition 
among children under age five, which rose during 1991 to 
1996, stabilized. However, the decline in childhood mortality 
was in the north and was not reflected in figures for south/
central Iraq. Further, although malnutrition rates declined, 
they remained high at 14.6 per cent of children under five. In 
other words, the Oil-for-Food program was not adequate.
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According to a March 1999 report by the UN Office of the 
Oil-for-Food program, since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq dropped 
from “relative affluence to massive poverty.” The Oil-for-
Food program was initially intended to provide humanitarian 
relief in the form of food and medicine. The World Health 
Organization, the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization, UNICEF, and the Secretary-General of the 
UN agreed on the central problem of the Oil-for-Food 
program – its inability to generate sufficient funds to address 
the rehabilitation of Iraq’s once-modern social and economic 
infrastructure. The office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food program 
recognized that the program was “never intended to be a 
substitute for normal economic activity” but suggested that, as 
long as Iraq was subjected to comprehensive sanctions, “there is 
no alternative to the program for addressing the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq.”
Humanitarian Impact of a Military Invasion
The new war in Iraq has resulted in devastating humanitarian 
consequences for the civilian population as evidenced by 
the news reports during the war and by the almost daily 
reports since the war officially ended. Estimates of the dead 
are in the 3,000–4,000 range with many more wounded 
and permanently disabled. The post-war lack of security for 
civilians, the severely damaged infrastructure, the extensive 
looting, the regular attacks by insurgents on the occupying 
forces, their supporters and Western agencies like the Red 
Cross and the UN are all signs of a society in crisis. The ability 
of Iraqis to cope is not the same as it was in 1991. Prior to the 
Gulf War, the Iraqi economy was viable, unemployment and 
poverty levels were lower, and citizens had access to health 
and education as well as cash and material assets. In short, 
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Iraqis were in a better socio-economic state to deal with the 
consequences of the first Gulf War.
Impact on Children
A Canadian medical team was in Baghdad conducting research 
at the same time that I was visiting Iraq (21–26 January 2003). 
In a report entitled Our Common Responsibility: The Impact of 
a New War on Iraq’s Children, the team, which included ten 
experts from the Harvard-based International Study Team, 
predicted a “grave humanitarian disaster” in the case of a new 
war in Iraq. The report examined the physical and mental state 
of Iraqi children. Based on data collected in Baghdad, Karbala, 
and Basra, the findings suggest that Iraqi children have “a great 
fear” of a new war and that children as young as four and five 
had clear concepts of the horrors of war.
The study found that half a million Iraqi children suffer 
from malnourishment: “Iraq’s 13 million children are at grave 
risk of starvation, disease, death and psychological trauma,” 
according to Dr. Samantha Nutt, the team’s health expert. In 
February, the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
examined the human cost of a new war in Iraq. CESR’s 
prediction that the U.S.-led military operation would trigger 
the collapse of Iraq’s public health, electrical power, and food 
distribution transportation systems has been confirmed by the 
reality of the U.S.-British occupation. CESR food security, 
public health, infrastructure, and medical emergency experts 
were in Baghdad January 17–30, 2003, conducting research. 
The CESR report concluded that the Iraqi population is highly 
vulnerable and will require much greater humanitarian aid in 
the event of war.
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International Humanitarian Law
The laws of war – International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
– stipulate that an occupying power or military force that 
takes control and authority of a region is responsible for the 
humanitarian needs of the population. According to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, an occupying power has an 
obligation to ensure the supply of food, medicine, hygiene, and 
public health. All parties to the conflict have a responsibility 
to “take all necessary precautions to avoid loss of civilian life.” 
The principles of IHL establish the rules of war and have 
several implications for all parties to a conflict.
First, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. This includes 
the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weap-
ons as well as cluster bombs and landmines, which are by their 
nature indiscriminate.2 IHL prohibits military attacks that 
have a disproportionate effect on civilians. Therefore, the de-
struction of water, electrical, or transport infrastructure, which 
Iraqis depend on for survival, is prohibited. Finally, all parties 
to the conflict are under an obligation to provide for the free 
flow of impartial humanitarian assistance. Grave breaches of 
these laws are considered war crimes.
The Humanitarian and Security Conditions 
of Refugees
In addition to the socio-economic and environmental costs 
of a second Gulf War, there are humanitarian consequences 
for refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced Iraqis. 
A February 2003 report conducted by Human Rights Watch 
concluded that the war would likely bring “new hardship” 
to the civilian population and displaced persons creating 
new refugee outflows. The report has been proven right. 
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IHL stipulates that civilians are protected from forced 
displacement.3 The occupying power must ensure the security 
of the civilian population and allow civilians to voluntarily 
move to escape war, both within and outside the state’s 
borders. In the event of conflict, neighbouring states may close 
their borders for fear of instability within their own countries 
and the cost of providing for refugees. Under international law, 
any country in control of “safe havens” must ensure that such 
camps are secure and that adequate humanitarian assistance 
is provided to refugees. Under IHL, the occupying power is 
also responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs). IDPs 
are particularly vulnerable. Prior to the invasion there were 
between 700,000 and one million IDPs in Iraq, the majority 
of whom were women and children.
Conclusions
This paper identifies three stages of U.S.–Iraqi relations (the 
period prior to the first Gulf War, the post-Gulf War era, and 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq) and offers positive alternatives 
to U.S. foreign policy within each historical stage. The 
occupation of Iraq or what the United States has referred to as 
post-war planning, including the role of the Iraqi opposition, 
the UN, and U.S. corporations are not examined. The focus 
is on the humanitarian dimension of the Iraqi crisis and its 
historical context. The alternatives presented (adherence and 
implementation of international law) are guided by a single 
imperative – the humanitarian consequences of U.S. policy for 
the Iraqi people.
It seems clear that an Iraqi population battered by decades 
of war, severely deprived under sanctions and highly dependent 
on government rations and a fragile public health system is at 
greater risk of a humanitarian disaster than ever before. It is 
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with these considerations in mind that we must be critical of 
a policy that seeks regime change and the military invasion 
needed to achieve this goal.
Notes
 1 In 1998, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 
each month, between 5,000 and 6,000 Iraqi children died because 
of sanctions. A 1993 UNICEF report states that there has been a 
resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases in Iraq, including polio, 
diphtheria, and measles. In 1997, UNICEF reported that more than 
1.2 million people, including 750,000 children below the age of 
five, have died because of the scarcity of food and medicine.
 2 Relevant sections of International Humanitarian Law, including: 
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 
International Convention of Economic and Social Rights, The 
Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.
 3 Relevant international standards that apply to refugees and 
displaced persons include: The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), and the Conclusions 
adopted by the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees.
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THE WAR ON IRAQ, 
THE BUSH DOCTRINE 
AND CANADA’S FUTURE
Jim Harding
Background to the War on Iraq
“We have seen the enemy, and the enemy is us.” – Pogo
The Anglo-American “coalition” which pre-emptively at-
tacked Iraq has been involved in Iraq’s affairs from its begin-
nings. The Kingdom of Iraq was created under the control of 
the United Kingdom in 1921, after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. Iraq became a separate country in 1932; however the 
Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC), and the Euro-Americans who ben-
efited from cheap oil industrialization, continued to dominate 
the country.
The Republic of Iraq came into existence in 1958, after the 
“constitutional” monarchy was overthrown by a nationalist 
coalition. The new Iraqi leader, General Kassem, immediately 
faced strong pressure from the United States. Kassem wanted 
Iraq to become neutral in the Cold War. However, wanting 
a compliant, not neutral, state, the United States created an 
invasion plan with its ally Turkey on the pretence of an ensuing 
“communist take-over.”1 Soviet influence in the region 
apparently tempered this initiative. The United States then 
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funded Iraqi Kurds and backed a failed assassination attempt 
on Kassem in 1960.2
Saddam Hussein was involved in this botched assassination 
and went into exile in Cairo. Due to his anti-communism, and 
his desire to oust the Kassem regime, he and the CIA began to 
co-operate.3 When Iraq formed its own oil company in 1962, 
U.S. opposition deepened. When Kassem began to talk of 
Iraq’s legitimate historical claim to oil-rich Kuwait, “regime 
change” came quickly. In 1963 the CIA, and British intelli-
gence, backed a coup that overthrew and murdered Kassem 
and saw thousands of “leftists” and trade unionists killed. 
The new regime gave assurances it would not nationalize the 
IPC, which had major U.S. ownership, nor make claims on 
Kuwait.
After a series of unstable coalitions and coups, the Baath 
Party took power in 1968. Saddam Hussein became vice– 
president in charge of oil and quickly emerged as the strong 
man.4 The IPC was nationalized in 1972, and Iraq began to 
modernize in hope of becoming the uncontested leader of the 
Arab world.
The U.S-backed, Shah of Iran, was deposed in 1979. The 
Iranian revolution was a call for Muslims everywhere to create 
Islamic states, which was a clear threat to the oil-monarchies 
which were U.S. “allies.” After the Iranian “revolution,” 
Hussein staged a successful “palace coup” and moved to 
establish absolute power in Iraq.
Though Iraq was an emerging secular nation, it was still 
dominated by Sunni Muslims in a country, like Iran, with a 
Shi’i majority.5 The Iranian regime was therefore seen as dou-
bly threatening to Hussein’s hold over Iraq.6 Thinking that 
Iran’s internal chaos might enable Iraq to win back land lost in 
a 1975 agreement, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980.
The United States, which wanted to defeat Khomeni’s 
theocracy at any human cost, backed Iraq. There were eight 
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years of vicious warfare, reminiscent of the brutality of World 
War I trenches. Oil revenues went to profit the merchants of 
death, rather than to meet desperate humans needs.7 It was “oil 
for weapons,” not “oil for food.” With nearly a million young, 
conscripted soldiers dead, and still no victor, a cease-fire was 
finally brokered by the UN in 1988.
Saddam Hussein earned his reputation for cruelty after 
his regime’s use of chemical, and perhaps biological, weapons 
during this war. What is ignored in the U.S.’s demonization 
of Hussein, is that from 1985, and perhaps earlier, until 1989, 
U.S. companies legally exported the materials required for Iraq 
to develop these weapons. This included anthrax, as well as 
other biological toxins. U.S. exports also included “precursors” 
for chemical weapons, like nerve gas, and equipment for 
chemical warheads. Later, in 1994, a U.S. Senate Committee 
found that the biological materials “were identical to those the 
U.N. inspectors found and removed.”8
After the chemical slaughter of five thousand Iraqi Kurds in 
1988, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to stop U.S. exports 
of these materials to Iraq. However, the Reagan-controlled 
White House, which had built up the military resources of 
Hussein’s regime, vetoed it. The analogy with the origins of al-
Qaeda, which the Reagan administration had armed to fight 
the Soviet army in Afghanistan, is astonishing.9
In the build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was 
much rhetoric about the extreme violence of Hussein’s regime. 
However, if ending violence were the core motivation to invade 
Iraq, these Western rulers would have had to have had a major 
conversion from their past embracing of violence in the serv-
ice of national and corporate interest. Through its support of 
coups and assassinations to protect Cold War and oil interests, 
the United States and Britain contributed to the political cul-
ture of violence within which Saddam rose to power.
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“Don’t try to put out a fire by throwing on more fire. Don’t 
wash a wound with blood.” – Rumi
If, in the aftermath of this war, we are to gain a deeper commit-
ment to international peace and security through international 
law, rather than head further down the path of pre-emptive 
warfare, we must cast a wide net of understanding over recent 
events. Though sanctioned by the UN, it is naive to look for 
simple, righteous motives in the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait, and breach of the UN Charter, was rooted in pan-
Arab nationalism, a desire to expand into this oil-rich area, and 
the vulnerability of Iraq as nearly completely land-locked.
But the invasion was triggered by a specific crisis. After the 
ravages of the Iran–Iraq war, Iraq became dependent on the 
financial backing of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In 1990 
these countries sold Iraq’s debts to international banks. When 
Kuwait later flooded the oil market, further cutting demand 
for cash-strapped Iraq, a summit was called to try to negotiate 
a settlement. When this failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait.10
After the Gulf War, the United States strengthened its 
military presence in Kuwait, which became the launching 
pad for its later attack on Iraq. It will remain one of the great 
examples of “big power” double standards in the Middle East 
that war was declared on Iraq by a U.S.-UN coalition, for il-
legally crossing the Kuwait border in 1991, while the United 
States and Britain, without UN backing, and breaching the 
UN Charter, crossed the same border, in the other direction, 
to start the 2003 war on Iraq.
In the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War, and now the war 
on Iraq, the United States perpetrated falsehoods to create an 
image of it intervening to right a wrong and to protect a victim 
of aggression.11 This “good versus evil” story, evolving from 
Protestant frontierism into Cold War, superpower ideology is 
so imbedded in the American mythology that it is very difficult 
for most Americans to see any larger truth.12 It is revealing that 
 86   Canada and the New American Empire    87  The War on Iraq, The Bush Doctrine and Canada
the Afro-American population, evolving from U.S. slavery, is 
the major exception.
After forty-three days of smart-bombing, and “collateral” 
and ecological carnage in 1991, Iraq became subject to UN arms 
inspection and sanctions.13 This persisted until 1997, when Iraq 
barred inspectors. Though Russia brokered a compromise for 
renewed inspections, Iraq again stopped inspections in early 
1998, accusing the U.S.-led team of spying. In February 1998, 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan re-negotiated inspections, 
but in October Iraq stopped working with UNSCOM. In 
November, Iraq reconsidered, and UNSCOM returned. Then, 
in December UNSCOM’s new head, American Richard Butler, 
reported that Iraq was refusing to co-operate. Soon after, the 
UN ordered all inspectors to leave, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq 
immediately began.
In its 2002–2003 propaganda, the Bush (Jr.) administration 
seriously distorted this chronology to make it look like Iraq 
stopped inspections, outright, and this was done to hide 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which might get into 
the hands of hostile terrorists.14 Actually, there was a lengthy 
to-and-fro of negotiations before inspections ended. The larger 
context for the inspection process included the devastating 
effects of the UN sanctions, mostly on children; a CIA-backed 
attempt to assassinate Hussein, the escalation of unsanctioned 
U.S. bombing in the “no fly” zones, and the growing fear 
that U.N.-enforced disarmament was a prelude to a U.S. 
invasion.15 It has been recently revealed in the media that the 
Iraqi government’s last-minute efforts to appease the U.S. just 
prior to the invasion were rebuffed, obviously because the U.S. 
countdown to war had begun. It was invasion and occupation 
that the U.S. was interested in and not compliance.
Americans woke up to the conflict, in 1998, when U.N. 
inspectors left Iraq. Except for a few American “moralists,” 
who complained of the dying of more than 1.5 million Iraqis 
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due to the sanctions, the U.S. population had no interest 
in Iraq until after Bush took power and the catastrophe of 
9/11.16 In the aftermath, and Bush’s “war on terrorism,” the 
U.S. public was feeling particularly patriotic and vulnerable. 
In this context, past UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler told a 
U.S. Senate Committee that Iraq was still producing chemical 
and biological weapons and might be developing nuclear 
weapons.17 The unlikelihood of these charges, which was 
already documented, was immaterial. The rhetoric of fear and 
aggression was ratcheted up. The “war on terrorism” and war 
on Iraq were collapsed into one policy. At one point, over 50 
per cent of Americans mistakenly believed Hussein was behind 
9/11 and had nuclear weapons.18
In late September 2002, the United States proposed a UN 
resolution with strict new inspection rules, which Iraq rejected. 
However, a month later Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons 
inspector, and Iraq agreed on new inspection arrangements, 
but U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell rejected these. In 
retrospect, with what we now know, by then the United States 
was after UN support to legitimize its decision to go to war. 
However, Bush was already saying the United States didn’t 
really need UN authorization, and could take pre-emptive 
action in self-defence. This, however, would contravene the 
UN Charter, go against international law, and would not 
likely be acceptable to European allies. British Prime Minister 
Blair, already in deep trouble with rising anti-war sentiment, 
desperately wanted this UN legitimacy. The UN and the 
United States were on a collision course.
After failing to convince the world that Iraq was linked 
to 9/11 terrorism, the United States refocused its attack on 
Iraq having WMD. On 8 November 2002, the UN Security 
Council unanimously approved a compromise resolution 
(Resolution 1441) calling for Iraq to completely disarm or face 
“serious consequences.” Several knowledgeable sources had 
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already questioned whether Iraq indeed still had any WMD. 
This included past UN inspector Scott Ritter – an ex-Marine 
Republican, whose dissent against Bush’s propaganda machine 
laid much of the groundwork for the pre-war, anti-war 
movement.19 It also included political refugee Hussein Kamel, 
who had previously headed Iraq’s WMD program and was 
assassinated by the Hussein regime when he returned to Iraq.20 
Thinking people worldwide were having trouble swallowing 
the shifting mix of justifications for war.
UN inspection reports initially were fairly ambiguous and 
provided “ammunition” for both poles forming in the Security 
Council. But, by the time of the 14 March 2003 Security 
Council meeting, a pattern that didn’t satisfy the United States 
was taking shape. The U.S. and British case was already greatly 
weakened when it was found that an earlier British intelligence 
report, submitted to the February Security Council meeting, 
arguing Iraq had WMD, was largely plagiarized. Then, at the 
Summit of 116 Non-Aligned countries, held 25 February, 
there was unanimous opposition to war without Security 
Council authorization. Later, both the Arab Summit and the 
Islamic Summit opposed any pre-emptive war. All the time, 
anti-war demonstrations continued to grow worldwide.21
Then, on March 7th, Hans Blix reported to the Security 
Council that he “welcomed the acceleration of initiative” 
on the part of Iraq since January. He reported that Iraq was 
starting to be “proactive,” even if it wasn’t “immediately co-
operative.” There were clearly more tasks left to verify that all 
chemical and biological weapons materials and capacities were 
accounted for, and destroyed, and disarmament complete. 
But he stressed, with only three months of inspections to 
date, that “disarmament and verification can’t be instant.” At 
that meeting IAEA head Mohamed El Baradei also reported 
that a document that Iraq had imported uranium to enrich 
for nuclear weapons was forged. That President Bush Jr. had 
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referred to this falsehood as fact in his January 2003 State of 
the Union address came back to haunt and discredit the U.S. 
administration.22
Rather than agreeing to intensify inspections and establish 
a schedule for key remaining items, as was suggested by 
other Security Council members, the United States and 
Britain pressed ahead to try to get UN support for war. 
Colin Powell argued in vain that “serious consequences” 
had always meant war. Then the Anglo-American coalition 
floated an amendment placing a March 17th deadline on Iraqi 
compliance to Resolution 1441. France, and later Russia, 
however, said they would veto this. More significant, the six 
undecided, small countries on the Security Council, did not 
budge. The resistance of Latin American countries, with an 
intimate history of U.S. foreign policies encouraging political 
violence, was particularly significant.23
The United States rejected a six-country proposal to extend 
the deadline for Iraq to March 31st, which was being supported 
behind the scenes by Canada as a compromise motion.24 Then, 
under growing British pressure for a second resolution, Tony 
Blair floated six demands that Iraq had to meet or face war. 
One British cabinet minister referred to Blair as “reckless,” and 
on March 17th, Robin Cook resigned as Blair’s House Leader 
because of the illegality of the coming war. The same day, the 
United States and Britain withdrew their second resolution, 
rather than have it go down to defeat. Bush stated “the time 
for diplomacy is over,” and the war machine went into full 
gear. There was little doubt left that the decision to go to war 
had been made before all the diplomatic jostling. A credible 
explanation of continued U.S. involvement in UN diplomacy 
until 17 March is that war preparations were not fully ready.25
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The Bush Doctrine’s Threat to International 
Peace and Security
“There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.” – Gandhi
After 9/11 Bush became the ideologue of Pax Americana. 
He polarized political discourse, in a fashion similar to anti-
communism and McCarthyism. He talked threateningly of 
how “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,” 
and how those who “harboured” anyone the United States 
considered terrorists were now also enemies of the United 
States26 Speaking of a “crusade” against terrorism, and invok-
ing his revengeful, Protestant, fundamentalist “god” into the 
language of war, he became the “cowboy evangelist.” All this 
fear mongering and manufacturing of consent, of course, was 
in the name of American-style “freedom.” Bush’s phrase, “the 
axis of evil,” for which Canada’s National Post columnist David 
Frum takes some credit, instantly put international politics 
back a half-century. Bush’s simplistic, retributive approach to 
justice has no room for the intricacies of international law or 
peacemaking. If anything, it stimulates conflict that can lead 
to warfare.27 The transparency of Bush’s mixing of religion 
and nationalism into belligerent superpower rhetoric is likely 
what catalyzed the pre-war anti-war movement throughout 
the world.
A major influence on the creation of the Bush doctrine was 
the writings of Atlantic Monthly journalist and author Robert 
Kaplan.28  His book, The Coming Anarchy, in particular, spoke 
to the fears and aspirations of these men.29 Kaplan’s most recent 
book, coming out with the neo-Reaganites already controlling 
the Pentagon, is appropriately named Warrior Politics. The sub-
title, “Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos,” implicitly 
advances the violence of raw power associated with many 
forms of paganism. The attraction to this image shows you 
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how far astray the fundamentalist “Christianity” associated 
with the Republican right is from the original Christians, who 
preached love and peace, and equality under a common God. 
The underlying perspective is more like that attributed to the 
Roman Empire, which repressed the early Christians, and 
the Holy Roman Empire, which turned Christianity into a 
repressive and colonial ideology.
It is not surprising that Kaplan’s writings are so appealing to 
many Americans, in their present circumstance. Thinking they 
had won the Cold War but, after 9/11, being psychologically 
shell-shocked and forced out of their “consumption and 
celebrity-worshipping bubble,” they have had to quickly “grow 
up” to face the realization that history hadn’t really ended with 
the “Corporate American Dream.”
But, there are many risks in Kaplan constructing such 
an eclectic worldview out of bits and pieces of political 
philosophy, with complete disregard for historical context. 
Perhaps this is what happens when the American far right, 
so traditionally hostile to serious intellectual endeavour, 
ran out of simplistic, dualistic direction and purpose in the 
aftermath of the Cold War.30 It is now grasping around for 
“new ideas” to justify asserting global American hegemony. 
Of course, these aren’t really new ideas. They are the ideas of 
authoritarian elitism, which are linked to the rise of fascism in 
Europe.31 The similarity is one main reason that people from 
“old Europe” have – almost instinctively – been repelled by the 
Bush doctrine.
Kaplan makes a lot out of NATO’s intervention in Bosnia, 
as an example of a “global constabulary force to intervene in 
human tragedies.” He argued that “as Bosnia showed, such 
a force is more likely to emerge from NATO than from the 
UN.”32 Not quite. In the aftermath of the War on Iraq, not 
only is the UN being sidelined by the United States, but 
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NATO is now deeply divided and unlikely to again throw its 
lot in with the United States so readily.
But, even though Kaplan cannot see the implications of the 
practices he is advocating, he provides a “good” rationale for 
them. As if intended as a memo to Bush, he writes:
Because international goals are best realized through 
national self-interest, the President of the U.S. should 
project power through the UN to the benefit of both. The 
U.S. should in essence, without declaring it, take over 
the UN in order to make it a transparent multiplier of 
American and western power.33
Well, there it is. The outcomes were not quite what was 
predicted. The UN has not rolled over to the United States, 
though it will be relegated to a secondary role in post-war Iraq. 
The UN, and international peace and security, certainly hasn’t 
“benefited” from the U.S.’s arbitrary use of power. And the 
United States, with Britain at its side, has had to “multiply” its 
power pretty much all by itself.
Canada and a New World Order
“No blood for oil” – anti-war slogan
This slogan has been used in anti-war marches throughout the 
world. Even before the war started, half of polled Canadians 
thought oil was a factor in the U.S. plan to attack Iraq. Not 
only is Bush, and many of his cohorts, schooled in the oil in-
dustry; the U.S. economy will increasingly become dependent 
on oil imports. Achieving geopolitical, superpower supremacy, 
and controlling security of supply of oil are inextricably linked, 
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though a move toward renewable energies and self-sufficiency 
could alter this.
A decade ago, when the neo-Reaganites were forming 
their policies, the trend-line was clear. The bulk of global oil 
production and oil reserves were in areas of actual or potential 
political destabilization, often due to resistance to Western 
globalization. In 1993, countries at high risk for political 
instability had 25 per cent of known oil reserves. And, very 
telling, Iraq had the most of any of these countries, with 10 per 
cent of the world’s total. Next was Iran, with 9 per cent. When 
you added in moderate-risk countries, it included 90 per cent 
of the world’s known reserves. Saudi Arabia had the largest 
percentage of world oil reserves in this group, at 26 per cent.34
The United States, as the most oil-consuming country 
on the planet, is interested in maintaining or gaining a direct 
say in the politics and economics of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Iran because they have nearly 50 per cent of the world’s oil 
reserves. Iraq is the most strategic base for this, bordering both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. It may sound crude, but “democracy” 
is becoming an American superpower code word for stable, 
accessible oil. The continued priority of oil over democracy is 
shown clearly in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War; which 
too was promoted as a war of liberation. After the “liberation 
of Kuwait” there was no demand by the United States to create 
democracy in that country. And the war to “democratize” Iraq 
was primarily launched from this non-democratic, U.S. client 
state. After Iraq is within U.S. control, based on the neo-
Reaganites own pronouncements, it is likely it will house a new 
military base, to enhance its influence on the whole region, and 
perhaps to launch a Pax Americana offensive on Iran.35
“War for oil” politics continues to unfold. Since 1993, 
huge oil reserves, larger than those in Saudi Arabia, have been 
located by Russia in the Black and Caspian seas. This oil was 
becoming an alternative source for both Germany and France, 
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and until the war over Kosovo, it could be piped directly 
through Europe. After 1999, it was piped through the Caucasus 
Mountains, through Iraq to the Persian Gulf port of Basra. 
What may be helping to consolidate the Anglo-American 
military alliance in Iraq, is the British Petroleum–Standard 
Oil merger in 1998.36 The oil interests of what is now the 
largest global oil multinational, along with a fear of Saddam 
starting oil fires, may help explain why controlling Basra, and 
the northern pipeline facilities at Kirkuk and Mosul, was such 
a military priority. The United States will watch the Kurds and 
Turks closely to see that they don’t use the war on Iraq as an 
excuse to assert their own control in this oil-rich area.
This opens up a complex can of worms about oil, 
colonialism, and war. U.S. oil companies directly benefited 
from France’s defeat in Vietnam in 1954 and in Algeria in 
1962. And the United States not only didn’t support France 
in either case but helped arm the Vietnamese at the end of 
World War II. You can see why France may be thinking there 
is a pattern. Chevron is now the oil partner to Vietnam, and 
Texaco-Mobile-Chevron is the oil partner to Algeria. It now 
looks like France (and Germany and Russia) may be about to 
lose out to BP in Iraq.37
The Iraqi people, like all people plundered for the 
resources of colonialism and industrialism, know full well 
that oil is a mixed blessing. One Iraqi saying refers to oil as 
“the excrement of the devil.” Not only did the struggle for 
oil keep Iraqis under external colonial rule for nearly half a 
century, but under internal authoritarian repression. For a 
short period in the 1970s, it looked like the nationalization 
of oil might fund a modern, secular, and possibly democratic 
society in Iraq. However, the Iran–Iraq war nullified that. It 
was Hussein’s near absolute power over oil and the country’s 
distorted development based on militarization and dependence 
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on oil that enabled him to consolidate power and posture as a 
megalomaniac.
After Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War, UN sanctions on oil 
exports placed Iraqi people in a new and, for some, deadly 
vulnerability. Now they are being promised a new era of oil-
based wealth, by their U.S. and British liberator-conquerors. 
But we know this will mean another highly stratified, class-
based society, of a few haves and mostly have-nots. Before 
the war was even over, U.S. corporations were taking over 
managing some of Iraqi’s infrastructure. U.S. corporations 
will be the primary benefactors of the profitable, post-war 
reconstruction. There is a serious threat that the UN’s role may 
be reduced to creating legitimacy. The lack of UN authority 
in post-war Iraq will surely exacerbate the humanitarian and 
political crisis.
Military and economic power go hand in hand with the 
United States, and they both depend on oil.38 The oil-guz-
zling U.S. economy dwarfs all others in the world, with a 
GDP in 2000 of $9.8 trillion.39 Not even the integration of all 
European economies in the EC, with a total GDP of $7.9 tril-
lion, comes close to the United States. Only Japan, as another 
single country economy, with a GDP of $4.7 trillion, stands 
out in comparison with the United States. The Canadian 
economy, with a GDP of $717 billion, is only the size of the 
state of Texas, the political homeland of George Bush Jr.
The annual U.S. military budget of $400 billion is now 
greater than the total Russian GDP of $259 billion. To get 
some perspective on the magnitude of the U.S. war machine 
that invaded Iraq, this figure is about three hundred times 
Iraq’s annual military budget in the post 1991 period. In the 
three weeks it took for the United States to get to and enter 
Baghdad, there were over thirty thousand aerial bombs or 
missiles dropped on Iraq. Many thousands more were delivered 
by low-flying helicopters and tanks. Were these kinds of 
 96   Canada and the New American Empire    97  The War on Iraq, The Bush Doctrine and Canada
resources available to meet human needs, some fundamental 
international peace and security would be forthcoming.40 But 
the Bush regime considers that “utopian internationalism.” 
Under the Bush Doctrine, brute force is the means to gain and 
keep respect and honour. And, of course, to control oil and oil 
profits.
The obscene magnitude of the killing power of the United 
States and the willingness to use this for global domination 
of resources should worry all people in the world. As the geo-
graphic neighbour of this gigantic, and increasingly aggressive 
military-industrial power, Canada and Canadians are now 
particularly challenged. We are seeing a warfare, not a welfare, 
state re-emerging south of our border. Warfare policies are 
deeply interlocked with the dynamics of American economic 
growth. This affects the nature of technological innovation, of 
the social structure and stratification, as well as the perpetua-
tion of social and domestic violence.41
If we are interested in strengthening international law and 
peace and security, we have to confront this underlying link 
between the economy, warfare, and violence. The Report on 
Business “Shock and Awe” edition referred to a study of the 
relationship between U.S. economic booms and profit-taking 
and major military and geopolitical crises since World War II.42 
In all but one case (i.e., the Berlin Blockade of 1948), there was 
substantial growth in, and profits from, stocks in the aftermath 
of these crises. Taking the average gains of the Dow Jones, if 
investors bought during the “gloom” of such a crisis, one year 
later they had earned substantial amounts. The increases were 
29 per cent from the Korean War, 34 per cent after the Cuban 
missile crisis, and 24 per cent after the 1991 Gulf War.
This is what the Bush administration is hoping for in the 
aftermath of this war. In fall 2002, with Bush’s ratings start-
ing to decline, after peaking in the wake of 9/11, and concerns 
about the U.S. economy not rebounding from the recession, 
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launching and quickly winning the war against Iraq was be-
coming both a political and economic necessity. The uncer-
tainty around the build-up to war, the projections of a massive 
$1.8 trillion government deficit, greatly due to a further $700 
billion projected tax cuts, and increasing military spending, 
were not creating a climate conducive to investment.43 One 
reason the Bush administration wasn’t willing to let multilat-
eral processes go on any longer was because of the need to get 
this war “over” and hope for an economic recovery, prior to the 
fall 2004 presidential election.
 “Oh Canada, [do] we stand on guard for thee?”
Opponents of Mulroney’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
warned that, with even greater dependency on the U.S. 
market, it would become much more difficult to maintain 
an independent Canadian foreign policy. They also warned 
that continental “free trade” may threaten domestic policies, 
such as Medicare. In the aftermath of the Chrétien Liberals’ 
not supporting the United States and Britain in their war on 
Iraq, we heard a barrage of rhetoric from the Alliance Party, oil 
baron Premier Klein, and other business interests concerned 
about U.S. economic retribution. In other words, Canada 
should have supported the United States in its superpower 
adventures, regardless of international law because we are a 
branch-plant. They would have us reduced to the status and 
stature of a Kuwait.44
There is no disputing we’re increasingly a branch-plant. 
The percentage of GDP which Canada exports has grown 
since the FTA and is now at 45 per cent. This is the greatest 
amount of any industrial nation. And, more telling, the vast 
amount of this (88%) goes to the United States. This means 
that the United States buys 38 per cent of everything Canada 
produces. Contrast this with the U.S. relationship to us. With 
the largest domestic consumer market in the world, the United 
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States only exports 13 per cent of its GDP. And only 22 per 
cent of this goes to Canada. This means that only 3 per cent of 
what the United States produces is bought by Canada.45
You can see who needs whom. In the name of post-9/11 
homeland security, and/or as punishment for Canada not be-
ing a superpower cheerleader, the U.S.-Canada border could 
be steadily tightened. And, whereas Canada’s economy has 
become more vulnerable to such trade interruptions, the U.S. 
economy doesn’t desperately require our market. While it does 
require our natural resources, these could be secured through 
a combination of foreign ownership, and even relocating com-
panies south of the border, for easy access to the large U.S. 
market.
This is big bargaining power. The United States might not 
even need troops in Canada to secure superpower supremacy 
here. Its huge economic weapon might coerce us to spend 
even more on the military, as part of an integrated coalition 
for future wars. These integrated forces might, in a future 
scenario, even repress “rebellious” Canadian citizens. The 
United States might also coerce us to create a continental 
policing and security system and to harmonize our refugee and 
immigration policies.
The anti-free trade scenario of the decline of Canada was, 
however, too economically deterministic.46 It often failed to see 
the military and imperial side of Corporate America. But, in 
the aftermath of the war on Iraq, we can more easily imagine 
the depth of the threat to our future. One thing of which 
we can be sure is that, as long as the Alliance Party and its 
successor the Conservative Party has significant parliamentary 
power, it will be the Trojan Horse pushing for these Pax 
Americana policies.
But Canada did not buckle under the immense pressure 
exerted on it to support the war on Iraq. From the beginning 
of the UN crisis, through the huge anti-war marches, right up 
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to the start of the war, Canadian public opinion held at about 
two-thirds opposed to unilateral, unsanctioned action. A drop 
in anti-war sentiment after the war began wasn’t unexpected. 
The federal Liberals were trying to straddle the “war on 
terrorism,” which they still supported in the Gulf, and the war 
on Iraq, which they weren’t supporting. The term “allies” has 
powerful, emotional connotations in our military and Cold 
War history and identity. The phrase “turning our backs on our 
American friends,” touches deep visceral feelings about loyalty 
and even self-worth. Some Canadians may sing “God Bless 
America” at a Toronto Blue Jays game, or sing the American 
national anthem at an Ottawa or Alberta pro-war rally, 
thinking it is a sign of respect for our American neighbours. 
If you try to imagine Americans singing “Oh Canada,” you 
will, however, realize that deep continentalist and imperial 
forces are at play. When criticizing Canada for not joining the 
“coalition,” America’s current ambassador described Canada as 
“part of our family,” saying that the United States would be 
there for Canada if Canada were threatened. Does this mean 
he sees Canadians as gullible junior partners, i.e., adopted 
children, in the American Empire? Of course, we aren’t one 
big American family. And it can be very manipulative to 
collapse the distinction between countries, and, more vital, 
between state and family. This latter distinction is as crucial to 
democratic theory and practice as the separation of church and 
state. The irrational passion that can come from connecting 
the identity of family and state is shown in all authoritarian 
regimes; including Nazi Germany, when Hitler, the Führer, 
became the “father” of the nation and “race.”47
The neo-Reaganites, like their neo-conservative allies in 
the Alliance Party, have consistently manipulated the language 
of family into a return to patriarchal values in a new American 
collectivism. The gated suburb, under threat from crime, is 
now becoming the gated nation, under threat from terrorists. 
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Under Pax Americana, being part of Ambassador Cellucci’s 
one big American family, we would come to live within an 
umbrella of fear, and ultimately aggression.
However, the drop in support for the no-war position in 
Canada is as much about the economic impact as outright 
identification with the U.S. position. Cellucci has also used 
his position to fan these fears. He has implied their will be 
repercussions, and at the same time, he used the occasion of 
this foreign policy split, and Canada’s economic dependence to 
further advance the Bush administration’s goal of a continental 
energy market.
Only Britain significantly supported the U.S. war effort. 
The flimsy nature of the larger “coalition of the willing” shows 
how little global support there is for Pax Americana. The fact 
that much of Europe put resisting American expansionism over 
and above preserving unity in the EC and in NATO shows 
that this is likely a watershed in world affairs. Geo-political 
reconfiguration, a new world order not under American 
hegemony in this post-Cold War era, may be underway. It 
is not far-fetched that even corporate-backed “globalization” 
may be being put at risk by Bush’s “warrior politics.”
Mexico is even more vulnerable to U.S. economic 
retribution than Canada, and even though they were on the 
Security Council, they didn’t crack. And if we look at other 
countries with huge economic ties to the United States (with 
the exception of Britain, with its own historical interest in Iraq), 
they stayed clear of the Bush doctrine. Canada was not alone 
as a major U.S. trading partner in not supporting this war. Not 
only was worldwide public opinion solidly against this war; so 
too were most of the U.S. trading partners and its traditional 
allies.
Just why Canada ended up in this position of opposition to 
the war on Iraq is perhaps our most crucial question. Certainly 
our fragile heritage as a welfare and not a warfare state is part 
 102   Canada and the New American Empire    103  The War on Iraq, The Bush Doctrine and Canada
of the answer. So, too, is our important role in the history of 
international law, the UN, and peacekeeping, and a heritage 
of independent foreign policy in Suez, Vietnam, and now. 
Although we are “caught” between the two Anglo-American 
empires, our multi-national character interconnects us with 
Europe, and even with France. The juxtaposition of a more 
internationalist Quebec, with the more continentalist West, is 
a vital moderator on the pressures to give in to Pax Americana. 
Oil wealth, as in Alberta, apparently plays a role in the flow of 
ideology, here, as well as in Iraq.
The potential of a constitutional and cultural reconciliation 
with First Nations and Metis also affects the flow of ideas that 
shape who we are, and who we can become. Communitarian 
Aboriginal traditions are helping to stimulate the broader 
Canadian society to consider “restorative” perspectives on 
seeking justice, which could help us break out of the cycle of 
punishment, revenge, and further violence, which is so evident 
to the south.
But we could continue to slide towards continental 
economic and military integration. The refusal to join the war 
on Iraq is therefore an opportunity and challenge to shore up 
our vulnerabilities, to deepen our commitments and resolve, 
and to build new bridges between diverse peoples and persons 
here and abroad. There is no hope or new direction in the 
destruction and threats resulting from the Bush Doctrine. We 
need Canadian alternatives, which respect the interconnections 
between ecology, justice, and peace, which put means squarely 
in the service of ends.
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Postscript: The Future in Iraq and the 
United States
“We’re flying blind on this.” – U.S. intelligence officer
Though the U.S. troops initially avoided the feared urban 
warfare, and the Hussein regime fell quickly, the celebration 
of victory was short-lived. Within days, the “liberated” were 
expressing opposition to the U.S. occupation. First through 
demonstrations and later through guerrilla attacks, Iraqi op-
position to occupation accelerated to the point that during the 
first six months of occupation, more American military were 
killed in attacks than during the war. 
The military might of the United States just couldn’t make 
the transition to creating public order. Things went from bad 
to worse. Looting and arson were rampant. And through the 
chaos, U.S. priorities became more transparent. Only the 
ministries of oil and information, and not even the world-
renowned Baghdad Museum of Antiquities, received any 
protection.
The credibility of the U.S. regime continued to slip. Soon 
General Garner had to be replaced by Paul Bremer, a loyal neo-
Reaganite. Though he moved to quickly establish a Council 
of co-operative Iraqis, the steady killing of U.S. soldiers con-
tinued. Water, electricity, and hospital services were still not 
restored months into the occupation.
Ironically, the United States and Britain had to go back to 
the UN to get the oil embargo lifted. Security Council mem-
bers who opposed the war bargained hard for three weeks to get 
some accountability for the use of oil revenues for reconstruc-
tion. (USAID is providing $1 billion of lucrative contracts, 
mostly to U.S. corporations.) However, the occupiers were left 
fully responsible for ensuing conditions, which was probably 
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the best the UN could salvage from the fiasco. The UN may 
yet come out stronger, not weaker, from this crisis.
The debate about the new “American Empire” went more 
mainstream in the homeland. Some called for the United 
States to act like an empire and create a more imperial-like 
military and civil service. Others speculated that the quagmire 
the United States seemed to be moving into was symptomatic 
of imperial “overreach,” and perhaps even a sign that the em-
pire was actually waning.
That there were no WMD, which was the biggest pretence 
for the invasion, continued to chip away at public opinion in 
the United States and Britain. The Blair government has faced 
the greatest crisis in the short-run, especially after the suicide 
of David Kelly, a government advisor on Iraq, who apparently 
gave the BBC a secret interview on the tampering of intelli-
gence documents to exaggerate the threat of Iraq to justify the 
war. If the Blair government should ultimately fall, it will be a 
strong sign to other government’s that backing U.S. unilateral-
ism is politically risky. And that would put the Bush Doctrine 
more on the defensive at home.
Bush has already looked like a hunted man. Though he 
tried to recast his presidency, with his “roadmap to peace” 
in the Middle East, he was journalistically hounded after 
revelations that CIA intelligence information, used in his pre-
war State of the Union address about Iraq importing uranium 
from Niger, was knowingly erroneous.
But the litany of official untruths about the war still grows. 
Private Jessica Lynch was manufactured into a national war 
hero, after it was alleged she was injured and captured in battle 
and freed by U.S. marine’s in a heroic night raid. It turned out 
she was injured in a vehicle accident, given medical care by an 
Iraqi doctor, and rescued without resistance. That, however, 
didn’t stop the U.S. military granting her the Purple Heart 
and Bronze Star as well as prisoner-of-war medal.48 As U.S. 
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casualties continue to mount, there are signs of low morale 
and public discontent among the fighting forces in Iraq.  As 
recruits and reservists begin to fear for their lives, and are no 
longer mesmerized by the heroic self-image of “freedom-fight-
ers,” deserting might return as a political force, as it was during 
Vietnam.
Suggesting some desperation, there is now talk of 
“internationalizing” the occupying force. To do this the 
United States would have to go back to the UN, and possibly 
the EC, which it shirked in the first place, and give up more 
of its control. This would be tantamount to the war opponents 
rescuing the Empire. For the present, the United States is 
creating an army of Iraqis to try to buffer itself from the deep 
opposition to its presence. The United States had hoped that 
the killing of Hussein’s two sons in July 2003 would be a 
turning point in the war of resistance. Even after the capture 
of Saddam Hussein, resistance continues. This war may yet 
humiliate the neo-Reaganites in search of Pax America, and 
encourage intimidated domestic voices, who would prefer the 
United States to be more of a multilateral partner in world 
affairs.
Most compelling to those in search of a stable, just peace 
in the region, the innocent casualties of the U.S.-led “war on 
terrorism,” used to justify the war on Iraq in the aftermath of 
9/11 have already outstripped those of “terrorism” itself. That 
this is not a viable or acceptable foreign policy will continue to 
sink in, in both Iraq and America.
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FINDING MY VOICE FOR PEACE
Dr. David Swann
Personal Background
My life was generally a pleasant adventure in a middle-class 
upbringing in Calgary, Alberta, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, including six years of medical training. I 
had a vague sense that life was not like this for most of the 
planet. In spite of sympathy I could see little relationship then 
of those suffering in poor countries to my way of life. Travelling 
to South Africa in the late seventies to work in mission 
hospitals during apartheid changed my consciousness. Apart 
from the daily struggle to meet basic needs for most Africans, 
I discovered the price people paid to speak out against the 
white government. At the time Steve Biko, a courageous black 
activist, was killed in a jail cell near the Black homeland where 
I worked, with barely any media coverage. Speaking out is a 
costly matter and I was conscious, as never before, that I too 
would pay a price if I spoke out on discrimination in South 
Africa. I continued to do all I could medically, with a vague 
sense that, without political change, little would change in the 
health and opportunities for Black  Africans.
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Following my return to university to specialize in 
public health in the mid-1980s, my family and I went to 
the Philippines with a Primary Health Care project for 
one hundred communities. There I took the next step in 
understanding structural violence and the inequitable world 
order, in which I began to see Canada’s part. As one Filipino 
peasant said in despair to me, “If I speak about the corruption 
I will be killed. If I don’t speak about it, my family and I will 
starve!” This summed up the dilemma of life: telling the truth 
and not telling the truth can both be fatal where there is no 
justice and civil society. The stark desperation of life there 
and the appalling environmental decline left me profoundly 
depressed for many months after returning to Canada.
The 1991 Gulf War occurred soon after my return to 
Canada from the Phillipines, and I found my voice, both 
writing to political leaders and speaking locally for alternatives 
to the war. It was clear that Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime 
had to be removed from their illegal occupation of Kuwait, but 
alternatives to war were never exhausted.
This led to my growing involvement in the anti-sanctions 
movement in the 1990s, against the decimation of Iraqi 
civil society, frequent bombing, and the destruction of basic 
infrastructure. In violation of the Geneva Convention and 
other international law, the water and sanitation damage 
contributed to appalling death rates, especially in the first 
few years. Conservative estimates from WHO and Red Cross 
place the death toll at over 750,000 children by 2002, due to 
malnutrition and lack of basic medical care, which had been 
part of an advanced health care system in Iraq until the 1991 
war. Through the Canadian Network to End Sanctions on 
Iraq, we encouraged all citizens of conscience to speak against 
this misguided policy of economic and social deprivation in 
the name of containing a bad dictator.
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From Kyoto to Baghdad
In October 2002, while employed by a regional health author-
ity and, following ten years of public health work in rural 
Alberta, I became increasingly involved and outspoken on 
environmental and health issues including air quality and fos-
sil fuel use, the health impact of intensive livestock operations, 
tobacco control, and the national strategy for gun control. As 
president of the Society of Alberta Medical Officers, I released 
our position supporting the Kyoto Protocol as good policy for 
health and the environment in Alberta. The Alberta environ-
ment minister was actively campaigning at the time against the 
Kyoto Accord, and the chair of my health board was his con-
stituency president. I was fired within days of expressing this 
position and, only following a national outcry was I invited to 
return to employment there – an invitation I found to be dis-
ingenuous and rejected in favour of focusing more attention on 
the crisis unfolding in Iraq. Even in Alberta I was discovering 
the price of speaking out!
My dismissal galvanized my awareness of three key issues: 
firstly, democracy is not free; secondly, the fossil fuel industry 
(especially in Alberta) is a major political force; and thirdly, 
powerful interests will go as far as possible to maintain control. 
How far they will go depends on the balance of interests 
such as independent media, other organized voices, and 
political accountability. I had little time to reflect on these 
philosophical and political realities at the time and, after 
recovering emotionally, felt a sense of relief that I could now 
get more involved in the worsening crisis unfolding in Iraq.
With public and media interest in me and in the 
humanitarian issues in Iraq, I was able to communicate the 
link between our dependence on oil in the western world (and 
resistance to the Kyoto Accord) and U.S. vested interest in Iraqi 
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reserves, the second largest in the world. The link between 
government power, the oil-military interests, and media 
conglomerates in both countries was too obvious not to expose. 
It was clear to many of us that war would be terribly costly to 
the Iraqi population and risky for not only the Gulf region but 
for the future of Arab–Western relations in the future. From a 
health and humanitarian perspective I needed to communicate 
the profound risks to the Iraqi population of war and global 
stability if the United States violated international law and 
carried out a pre-emptive strike under the guise of protecting 
itself from terrorist attacks.
Iraq Mission: November 2002
Talk of war was well established in the fall of 2002, and it 
suddenly occurred to me that we were about to observe a 
terrible human catastrophe in Iraq from the security of our 
North American living rooms. The thought appalled me and 
I contacted Physicians for Global Survival (PGS) in Ottawa, 
the Canadian Red Cross, and a friend with Doctors Without 
Borders with two questions: what planning had been done to 
assist with this disaster in Iraq and was there an opportunity 
for me to go to Iraq, even at this late time, to assess medical 
preparedness and provide information to Canadians on what 
was needed?
PGS, a non-government organization committed to 
education for the prevention of war and elimination of nuclear 
arms use, responded positively to the idea, and I travelled to Iraq 
between 16 November and 16 December, 2002, via Amman, 
Jordan. Travelling with me was an Iranian Canadian, Dr. 
Amir Khadir, with Médecins du Monde, from Montreal, with 
similar goals. Our independent reports were produced within 
weeks of returning and circulated to colleagues, activists, 
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and politicians across Canada in hopes of strengthening the 
budding anti-war movement. In my report I tried to sketch 
briefly a picture of the very hard life of people in Iraq under 
the most brutal sanctions in history. These sanctions followed 
two decades of relative abundance and development as a 
result of their oil wealth, including inexpensive food, cheap 
transportation, and free, modern health care and education for 
all. Clearly the contrast for Iraqi citizens was painful indeed, 
and most blamed the U.S. Administration and its influence at 
the UN for this decade of suffering – not Saddam Hussein.
In Baghdad I met a retired engineer who spoke of the 
prospect of war in this way: “First you tell me I have a headache, 
and then, to relieve me, you decide to chop off my head!” Given 
the carnage of the war that ensued, these comments return to 
haunt many of us. I met only a single individual who believed 
war was the best solution to the problems of terrorism or the 
oppression of Iraqis. No one is disappointed at the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein, but the cost both to the country and to 
international institutions, including the UN, has been great.
Dr. Khadir and I experienced an extraordinary cooperation 
and assistance by Iraqi officials in meeting with individuals and 
humanitarian organizations we chose. Some of the mortality 
statistics were disturbing indeed and, while produced by 
credible organizations, such as UNICEF, could not be verified 
from primary sources.
We reviewed government data and reports from UN 
agencies (United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, 
and WHO), non-governmental organizations, and committee 
meetings. In addition there were numerous interviews with 
International Red Cross, CARE, Médecins du Monde, 
Enfants du Monde, Première Urgence, and Architects for 
People in Need relating to disaster preparedness in Iraq as well 
as with many citizens and health workers, including physicians 
and nurses in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.
 118   Canada and the New American Empire    119  Finding My Voice for Peace
Our Findings
Since Iraq was seriously cut off from the world, the sanctions 
stifled human development at all ages and in every walk of 
life. The Oil-for-Food program, started six years after the 
end of the Gulf War and managed by the UN, provided the 
minimum of basic foodstuffs and medicines for survival. The 
psychological toll was evident in all our interactions and surely 
contributed to massive increases in medical demands.
Individuals and families we met were remarkably helpful 
and accepting of our mission and gave an important human 
dimension to the study. One family – that of Karima in central 
Baghdad – had particular challenges even without the war. 
This widow of eight years coped with great courage with her 
nine children in a two-room dwelling, selling condiments on 
the street. Three of the teen children were also working to 
keep the family fed and could not attend school, despite a keen 
interest. Twin girls of twelve years playfully tried to teach me 
Arabic during my three visits to their home. They all survived 
on the monthly rations of the Oil-for-Food program – flour, 
rice, sugar, tea, lentils, oil, and a few vegetables. The father had 
been killed in his taxi when the brakes failed – a predictable 
consequence of economic sanctions.
Hard Facts
The physical environment in Iraq (air, water quality and 
sanitation, vehicle and building safety) was poor and placed 
extra risk on all, but especially on the most disadvantaged. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 
2002) reported 60 per cent access to safe drinking water, but 
this assumes a functional pumping system with consistent 
electricity, which is not the case. Garbage is seen everywhere 
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– streets, parks, empty lots, and playgrounds – attracting rats, 
packs of wild dogs, and poor people, young and old. Public 
service was extremely limited due to lack of trucks and cash 
to pay employees. Vehicles were abysmally maintained, except 
for those of the wealthy. Taxis were missing door handles 
and even lights. Even with marginal braking systems, they 
travelled at high speeds and polluted terribly. Roads were not 
maintained well during the sanctions, and, especially outside 
Baghdad, multiple hazards existed. Vehicle-related injury was 
commonplace, as would be expected, and there was minimal 
evidence of traffic control.
The economic conditions for over half of the population 
were desperate and caused widespread anxiety and stress, 
particularly when unexpected expenses arose such as home 
maintenance and health problems. With the sanctions since 
1990, the dinar, formerly equivalent to US$3, was devalued 
by over six-thousand-fold, forcing people to sell personal 
possessions to survive. Many people, especially young people, 
gave up school or career in order to feed their families. Some 
of the monthly food rations were sold in order to meet such 
pressing needs. According to the UN many aspects of the food 
program were functioning with 94 per cent of funds for food, 
housing, and oil spare parts being available to those in need. 
Other sectors such as water, sanitation, education, electricity, 
agriculture, and health received substantially less of designated 
funds. The September 2002 UN Report on the Humanitarian 
Program indicated satisfactory distribution of commodities 
by the former Iraqi government, given the limitations in 
communications and transportation in Iraq at the time.
The entire health sector was profoundly degraded: lack of 
manpower and training, particularly in nursing; breakdown 
of infrastructure and inability to replace or repair equipment 
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and acquire new technology; intermittent drug shortages; lack 
of transportation and weak communications. This contributed 
to many professionals leaving the country and meant an 
impoverished and demoralized workforce. Salaries (physicians 
earned twenty dollars a month and nurses are paid similarly) 
and working conditions discourage entry into the health 
professions. Patients had reduced access to care, incomplete 
investigations, and more expensive treatment options. 
Preventable conditions were common, due to a combination of 
marginal nutrition and poor water and sanitation. Diarrhoea, 
typhoid fever, hepatitis, influenza, and TB were common, 
with chronic conditions such as mental illness, heart disease 
and cancer increasing. International organizations, including 
Red Cross, CARE, and Première Urgence, assisted in some 
refurbishing of infrastructure in institutions, including water 
systems, but these remained unreliable due to power outages 
and drops in water pressure. Certain drugs (20% of essential 
drug lists) and much electronic and imaging technology were 
blocked from entry by the UN 661 Committee. Health status 
improved in some cases, especially in the northern Kurdish 
areas since the Oil-for-Food program began in 1996. Yet child 
health in particular remained precarious, with a shocking 24 
per cent low birth weight (under 2,500 grams) and over 20 per 
cent malnutrition in children under five years.
Depleted uranium (DU) used in Gulf War armaments 
continues to be a plausible cause of the large increase in birth 
defects and childhood cancers reported by physicians in many 
hospitals, particularly in the Basra area. This has been noticed 
especially for leukemias and lymphomas, which appear also 
to be more aggressive and difficult to treat than in the past. 
The lack of any systematic review of increased incidence of 
cancers remains a matter of urgency and should be addressed 
in objective studies, especially in light of continued use of DU 
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by the United States and other countries in their arsenal of 
conventional weapons. 
Maternal mortality was another unacceptable result of 
the sanctions, with 294 deaths per 100,000 live births (three 
times higher than in 1990) due to maternal malnutrition, iron 
deficiency, unaffordable or inaccessible care, and inadequate 
emergency and health care services. Social problems increased 
in association with declining employment (43% for men; 10% 
for women) and falling literacy rates (from 90% in 1985 to 
57% in 1997; UNDP 2002) as people focused on meeting 
basic needs. Sanctions included textbooks, computers, and all 
communications with the outside world, leaving teachers with 
low morale. Eighty-three per cent of schools were in disrepair, 
and over five thousand new schools are needed for the current 
population (UNDP 2002). Other problems included theft 
and increased numbers of street children, prostitution, and 
violence, which were rare prior to 1990.
Personal Observations
The people of Iraq touched me in many ways. Despite their 
suffering, they were cheerful and very hospitable – sharing the 
little they had with simplicity, humility, and dignity. Despite 
years of propaganda from their media against westerners, many 
Iraqis had a maturity and decency that recognized people 
as equal from our respective countries while seeing political 
leaders as responsible for problems in both our cultures. Their 
plea to us, on our returning to our home countries, was to put 
a human face on Iraqis. “We are not all Saddam Hussein or 
terrorists. You must stop treating us like insects,” one woman 
exclaimed. Indeed.
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Disaster Prevention: A Game Worth Trying
I argued, along with many organizations across the world and 
the United Nations, for active involvement in the critical work 
of preventing, as well as preparing for a U.S. invasion. Indeed 
the UN’s purpose is to “protect future generations from the 
scourge of war,” in part through its Charter which clearly 
identifies war as legal only where a country is being invaded 
(Article 51) or under the Security Council where no other 
option exists to restore peace to a country.
Disaster planning generally assumes the worst-case 
scenario and designs a strategy to mobilize human and material 
resources to minimize injury and death before disaster strikes. 
However, in the case of Iraq, we were dealing with a deliberate, 
manmade event (war). Among other factors, prevention hinged 
on a willingness to invest time, energy, and resources toward 
constructive resolution of conflict equal to that invested in 
preparations for war.
With weak medical and infrastructure support, extremely 
variable in each part of the country, extra demands of war 
meant dramatic loss of access to care for those with existing 
chronic disease as well as those in acute need during conflict. 
Areas for Canadian Support to Iraq
Canada chose to stand with the UN and its Charter against 
teh U.S. invasion, and many Canadians were very grateful for 
this sign of leadership, even statesmanship. As such Canada 
can continue to play a moderating role on the United States, 
foster civil society in Iraq and provide a reasoned voice for 
the legitimate role of the United Nations in peace-making 
and in rebuilding the country. The pressing need has 
become security, which is based on the lack of credibility and 
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motives of the occupying U.S. forces. Financial and in-kind 
contributions through existing humanitarian organizations 
(e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, MSF, Care 
International, and Doctors of the World) are critically needed. 
Faith-based organizations may also have a role to provide direct 
service to displaced persons, the ill, the injured, and the poor, 
but the danger is that evangelization could add enormously to 
the sense of violation of this Muslim land.
The Good News
The largest anti-war movement in human history arose as a 
result of this war. We know that in this the most violent of eras 
greater and greater armaments do not lead to greater security: 
witness the United States spending a billion dollars daily on 
military and weapons and a homeland security strategy that 
violates the rights and freedoms of U.S. citizens themselves. 
The real basis of human security lies in construction of better 
living conditions, equitable distribution of resources, and 
international trust. Constructive human and environmental 
development, unlike destructive war, would reduce rather than 
increase terrorism. In the post-war context we can see that the 
unilateral aggression by the United States:
 • violated UN principles and process,
 • destroyed lives on both sides of the conflict and 
increased refugees,
 • provided no guarantee of better lives for Iraqis,
 • risked nuclear and other weapons use,
 • further destroyed the fragile environment,
 • destabilized the Gulf region and may contribute to 
civil wars within Iraq,
 • will contribute to extremism and terrorism,
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 • has major economic and social impacts on all 
countries and their citizens.
It is unfortunate that the U.S. Administration under George 
W. Bush does not appreciate the degree of violence done to 
Iraqis and other Arab citizens through its actions. The level of 
distrust and anger at the United States makes it impossible for 
it to be seen as a benevolent actor or liberator of Iraqis in this 
crisis. Other interests of the United States are also too evident 
– oil, strategic control in the Gulf, favoured relations with 
Israel, and others.
The UN, representing many countries, and limited as 
it is by its procedures, is still in the best position to balance 
individual state interests and preserve world order. It remains 
our best hope of avoiding arbitrary force by individual 
states and the endless cycles of violence we have witnessed. 
Our environments, economies, and social stability depend 
fundamentally on an international order grounded in law, as 
represented by the UN Charter and the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions.
The convergence of powerful political, military, and oil 
interests in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 
with compliant media, created an unprecedented momentum 
for war on Iraq. The rush to war, deliberate undermining 
of the role of the UN, and U.S. self-interest were revealed 
largely through the independent media and global Internet 
communications. The result was a second “super-power,” an 
international community against the war that gave a powerful 
voice for an alternative vision for the planet.
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Final Reflections
As a father, a citizen, and a physician, I have thought about 
what it means to be an ethical and responsible citizen of the 
world. I have been moved deeply by what I experienced of 
life in several countries, including apartheid South Africa, 
post-Marcos Philippines, and now Iraq, and realize the cost 
of silence. Democracy is only an idea until those of us able 
to speak and act freely do so. One elderly U.S. peace team 
member I met in Baghdad, Cynthia Banas, said this, when 
asked why she planned to stay there through the war: “It seems 
many people are willing to give their lives for war. More of us 
need to be willing to give our lives for peace.”
For a large number of citizens on the planet, this conflict has 
awakened a consciousness that our very survival is dependent 
on recovering our vision for democracy, humanity, and the 
rule of law. We know there is a cost both to speaking and to 
remaining silent. The war in Iraq has touched us because it is 
ultimately about who we are, what we stand for in Canada, and 
what sacrifice we are willing to make to create a more sane and 
humane world for us and for our children.
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FAITHFUL COUNTERPOINT TO WAR
Very Reverend Bill Phipps
A soldier deeply experienced in war once said: “I hate 
war as only a soldier who has lived it can; as one who 
has seen its brutality, its futility, and its stupidity.”
The speaker was General Eisenhower, speaking in Ottawa in 
1946. He also warned the world about the destructive, all-
pervasive, and suffocating obscenity of the military- industrial 
complex. The integration of making instruments of war with 
products for domestic consumption pervades many American 
industries. General Electric is one example of a corporation 
with substantial defence contracts. Furthermore, few states of 
the union (perhaps none) are without companies with defence 
contracts. Elected officials do not want to jeopardize jobs 
dependent on the war machine.
It is unfortunate that the current commander-in-
chief, i.e., president of the testosterone-laden United States 
administration, has had no personal, first-hand experience of 
war. He managed to avoid the Vietnam War, and not because 
of conscientious objection. The first nine months of the Bush 
administration were without vision, energy, or program. 
He had no compelling agenda. September 11th changed all 
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that. Deeply influenced by his non-elected cabinet and other 
officials – Rumsfeld, Pearle, and Rice, for example, he found 
a clear, simple purpose, which was to make war on terrorists. 
With the new American agenda for the twenty-first century, 
the war on terrorism provided a popular cover to wage war on 
“America’s enemies.” When you are commander-in-chief of the 
world’s most lethal war machine, it is easier to wage war than 
it is to build peace or attend to a complicated and troubling 
domestic agenda. And when you have an uncritical Congress, 
why bother with other divisive and complex issues?
There are three main reasons why the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq is wrong. First, war is outdated, passé, 
futile, and stupid. Ironically the destructive power of modern 
weapons renders them obsolete. Precision bombs are anything 
but. The cost in civilian life, environmental damage, and 
sheer dollars is prohibitive, and, except for the boys in power 
who seem to need their violence-fix, people around the world 
rebel at their deployment. Sanctions themselves led to at least 
500,000 Iraqi deaths, most of them children. The civilian 
death toll of the actual four-week war is estimated to be a few 
thousand, but the wounded are in the tens of thousands. We 
will never know for sure. The depleted uranium poisoning 
land, soldiers, and civilians is a case in point.
Second, a massive use of force as carried out against Iraq 
can only lead to further anger and a more-determined com-
mitment to acts of terrorism. Suicide bombers in Palestine 
and in Iraq itself are lining up to do damage to the enemy. 
The fear of suicide bombing being one of the few available 
weapons against the world’s only superpower is very real. It 
is a new vehicle of guerrilla warfare. It will provide Bush and 
company with a never-ending threat to U.S. “security” and 
therefore perpetual war. It is beyond me how the heavy think-
ers in Washington can ignore the inevitable violent backlash 
from a wider band of terrorists. Basic common sense, let alone 
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human experience, knows that violence begets violence. When 
the United States pulls out of multi-lateral agreements and in-
ternational actions, people see no alternative but to fight back 
with whatever tactics are available. When there is no hope in 
other solutions, what is there to lose?
Third, war is futile in our “globalized” world. The 
coordinated global peace campaigns, even before the U.S.-Iraq 
war started, were unprecedented. The United States may be 
a superpower militarily, but the countervailing global peace-
builders expose the fundamental weakness and laziness of war 
as an instrument of foreign policy. Millions of people parading 
on the same day testify to a moral, common cause. A thousand 
performances worldwide of Lysistrada (the ancient Greek play 
whose women withdrew sex until their men withdrew from 
war) on the same day testify to humour as an instrument 
revealing war’s futility. Global multi-faith peace vigils testify 
to the common religious traditions of non-violence. People 
who participate in multi-faith peace vigils do so for a variety 
of reasons. Public vigils declare their viewpoint about war 
and peace. Such events become personal testimonies to faith 
and public policy. They demonstrate solidarity with victims 
and fellow “vigilers” around the world. They embody hope in 
the human spirit and the Creator (however understood). And 
many people believe in the power of prayer (again, however 
understood). Lastly, peace vigils usually represent co-operative 
solidarity with other peace activism.
Global communication and solidarity instantly reveal the 
lies and manipulations of the propaganda from the powerful. 
Each of these ingredients of the new global conscience renders 
the purveyors of war impotent in their callous and hollow jus-
tifications. People question the goal of bringing “freedom” to 
Iraq when civil liberties are suspended in the United States. 
When the rationale for war constantly changes, people smell 
something foul. When no weapons of mass destruction are 
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found, and no invasion of another country by Saddam Hussein 
occurs, “regime change” becomes the excuse for war. People 
begin to mistrust and become cynical. It doesn’t help that some 
media become cheerleaders for Bush’s war, abandoning their 
traditional critical function. Reliable language, as well as truth, 
becomes a casualty of war.
My observation after an extensive exposure tour of Israel 
and Palestine in January 2003 is that the two sides in that 
conflict can be characterized as those who are committed 
to peaceful solutions versus those who have no imagination 
and therefore rely on violence. There are outstanding people 
throughout both Palestinian and Israeli societies who could 
build a lasting peace if the minority war people would step 
aside. People in both societies are sick of being fearful and 
vulnerable. People in Israel and Palestine realize the futility 
of brute force. Their efforts are rarely reported in the media, 
whose idea of news is yet another suicide bomber in Tel Aviv 
or a tank rumbling through Hebron killing terrorists and 
civilians alike.
Then there is the financial cost in addition to the loss of life 
and ecological destruction. By any moral calculation, spending 
tens of billions of dollars (the U.S. invasion of Iraq will prob-
ably top $100 billion), killing thousands of people, desecrating 
the environment, and pummelling infrastructure in order to 
depose one man is obscene and immoral. Everyone knows that 
money spent to wage that one war would provide food, clean 
water, education, health care, and positive economic develop-
ment for most of the developing world.
On a purely cost-benefit analysis, waging war instead of 
peace is immoral. The pure waste of the Earth’s abundant, yet 
limited, resources is both unbelievable and unconscionable. 
How can anyone justify such expenditures? They can’t. 
Recent U.S. foreign policy aside, there has been a relentless 
global movement toward international law, institutions, and 
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treaties that recognize the futility of violence and promote 
positive interdependence of all life, including nation states. 
The International Criminal Court is only one example. It 
is unfortunate that the United States is withdrawing from 
these cooperative beacons of genuine hope. The best impulses 
of American society have much to contribute (as they have 
done in the past). I believe the bully mentality of the current 
administration may be the last gasp of weak men on steroids. 
The international community need not be bullied, bribed, nor 
beaten into submission to a fading ideology.
I believe the United Nations demonstrated great strength in 
January and February 2003 when it resisted U.S. intimidation. 
It took courage for nations who rely on U.S. aid, trade, and 
goodwill to say “No” to this immoral and illegal war. It was the 
United States that demonstrated weakness in not having the 
imagination, commitment, and intelligence to continue the 
international pathway in containing Saddam Hussein. It was 
the United States that abandoned the global community, not 
the other way around. To say Canada abandoned the United 
States in their time of need was absurd. On 11 September 
2001, Canada was “there” for the United States. Just ask those 
Americans diverted to Newfoundland. Our government joined 
the United States in pouring billions of dollars into mutual 
“security.” We joined the “war on terror” against Afghanistan, 
recommitting troops as the war on Iraq commenced. However, 
Canada believes in the United Nations and believes, along 
with most of the world, that increased support of the UN 
is the best way to peace with justice. By the way, where was 
the United States in 1939, 1940, and 1941 when Hitler had 
overrun Europe and thousands of Canadians were dying for 
freedom? They were nowhere, Mr. President.
Through hundreds of global organizations and twenty-
first century means of communication, I believe that we 
are beginning the age of true internationalism. Even the 
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overwhelming power of the United States will not be able 
to stem the tide of the irresistible global movement of peace 
with justice. My work on behalf of peace is centred on my 
role as an international president of the World Conference 
on Religion for Peace (WCRP). Founded in 1970, WCRP 
is an international peace organization representing the major 
religious traditions of the world. Active in over forty countries, 
WCRP supports local communities in building interfaith 
actions for peace. They have been active in creating a climate 
for reconciliation and peace in such places as Sierra Leone, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo. In its seventh world assembly in Amman, 
Jordan, WCRP declared:
The common ethical concerns embodied in all religious 
traditions call us to be individually and socially responsible 
for our neighbours and those in need. They help us draw 
on the sources of love, duty and responsibility as the 
foundations that undergird the establishment of justice.
This global multi-faith organization sponsors work concern-
ing AIDS, peace education, disarmament and security, conflict 
transformation, justice for children, and a global network of 
religious women’s organizations.
Regardless of theology or doctrine, most religious tra-
ditions of the world share a common social ethic. Love of 
neighbour, peace with justice, harmony with Creation, mutual 
respect, dignity, and wholeness are ingredients in the ethical 
framework of the world’s faiths. Increasingly the elements we 
share are greater than our disagreements. I believe that it is 
time for the mainstream “liberal” expressions of religious faith 
to step forward as representing the integrating and cooperative 
spirit of religion in contrast to the divisive “fundamentalist” 
minority.
No one has a corner on “the truth.” One exciting aspect 
of living in an age of global communication is discovering the 
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rich experience and traditions of so many expressions of faith. 
To learn the myths that motivate reverence and compassion; 
to realize the commonalties of ancient and eternal stories that 
define who we are; to share the beauty, texture, and vitality of 
each other’s “holy” walk is not only inspiring; it is the future. 
No war machine nor oppressive ideology will be able to stop 
this journey into genuine global respect and partnership.
Canada is a place and space where discovering how to live 
together with all the world cultures is possible. Wherever I 
have travelled (Africa, Middle East, Central America, Asia), 
people still express hope and confidence in Canada’s vocation 
as peace-builders. If we don’t blow it, we are still trusted. I 
believe our national identity for the twenty-first century can 
be one of helping create “cultures of peace.”
Our multicultural cities, our strong commitment to the 
United Nations, our overall foreign policy can lead the way 
in showing the world that peace with justice is possible. 
With a growing global jurisprudence, global institutions, 
and commitment to global cooperation gaining strength and 
credence, the way of the bully will become the way of the past. 
Fostered by the gutsy strength of the UN, we witnessed an 
unprecedented discussion of the legalities and morality of war 
before the United States invaded Iraq. The world’s so-called 
superpower was forced to act unilaterally in their immoral and 
illegal aggression. Their defiance of international solidarity 
was transparent for all to see.
The world still needs to develop effective means to curtail 
and to control the killing madness of a Saddam Hussein. I 
believe it is possible. The International Criminal Court is 
just beginning its work. There’s no reason why an effective 
UN “police force” cannot be developed. The key, however, is 
the continuing movement of civil society around the world. 
Closing the gap between rich and poor, creating a culture of 
peace within which children are raised, respecting indigenous 
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cultures, honouring the integrity of Creation, and building 
bridges of international solidarity are some of the building 
blocks toward peace with justice. Continuing these efforts will 
render war obsolete.
Peace must be seen in its fullest sense. Peace is possible when 
the grievances concerning poverty, racism, sexism, disease, 
and oppression of all kinds are addressed honestly, openly, 
effectively, and with compassion. When the people of the world 
embrace one another in common cause, it will be inevitable 
that “the nations shall learn war no more” (Isaiah 2: 4).
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PEACE ACTIVISM: A CANADIAN’S 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAQ 
CONFLICT
Donn Lovett
“One drop in the ocean, but each drop can swell the 
tide” – Judy Small
It was fall, 1962. I was thirteen years old and the world was on 
the brink of a nuclear war. This time the given reason was the 
deployment of missiles in Cuba by the Russians. Something, 
apparently, the United States disagreed with. I remember those 
days as if they occurred last week. I spent six months of my life 
in constant stress. If I slept, I had nightmares about nuclear 
war. While awake I constantly thought of nuclear war and the 
destruction that would result, including my death. I remem-
ber the federal Canadian government organization called the 
Emergency Measures Organization (EMO), telling me that in 
the event of a nuclear attack while I was at school, I should hide 
under my desk. Remember, I was thirteen and, even at that 
age, I knew that “under the desk” was where they would find 
the vapour from the nuclear explosion – provided, of course, 
there was someone around to look for the vapour.
I remember one particular Monday evening. I know it was 
Monday because I delivered the Star Weekly magazine on that 
day. It was September in Winnipeg and after 6:00 p.m. when 
 136   Canada and the New American Empire    137  Peace Activism: A Canadian’s Involvement in the Iraq Conflict
the sun was setting and the street was getting dark. Suddenly 
the air was filled with the unprecedented sound of air raid 
sirens. I panicked and, running to the first house I could find, 
I pounded on the door. The man who met me immediately 
recognized my problem, tried to answer my stream of questions 
quickly and attempted to calm me. He put me in front of his 
television to show me that the sirens were part of what the 
EMO referred to as a “mock nuclear attack,” and I should not 
be afraid. How dare my government do this to a thirteen-year-
old child? They staged a “mock nuclear attack,” sounding air 
raid sirens without warning. I knew I had to do something 
to prevent a complete personal collapse. I sought people with 
whom I could discuss these issues and who were already doing 
something about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I joined 
a peace movement and learned what “one person can do.”
Also, vivid in my memory was the fact that the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was solved, not because one country attacked 
another, but rather as an outcome of dialogue. Yes, the Russians 
sent ships and the Americans countered with more ships, but 
ultimately dialogue prevented a war and the United Nations 
was involved in the solution. This message that I received from 
the events of 1962 still resonates today. That is, that dialogue 
is still the best way to solve disputes and the United Nations 
Organization is needed more than ever.
My activism carried me through high school and the 
Vietnam War. The point is my activism was born out of these 
events and the tumultuous sixties. In 1981 I found myself liv-
ing in Baghdad and working for a Canadian company called 
Canron. We were providing water pipe and fittings to Iraq for 
the supply of drinking water. The Iraqi regime had decreed that 
everyone in Iraq would have clean drinking water and properly 
treated sewage. As a Canadian company, we were doing mil-
lions of dollars of trade in Iraq, and I was sent to administer 
the contracts. My experience living among the people of Iraq 
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and interacting with them was one of respect, kindness, and 
honesty. When the Gulf War broke out and the United States 
talked about collateral damage for the first time, I thought of 
my Iraqi friends, and so I saw the war from a different 
perspective than did most North Americans.
I followed the events in Iraq and learned about the effect 
of the embargo on the people of Iraq and in particular the in-
creased infant mortality. My daughter was born in December 
1990 and, being a stay-at-home father, I was deeply involved 
in raising my child, and I readily empathized with those Iraqis 
who were losing their children at an alarming rate. Reports 
of the rise in infant mortality and deaths of civilians were 
stalled by the United States and the United Kingdom at the 
UN. They blocked reports coming from the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF. Finally, the information could no 
longer be hidden, and the Oil-for-Food program was initiated 
in an attempt to alleviate the hunger to which years of embargo 
had subjected the Iraqi people.
We learned that during the 1991 Gulf War, the United 
States led bombing raids that attacked every hospital, every 
water treatment plant, every wastewater plant, most schools, 
and every major intersection in downtown Baghdad in order to 
destroy the water distribution and sewage collection systems. 
All attacks against civilian infrastructure are in direct violation 
of the UN Charter and must be considered war crimes. A good 
friend of mine, Denis Halliday, the former UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Iraq said: “We are in the process of destroying 
an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal 
and immoral.” Pre-1990 Iraq reflected the status of a modern 
developing society, in which the wealth it obtained from ex-
porting its main commodity, oil, contributed to improving the 
quality of life of the Iraqi people.The Government of Iraq made 
sizable investments in the education sector from the mid-1970s 
until 1990. Educational policy included provision for scholar-
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ships, research facilities and medical support for students. By 
1989 the combined primary and secondary enrolment stood at 
75% (slightly above the average for all developing countries at 
70%). Illiteracy had been reduced to 20% by 1987. Education 
accounted for over 5% of the state budget, which was superior 
to the average for developing countries at 3.8%.
After the imposition of sanctions in 1991, we know that:
 1. 1.5 million Iraqi civilians have died since 1991 as a 
direct result of the sanctions.
 2. 600,000 of the dead were children under 5 years of 
age according to UNICEF reports and substantiated 
by the Red Cross. A recent UN report stated that 
the infant mortality rate in Iraq is 133. This means 
that for every 1,000 children born, 133 will not 
reach the age of five. By comparison, Canada’s 
infant mortality rate is less than four.
 3. The number of malnourished children has increased 
over 300% since 1991.
 4. Maternal mortality rates have more than doubled 
during this period of the sanctions and 70% of Iraqi 
women suffer from anemia.
 5. Unemployment has soared under the sanctions, 
as has inflation. The average civilian salary, for 
example, is C$3.60 per month.
 6. An estimated 800 tonnes of depleted uranium 
contained in ammunitions were used by the allied 
forces in the Gulf War. Cancer rates in Iraq have 
increased five-fold since the Gulf War. Childhood 
leukemia in Iraq has the highest rate in the world.
These undeniable facts lead me to travel to Iraq to view first 
hand the devastation to the Iraqi civilian population and the 
complete destruction of the civilian infrastructure and the 
civilian economy. I could no longer stand by and let the crimes 
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continue, crimes to which the Canadian government was a 
partner. Tacit approval of the unjust conditions to which Iraqis 
were subjected was tantamount to direct involvement in the 
destruction.
I began to contact people I thought could give me informa-
tion to help me develop a plan of action to assist the people 
of Iraq. The first was Denis Halliday. I remembered reading 
a statement that Mr. Halliday had made after he resigned his 
position with the UN in protest over U.S. interference in the 
relief operations in Iraq. He said, “I can find no legitimate 
justification for sustaining economic sanctions under these 
circumstances. To do so in my view is to disregard the high 
principles of the United Nation’s Charter, the Convention of 
Human Rights, the very moral leadership and the credibility of 
the United Nations itself.”
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Denis J. Halliday, 
an Irish national, to the post of United Nations Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Iraq, at the Assistant Secretary-General level 
on 1 September 1997. Halliday served as such until the end 
of September 1998. During this period, the Security Council 
Resolution 986 Oil-for-Food Program, introduced in 1996/
97 to assist the people of Iraq under the economic sanctions 
imposed and sustained by the Security Council, was more 
than doubled in terms of oil revenues allowed. This enabled 
the introduction of a multi-sectored approach, albeit modest, 
to the problems of resolving malnutrition and child mortality. 
Mr. Halliday resigned from the post in Iraq, and from the 
United Nations as a whole, on 31 October 1998, after serving 
the organization for thirty-four years.
After running the Oil-for-Food program, which uses Iraqi 
oil revenues to distribute basic food rations and medical aid 
to Iraqi civilians, Halliday turned his attention to spreading 
the word about sanctions-related suffering. I contacted Mr. 
Halliday in late 1999 and invited him to Canada. We met in 
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Ottawa for a series of lectures, and I took him to the House of 
Commons to meet the then Chair of the Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Graham. I wanted him to ask Mr. 
Graham to hold hearings on Iraq at the Standing Committee. 
Graham agreed immediately and the hearing was scheduled 
for March 2000. I arranged for Mr. Halliday and Mr. Arthur 
Millholland, the president of Oilexco, the only Canadian 
company participating in the Oil-for-Food program, to come 
to Ottawa as witnesses to the committee. The hearings lasted 
for three days, culminating in Report #5, “Resolution on Iraq,” 
which was tabled in the Canadian House of Commons on 12 
April 2000.
Report #5, which was unanimously supported by the 
eighteen members of Parliament sitting on the committee and 
representing all five political parties, called for a de-linking 
of sanctions. This meant the removal of economic sanctions 
but leaving military sanctions in place. It further called for an 
opening of dialogue between Canada and Iraq. The deputy 
prime minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, accepted Report #5 as 
a good basis to resolve the situation in Iraq. It was suggested 
that the secretary-general of the United Nations might use this 
report as a basis for breaking the impasse on getting proper 
humanitarian relief to Iraq.
Report #5 was rejected outright by the then Canadian 
foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and it died without being 
taken to the UN. The main reason given by senior advisors 
to Axworthy, at a meeting that I attended, were as follows: 
“While we recognize the destruction to the people of Iraq, we 
cannot do anything to upset the U.S. Administration because 
they will beat us up on trade.” One of the senior advisors was 
a medical doctor who had visited Iraq and had seen first hand 
the difficulties being experienced by the people of Iraq.
This resulted in two important outcomes for me. I met 
Madame Colleen Beaumier, the vice-chair of the Standing 
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, and I discovered that Lloyd 
Axworthy would not act if it meant confronting the United 
States.
I invited Madame Beaumier to come to New York to meet 
with the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz. She 
agreed and the meeting was arranged for September 2000 
at the Iraq Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. We 
discussed Report #5 as a basis to solving the economic embargo 
on Iraq while agreeing that at this stage the military embargo 
had to remain in place. The meeting was cordial and it was 
the first time that parliamentarians from Canada and Iraq had 
met since the Gulf War. By now Canada had closed its embassy 
in Baghdad, even though Iraq maintained a chargé d’affaires 
in Ottawa. The action now became one of getting individual 
MPs to endorse Report #5 in an attempt to get a majority of the 
301 MPs to sign a letter addressed to the prime minister (and 
copied to the foreign minister) demanding that Canada accept 
the results of the report drafted by the Standing Committee. 
We received unanimous support from the Bloc Québécois, the 
New Democratic Party, and the Progressive Conservatives, 
while individual members of both the Liberal Party and the 
Alliance Party, led by Dr. Keith Martin, agreed to endorse the 
report. We had the support of 127 members when Parliament 
was dissolved on 22 October 2000, and an election called. 
This nullified our efforts until after the election.
A new parliament was elected in November 2000, and we 
restarted our efforts to get Report #5 accepted by the Canadian 
Government. However, we now faced a new resistance. John 
Manley was appointed to the position of foreign minister, 
and he took an even closer stance with Washington. During 
Manley’s tenure, Canada moved as close to Washington as 
Canada had ever been. This caused individual MPs in the 
Liberal ranks to distance themselves from any initiative that 
may confront the United States. We also witnessed a hardening 
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of a pro-U.S. position with the Alliance Party, under their new 
leader, Stockwell Day. Although we still held the support of 
the Bloc, the NDP and the Tories, getting majority support 
was becoming increasingly more difficult. This, combined 
with the election of the neo-conservative Bush administration, 
made the matter of getting a resolution of the Iraqi sanctions 
almost impossible. It became clear to me that removal of 
sanctions could not happen without the return of the weapons 
inspectors and a resolution on the question of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMDs), which became the buzzword of 
the Bush White House.
At this time the Bush White House had little or no interest 
in foreign relations. It seemed hunkered down in an isolationist 
mentality until the attack on the World Trade Center in 
September 2001. The ensuing “War on Terrorism” set a course 
for Bush and his neo-conservative cohorts that continue to 
affect the world in a seriously negative way. The appetite 
for war, demonstrated by Bush after the September attack, 
provoked me to call a meeting of international diplomats and 
interested individuals to meet in New York to see what we 
could do to dampen the U.S. enthusiasm for war. I contacted 
Denis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck, both former United 
Nations humanitarian coordinators in Iraq. I contacted Scott 
Ritter, the former U.S. marine major and head of the UN 
weapons inspections in Iraq from 1991 through 1998. I also 
asked the former foreign minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, 
to join us, along with the president of the Canadian oil 
company, Oilexco, Arthur Millholland. Lloyd Axworthy had 
had a change of heart since leaving Ottawa and wanted to see 
what could be done to ease the pressure on Iraqi civilians. All 
agreed and a meeting was arranged for the end of November 
2001 in New York, ironically held at the Republican Women’s 
Center. Mr. von Sponeck could not join us but was in contact 
via phone and e-mail.
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Although several ideas were discussed, it became clear that 
the return of the weapons inspectors was the only way out of 
the impasse. It was thought that Canada could play a role, 
given that it had an outstanding reputation at the UN and was 
not an imperialist nation. Iraq might accept recommendations 
coming from there. However, John Manley was still foreign 
minister in Canada and not predisposed to anything that may 
confront the United States. We decided to continue discussions 
and to formulate a plan that could be discussed between 
Canada, Iraq, and the UN.
Lloyd Axworthy agreed to discuss our meeting with Louise 
Frechette, a Canadian and the deputy secretary-general of the 
UN, and with Colin Powell, the U.S. secretary of state, whom 
he was to meet with at dinner while he was in New York and 
Washington. Conversations within the group continued over 
the last part of 2001 and into 2002.
In January 2002, Prime Minister Chrétien appointed Bill 
Graham as the new Canadian foreign minister, and hopes for 
a more sovereign Canadian position with regard to the United 
States gave us a reason to quicken our attempts to get the weap-
ons inspectors back into Iraq. By this time Denis Halliday and 
Hans von Sponeck were now concentrating their efforts in 
Europe. Arthur Millholland was in the UK and busy with his 
business efforts. Lloyd Axworthy became busy with his UBC 
institute. It was left to Scott Ritter and me to continue the dis-
cussions started in New York in the fall of 2001.
Scott Ritter arranged to meet with the Labour Party in the 
UK and the French Government to discuss the return of the 
inspectors. I began to build support in Ottawa with MPs with 
whom we could work. Notably, Madame Francine Lalonde 
of the Bloc, Dr. Keith Martin of the Alliance, Joe Clark of 
the Conservatives, and Alexa McDonough of the NDP were 
contacted, and they agreed to keep in touch with the initiative. 
Madame Lalonde became quite active and was a strong source 
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of support. I was in constant contact with Madame Colleen 
Beaumier, who gave us access to the Liberal caucus.
Meanwhile, I developed a relationship with Robert Fry, the 
senior advisor to Bill Graham, the foreign minister, as well as 
with Chris Hull and Graeme McIntyre from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Through 
Robert Fry we could get access to the foreign minister if the 
matter was significant enough. At this point we were feeling 
quite encouraged and I asked the Standing Committee to meet 
with Scott Ritter to discuss the return of weapons inspectors. 
Thanks to the efforts of Madame Lalonde and Dr. Martin, 
the committee agreed to meet with Scott Ritter and Denis 
Halliday in early June 2002.
The meeting with the Standing Committee was very 
successful. Scott Ritter was able to convey the importance of 
getting the weapons inspectors back into Iraq as a necessary 
step to getting the economic sanctions removed. There was a 
sense from the meeting that Canada could play a role once 
the inspectors had returned. Scott Ritter and I then met 
with Madame Lalonde to develop a document entitled “The 
Honest Broker.” The thrust of this document was to ask Iraq 
to agree first to the return of the weapons’ inspectors and 
then to permit Canada, South Africa, and Belgium to help 
mitigate any difficulties that might arise between Iraq and 
the UN as a consequence of the inspections. These countries 
would not interfere with the inspectors themselves because 
they recognized that the United States would not tolerate any 
interference with the inspection process. However, situations 
might have arisen requiring some form of reconciliation 
between the UN and Iraq during the inspections. Canada was 
chosen because it is the major trading partner of the United 
States with a close historical, political, and geographical 
relationship. South Africa was chosen to represent the non-
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aligned nations and Belgium because of its membership in 
NATO and the EU.
In August 2002, Scott Ritter went to South Africa to 
meet with the Tariq Aziz of Iraq, Mr. Pahad, the deputy 
foreign minister of South Africa, and the Belgian foreign 
minister. During these meetings it was agreed that Scott 
would go to Baghdad to address the Iraq National Assembly 
on 8 September and during the presentation would discuss the 
return of the inspectors. South Africa and Belgium agreed to 
cooperate with Canada, if Canada would take the lead on the 
“honest broker” initiative.
Meanwhile back in Canada, I stayed in touch with the 
prime minister and the foreign minister to ensure that, at the 
very least, Canada would continue to support the UN and not 
support U.S. unilateral actions. On two occasions in July and 
August of 2002, in direct phone conversations with Prime 
Minister Chrétien, I was assured that Canada would keep 
supporting the UN. On 9 August 2002, at a meeting with 
Bush in Detroit, Mr. Chrétien reiterated Canada’s support for 
a UN resolution to the Iraq situation. At the same time I had 
met with Minister Graham, who also assured me that Canada 
would stay with a UN resolution. They have maintained that 
position, and I believe that Canadians should be very proud 
of their actions in the face of the tremendous pressure from 
the United States. I was in the Canadian House of Commons 
on 17 March 2003, when the prime minister announced that 
Canada would not support the U.S. war on Iraq. This was one 
of the bravest things he had ever done.
Scott Ritter met with the Iraq National Assembly on 8 
September 2002, and told them in no uncertain words that 
they had to allow the inspectors to return and that there was 
no room for negotiations on this matter. Further, they had to 
advise the UN that they would accept the inspectors before 
the United States was able to get a resolution before the UN 
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that they would not be able to deal with. Iraq accepted what 
Scott Ritter had to say and dispatched Foreign Minister Sabri 
to New York for 14 September.
While this was being organized and unfolding, Bush was 
dragged kicking and screaming to the UN on 12 September. 
This happened through the efforts of a number of countries 
including Canada and the United Kingdom. He appeared at 
the UN because there was virtually no support for U.S. ac-
tions against Iraq and Bush felt that the United States could 
beat the UN into submission. The timing worked out for Iraq, 
which had agreed to come to New York for 14 September 
and, through a series of negotiations in New York that I was 
involved in, made its proposal to the UN through Kofi Annan 
on 16 September 2002. The proposal allowed for a return of 
weapons inspectors to Iraq with no conditions attached. The 
negotiations were finalized in November 2002 and the way was 
paved for Hans Blix to return to Iraq after four years without 
inspections.
The return of the inspectors neutralized the U.S. demand 
that Iraq disarm. However, it soon became apparent that the 
United States was not interested in a disarmed Iraq but rather 
wanted control of the country for several reasons, not the 
least of which was Iraqi oil and the fact that in their war on 
terrorism they had not been able to find Osama bin Laden. 
The United States then moved to the language of “regime 
change,” and the world began to respond to their actions, 
culminating in the mass rallies held worldwide on 15 February 
2003. Tens of millions of people protested the U.S. position, 
including 1.5 million people in London, who opposed Tony 
Blair’s pro-U.S. stance, and one million people in Rome, who 
opposed their government’s support for the United States. 
Spain saw hundreds of thousands of people in Madrid and 
Barcelona protesting the Spanish government’s support of 
Bush. As a result, the United States changed its rhetoric from 
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“regime change” to “liberation of the Iraqi people and a change 
in human rights.”
In January 2003 I organized a parliamentary delegation to 
go to Iraq with the knowledge of both the prime minister and 
the foreign minister. Madame Colleen Beaumier and her able 
assistant, Natalie Jewett, joined me on the trip. In Baghdad 
we met with the deputy prime minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, the 
foreign minister, Mr. Naji Sabri, the Iraq trade minister, the 
communications and transportation minister, the deputy 
agriculture minister, and the deputy speaker of the Iraq 
National Assembly, accompanied by several members of the 
Assembly. The purpose of the trip was to convey to Iraq the 
Canadian position with regard to disarmament and to receive 
any message that Iraq wanted put before our government. The 
Iraqis asked one thing and that was for Canada to maintain its 
position in support of the UN.
We arrived back in Canada on 29 January 2003, and 
worked non-stop to try and reach agreement on an initiative 
that would prevent the United States from invading. This 
involved a two-stage proposal. Initially there was the six points 
for peace plan that was developed through the efforts of Scott 
Ritter and the deputy foreign minister of South Africa, Mr. 
Pahad, and was an extension of the Canadian initiative that 
was being discussed by the non-permanent members of the 
UN Security Council in February 2003. After the attack by 
the United States and the United Kingdom, a modification of 
that plan which was now being sponsored by the Vatican was 
tabled. Both of these proposals had been somewhat agreed to 
by Iraq and involved disarmament, human rights, democracy, 
diplomacy, economy, and, of course, peace. But as the entire 
world now understands, the United States and the United 
Kingdom were not interested in a peaceful solution to Iraq.
The point of this article is to let people know that anyone 
can make a difference. Although we failed in our attempt to 
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prevent the United States from invading Iraq, we accomplished 
great things during the past few years. Canada did not change 
its position and support the U.S./UK war. Canada maintained 
its support for the UN. We met with several governments 
around the world and we felt we influenced their decisions. 
Often it is very ordinary Canadians who make a difference. 
For example, my twenty-three-year-old daughter, Shanda, 
travelled to Iraq in 1999 as part of an international women’s 
conference. While in Iraq she visited several schools and talked 
to children about the sanctions. She was invited to meet with 
Madame Aline Chrétien and in December 1999 had a ninety-
minute audience with Madame Chrétien to discuss her experi-
ence in Iraq. Shanda and her younger sister Kate have become 
anti-war activists in there own right. The unwavering support 
of my wife Nora has been crucial to both our daughters’ and 
my activism.
Our responsibility now is to ensure that the United States 
does not become the judge, jury, and executioner for the world. 
We shall overcome.
Epilogue: September 2003
A large group of activists and academics travelled to Cyprus in 
April 2003 to discuss what to do next. Out of those discussions 
came the dream of Dr. Tareq Ismael of the University of Calgary 
to build an International University in Baghdad (IUB). The 
initial proposal was developed in Cyprus, and it was decided 
that the initiative should be a Canadian-sponsored one.
The IUB would begin as a “virtual university,” meaning that 
the project will begin to get underway in terms of establishing 
programs, international connections, and so forth, even before 
it would acquire a physical presence in Iraq. Once established, 
however, it will be a graduate-focused institution and would 
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complement post-secondary education in Iraq, rather than 
compete in the post-Baath environment. Not only will the 
university spearhead needed educational programs, but it will 
also make available a wealth of educated individuals capable of 
filling the “brain-drain” that resulted from the years of war, 
militarization, and sanctions. Before the U.S. and British-led 
attack on Iraq, there were ten universities in the country, but 
the quality of education provided at these universities was 
in decline as there was not enough funding available to run 
these institutions properly, principally due to the UN Security 
Council sanctions and the choices made by the previous 
Iraqi government to focus predominantly on militarization. 
Vast numbers of university professors and professionals, such 
as doctors and engineers, left the country in the 1990s as a 
result of the dramatic decline in social services. Now, largely 
due to the destruction and looting incurred in the recent war 
and its aftermath, none of the universities in Iraq remain 
fully functional. This is a predicament that urgently requires 
attention, as access to education has always been instrumental 
in developing a lively and independent civil environment.
The established universities in Iraq will benefit greatly 
from an internationally oriented, graduate studies facility in 
their country. The IUB will be able to draw students from 
all over the world to study in Iraq, alongside Iraqi citizens, 
creating a constructive dialogue that is capable of transcend-
ing the simplicities of international conflict scenarios. The 
breadth of experiences possessed by the international students 
will enhance the resources and connections that Iraqi citizens 
themselves would have, fostering greater civil society through 
an ever-increasing independence from governmental contacts. 
At the same time, the unique experiences of the Iraqi students 
– historically, politically, economically, and culturally – along 
with the potential revival of a “cosmopolitan” Baghdad, will 
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serve to enrich the international students who would be 
studying at the IUB.
The planning committee has already garnered a great deal 
of international recognition for this project, including support 
from individuals such as Betty Williams, the Irish Nobel 
laureate, and Jordan’s Prince el-Hassan Bin Talal, brother 
of the late King Hussein, who is acting as the chairman of 
the board of trustees. Furthermore, IUB advocates include 
Canada’s former prime minister Jean Chrétien, along 
with Edward Broadbent, former leader of NDP; Richard 
Falk, professor of international law (emeritus) at Princeton 
University; and John Polanyi, winner of the Nobel Prize in 
chemistry and professor of chemistry at the University of 
Toronto. With the help of other supporters, the IUB planning 
committee is also currently working to urge Nelson Mandela, 
former South African president, to become a member of the 
university’s board of trustees.
At this crucial time when many Iraqis see any outside 
involvement as largely negative and tied to an “occupation” and 
relate to the international environment in terms of “conflict,” 
the reconstruction of Iraqi educational infrastructure through 
this project and others will help to provide an example for the 
positive possibilities of international cooperation. Canada is 
in a unique position to spearhead such a project and should 
seize the opportunity to foster positive development in Iraq 
and advance our traditional role as a peacemaker in the 
international environment.
Over the past few months, we have had meetings with 
several MPs, senators, DFAIT, CIDA and potential partner 
agencies such as the Association of Universities and Colleges 
of Canada, the Canadian Bureau for International Education, 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. We presented them with the following rationale for 
why Canada should lead this initiative:
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 1. Canada has had a long-standing relationship with 
the Middle East and in particular with Iraq. Prior 
to the Gulf War of 1991, Canada was one of Iraq’s 
primary trading partners, and the Canadian Wheat 
Board was the largest supplier of wheat to Iraq.
 2. Canada is considered a non-imperialistic actor 
in the region. We have not had the expansionist 
policies of France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
 3. Canada has had a reputation as a Middle Power and 
a peacemaker in world affairs.
 4. The stance that Canada took in the recent Gulf 
War of not supporting unilateral U.S. action has 
reinforced Canada’s image in world affairs.
 5. Canada can exercise a tremendous amount of 
influence in Iraq and the region by taking these 
kinds of initiatives.
Anyone who finds this rationale compelling and is interested 
in helping us realize this project may contact me at 
donn@dlagency.com. This may be a small step for each of us, 
but for Iraqi society it is a major leap.
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IRAQ, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND 
RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP
Dr. Arthur Clark
The United States and the United Kingdom invaded and 
occupied Iraq claiming that weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) in Iraq represented a threat to international peace. 
To date no evidence to substantiate this claim has been 
found. But the invasion and occupation have demonstrated an 
unequivocal threat to international peace. By their unlawful 
use of force against the government of a sovereign state, the 
perpetrators – and particularly the government of the United 
States – have made unmistakable their potentially lethal threat 
to various governments worldwide, and therefore their threat 
to international peace. There is nothing subtle about this 
threat, and the “opinion leaders” in the Bush administration 
seem particularly eager to make the threat clear to anyone 
paying attention.
This threat did not begin with the Bush administration, 
and it is not unique to the government of the United States. 
Lawless violence, cloaked in noble intentions, is characteristic 
of powerful states. The United States, as the dominant 
power, is the current prototype. In our culture there is a 
general reluctance to recognize the threat we pose to others. 
Norman Cousins in his 1987 book, The Pathology of Power 
noted the tendency of power to create a language of its own, 
making other forms of communication suspect.1 The United 
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States and the United Kingdom are unlikely to repudiate 
international law outright because they derive massive benefits 
from the international legal system. But their invasion of Iraq 
has destabilized the framework for international peace and 
security, produced thousands of casualties, devastated Iraqi 
cultural institutions, increased risks to Americans and others, 
and accelerated the drain of public resources into the military 
sector of the U.S. economy. Somebody, of course, has benefited 
handsomely from all this. But that is a topic for a different 
essay.
Calling for an investigation into the Bush administration’s 
claims about Iraqi WMD has recently become politically 
acceptable, and even calls for impeachment are beginning to 
appear. It is not politically correct, however, to do anything 
that would fundamentally challenge the lawless violence of 
the government of the United States. Yet that challenge is 
essential to the future peace and security of North Americans. 
Any state or institution arrogating to itself the right to 
threaten others will thereby jeopardize its own security. The 
costs of maintaining that security will increase, draining 
public revenues and devastating the lives of individuals. It is 
unrealistic to think that security for North Americans can be 
reliably promoted without promoting the security of others. 
But conventional wisdom accepts the preposterous idea that 
our long-term security is being enhanced by escalating our 
threat to other countries. These issues, as elementary and 
urgent as they are, must be placed in the public arena by 
concerned citizens. Otherwise, they will not be taken seriously 
by political and intellectual “leaders.”
From the Gulf War until the illegal invasion of Iraq in 
2003, western policy toward Iraq was based on an intense and 
sustained hostility to the government of that country. This 
hostility has had devastating consequences for the people of 
Iraq. In North America, public support for this hostile policy 
 154   Canada and the New American Empire    155  Iraq, International Law and Responsible Citizenship
has been cultivated using standard devices of war propaganda, 
notably demonization of the political leadership in the targeted 
country. Propaganda for war characteristically draws on 
factual information but removes it from context or places it in 
a context to evoke support for war. Outright lying is usually 
unnecessary.2
This essay provides some context for the themes which, 
removed from their context, have been used as propaganda for 
war against Iraq. It emphasizes the violations of international 
law by all parties to the conflict. It uses this background as an 
object lesson on the failure of responsible citizenship in our 
culture. I conclude with a proposal for a functional concept 
of responsible citizenship. Implementing that concept can im-
prove the chances for peace and security in the future, not only 
for Iraq and other countries overseas, but for North Americans 
as well.
Invasion and Lawlessness
The standard North American view of Saddam Hussein’s Baath 
government in Iraq has emphasized its treachery. Governments 
are often violent and deceitful, and the government of Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein has provided an important example. 
Much more telling examples are the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, since they have had, individually 
and in aggregate, a far more decisive influence on twentieth-
century history than the government of Iraq. Each of those 
five countries has a history of murderous internal conflict and 
murderous and aggressive foreign policy.
This treachery of governments has historically been tol-
erated or supported by their citizens and by their allies. A 
standard way of achieving that toleration and support is the 
government’s emphasis on the necessity of its own treachery 
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to overcome an adversary’s treachery. To the extent that this 
argument is effective, the problem will persist.
The case of Iraq illustrates this paradox. The invasion of Iraq 
by the United States and the United Kingdom was justified on 
the grounds that Iraq was a threat to the peace. It is irrational 
to support one government’s armed attack on another based on 
the claim that the country being attacked might do something 
similar in the future. The invasion was also an assault on the 
principle of non-aggression, which is a necessary cornerstone 
of the international legal system. The invasion is illegal, and 
the argument in support of it is irrational.
Every major act of lawless violence opens a Pandora’s box. 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq were expected to increase 
recruitment into terrorist organizations and emerging evidence 
supports the prediction. The U.S./UK aggression will prompt 
a range of countermeasures from governments around the 
world. We cannot predict these developments in detail, but the 
dangers may have massively increased. The larger problem of 
lawless violence has been made worse by using lawless violence 
against the government of Iraq.
A powerful state can often persuade the public to abandon 
reason and common sense in support of its violence and 
treachery. Because every powerful state also facilitates major 
positive achievements and conveys important benefits, the 
grateful public is easily seduced into support for the state’s 
villainy. An act of military aggression by a powerful state will 
reflect this ambivalent nature. An act of aggression produces 
irreparable harm and major atrocities. Part of the irreparable 
harm will be the increased volatility and a waste of resources 
that attend lawless violence. But the act of aggression will also 
be associated with ample benefits and positive effects. And the 
propagandist can use that aspect of reality to recruit support 
for further acts of lawless violence.
 156   Canada and the New American Empire    157  Iraq, International Law and Responsible Citizenship
Iraq’s Brutal Dictatorship
The rise of Saddam Hussein’s murderous dictatorship can be 
understood in much the same way. It was probably perceived 
by its supporters as a necessary evil in defence against mortal 
dangers. In Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973), 
more open governments had been overthrown with the 
assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA 
had also helped the conspirators (including Saddam Hussein) 
who overthrew Iraq’s popular revolutionary regime in 1963. 
Saddam’s nationalist Baath party was therefore keenly aware of 
the danger of internal subversion, and particularly one directed 
from Washington. Thus the danger of subversion was used to 
justify the savage internal security apparatus set up by Saddam 
Hussein. The measure was temporarily successful on its own 
terms. The CIA never did to the Baath in Iraq what they had 
done in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile.
Iraq’s Brutal Repression of the Kurds
The Baath government had also carried out murderous at-
tacks against the armed Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq, 
and villages known to support it. Like so many other acts of 
the Iraqi government, these attacks were astonishing in their 
brutality. They exceeded even the Turkish attacks on Kurdish 
insurgents and villages in that country and rivalled the attacks 
by Guatemalan armed forces on Guatemalan villages after 
1954. This is state terrorism, the form of terror that shaped 
the meaning of the word in the French Revolution of the late 
eighteenth century.
All these acts of violence occurred in a context that 
seemed, to some observers, to justify the atrocities. The Iraqi 
government campaign was directed against Kurdish factions 
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that had sustained an armed nationalist movement. An armed 
insurgency in a country surrounded by hostile states can 
reasonably be considered a “security threat.”
There had been violent conflict between the Kurdish 
insurgents and the Iraqi government well before the Baath party 
came to power in Iraq. The Iraqi government, before and after 
the rise of Saddam Hussein, used a carrot-and-stick approach 
in dealing with the threat. In March 1970, an agreement had 
been worked out between the government in Baghdad and the 
Kurdish leadership, whereby Kurdish would be the official 
language of the region and any government official stationed 
there would have to speak Kurdish. There would be Kurdish 
representation in the central governing body of Iraq, and a 
Kurdish university would be established. By regional standards 
this was a remarkably progressive arrangement, and the accord, 
sponsored by the Iraqi government, was signed by the Kurdish 
leadership. But the Kurds continued to seek foreign support for 
their insurgency, the internal security threat to Iraq persisted, 
and with it the government’s murderous repression.3
Iraq’s Aggression
Iraq’s major act of foreign aggression under Saddam Hussein 
was directed against Iran, beginning in 1980. It was ultimately 
responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and major 
setbacks to the economy in Iraq and in Iran.4 Like Saddam 
Hussein’s other acts of violence prior to 1990, the aggression 
against Iran was largely ignored or supported by other 
countries including the United States. That complicity 
changed suddenly in August 1990, when Iraq launched its 
aggression against Kuwait, a regional U.S. client ruled by a 
family dictatorship. Saddam Hussein’s tyranny and aggression 
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instantly became the subject of unrelenting propaganda for 
war in the western media.
The death toll resulting directly from Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait is estimated at three to five thousand, 
higher than the death toll from the U.S. invasion of Panama a 
few months earlier, but lower than the death toll from Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Neither the U.S. invasion of 
Panama nor Israel’s invasion of Lebanon became the object of 
effective action from the UN Security Council.5 By contrast, in 
the case of Iraq, international law was applied, leading to a series 
of proposals from Iraq for a negotiated peaceful withdrawal 
from Kuwait.6 Those proposals for a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis represent the intended effect of mechanisms established 
in the UN Charter.
But the UN Security Council had abdicated its decision-
making authority to then president George Bush. Bush rejected 
Iraq’s offers: “There will be no negotiations.” By late December 
1990, Iraq was seeking guarantees that their troops would not 
be attacked as they withdrew, that foreign armed forces in the 
region would go home after resolution of the crisis, that some 
steps toward resolution of the Palestinian problem would be 
made, and that some measure to control weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East would be initiated. The last 
point was a scarcely veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapons 
program, which threatened Iraq.
The Iraqi offer was recognized as a “serious pre-negotiat-
ing position” by U.S. analysts. Instead of pursuing it, as would 
be required under any reasonable interpretation of the UN 
Charter, the Bush (Sr.) administration drove events to a mas-
sive escalation of violence. Just the initial phase of that escala-
tion of violence, driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait, is estimated 
to have cost more than ten times as many lives as Iraq’s own 
actions during the occupation. And that was just the begin-
ning. The internal volatility in Iraq produced by the Gulf War 
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of 1991 led to uprisings in southern and northern Iraq against 
the government, with a predictably violent response from 
Baghdad. In southern Iraq, the United States was complicit in 
Baghdad’s suppression of the insurrection.
The violence of the Iraqi government has arisen in a context 
of violent actors, from armed insurgents to world powers. If we 
are ever to achieve a rule of law, aggressors must be held ac-
countable for their acts of aggression. That accountability will 
have to be consistent, whether it is Iraq or the United States 
or some other country carrying out the aggression. Otherwise 
there will be no rule of law. The betrayal of the UN Charter 
by the UN Security Council itself is made obvious by the gro-
tesque and violent response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and by 
the utter failure to apply the law of the Charter in response to 
the U.S./UK invasion of Iraq.
Economic Sanctions and Iraq’s “Hidden 
Weapons”
After Iraq’s retreat from Kuwait, the sanctions were extended 
on the premise that Iraq might be continuing its development 
of weapons of mass destruction. But Iraq’s WMD programs 
were effectively terminated by mid-1991. Despite more than 
seven years of intrusive weapons inspections (1991–98), UN 
weapons inspectors found no substantive evidence that Iraq 
was developing WMD. Yet the sanctions continued. A rational 
person might ask why. A rational answer is that they served 
functions other than that of a serious arms control measure.
Serious arms control measures must involve multilateral 
agreements and take into account the legitimate security needs 
of all parties to the arrangement. Forcing one country to disarm 
when it faces threats from regional adversaries is not a legiti-
mate arms control measure. When the country is additionally 
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subjected to military assault by the superpower that imposed 
the disarmament, the problem becomes an obscenity.
The sanctions were, from their inception, well understood 
to be of a type and severity that would ravage the economy of 
the targeted country. They represented a state of siege. British 
and U.S. government efforts to implicate Iraq in WMD 
production after 1991 were largely designed as propaganda and 
recently included forged documents, plagiarism, and a series of 
claims discredited by UN weapons inspectors and by events 
since the occupation.7 But for more than a decade the sanctions 
had an effect on the Iraqi population not unlike weapons of 
mass destruction, being responsible for hundreds of thousands 
of deaths, according to international observers. Several United 
Nations officials resigned in protest against the sanctions.
The sanctions were evidently intended to destroy the Iraqi 
economy, weaken support for the Iraqi leadership, and thus 
make it easier to recruit collaborators to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. The elimination of Saddam Hussein’s government was 
a consistent U.S. policy objective from August 1990 onward.8 
The Iraqi government was certainly aware that it faced a mortal 
threat. Exactly how forthright should a government be with its 
mortal enemies? Saddam’s “duplicity and deceit,” which served 
so well as North American propaganda, should be understood 
in this context. Subsequent events have vindicated the Iraqi 
government’s evasiveness.
By cynically playing on the possibility that Iraq might be 
developing WMD, the U.S. government was able to recruit the 
UN Security Council to the siege of Iraq and maintain some 
public support for the economic sanctions. The effect was a 
sustained assault not only on Iraq but also on the principles 
and purposes of the UN Charter, and on international hu-
manitarian and human rights law.
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Iraq’s “Threat to the Peace”
The legal basis of authority for imposing economic sanctions 
under certain circumstances is contained in Article 39 and 
other parts of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
Article 39 gives the UN Security Council authority to deter-
mine the existence of any threats to the peace and to decide 
what measures are to be taken in accord with other parts of the 
UN Charter. Law must be interpreted reasonably, however, if 
it is to be respected. Iraq’s “threat to the peace” must be inter-
preted in the context of other issues, including the external 
threats to Iraq’s security. Instead, the law was interpreted in a 
way that served purposes quite different from those expressed 
in the United Nations Charter.
Even at its peak, Iraq’s threat to regional peace was 
insufficient to defeat Iran, and the threat was rendered 
marginal simply by removing the external support for it in 
1990. For the rest of the decade, the claims of Iraq’s “threat to 
the peace” were themselves largely propaganda for war.9
Economic Sanctions and International Law
The legality of the economic sanctions on Iraq after 1991 
depended on the argument that Iraq was a “threat to the 
peace.” That argument was fraudulent under any reasonable 
interpretation of the UN Charter. The economic sanctions 
on Iraq also failed other tests of legality, including tests under 
human rights and humanitarian law. Law will be treated with 
contempt if it is applied inequitably, or if the law is used as 
pretext to violate the most fundamental principles of the law 
itself. Both conditions characterize the treatment of Iraq after 
August 1990. In the case of Iraq, the United Nations Security 
Council has been subverted to serve the narrowly conceived 
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foreign policy agenda of the United States. That subversion has 
led to widespread contempt for the Security Council and has 
undermined credibility of the United Nations itself.10
Yet the United Nations Security Council continues to play 
a constructive role in some situations. When the United States 
tried to gain its collaboration in the invasion of Iraq, the ef-
fort backfired. Iraq unexpectedly agreed to readmit the UN 
inspectors, despite the past record of espionage and duplicity 
associated with the inspections. Step by step the inspections 
began to discredit U.S. and UK claims that Iraq was devel-
oping weapons of mass destruction. The time gained in this 
process allowed the global community’s opposition to the war 
to build, and that made it easier for governments and for the 
UN Security Council itself to reject collaboration in the U.S. 
invasion.
The United Nations Security Council is required under 
Article 24 of the UN Charter to exercise its authority in accord 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It can-
not legally impose economic sanctions or approve the interna-
tional threat or use of force whenever it likes. Had it approved 
the U.S. use of force, the invasion would still have been illegal. 
But in this instance the Security Council upheld the Charter. 
And that is an important achievement.
Empire or International Law: A Choice
An increasingly global community faces a choice for 
governance in the decades ahead. The choice is between 
the norms and structures offered by the international legal 
system or the norms and structures imposed by empire, the 
international domination by a powerful state. The problem 
is clear from Henry Kissinger’s statement (Diplomacy, 1994): 
“Empires have no interest in operating within an international 
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system; they aspire to be the international system.... That is 
how the United States has conducted its foreign policy in 
the Americas, and China throughout most of its history in 
Asia.” The United Nations Charter and other instruments 
of international law are based on principles including the 
sovereign equality of states and purposes including the 
maintenance of international peace and security. International 
law provides a pragmatic system for addressing the problems 
that give rise to international conflict. It has developed in full 
and fresh awareness of dictatorships, threats to peace, acts of 
aggression, ethnic and nationalist sources of conflict, and a host 
of other problems. Contemporary international law recognizes 
instances in which armed conflict may be justified. It specifies 
conditions under which the international use of force may be 
legal, and it provides mechanisms for effective international 
action to reject breaches of the peace and address threats to 
peace, while international humanitarian law places constraints 
on the conduct of war when it does break out.
Each of the two systems, international law and empire, 
provides a cultural frame of reference. But the cultural domain 
of empire cannot be universally coherent. Its preference for 
domination is inherently alien to those it seeks to dominate. 
Hence the threat and use of force is necessary to maintain 
“credibility.” The military means of maintaining that threat 
carry an ever-increasing cost, with a steady erosion of economic 
resources. Hostility to the project simmers and grows, leading 
to the ultimate decline of empire, after decades or centuries of 
carnage and waste.
The cultural system of empire is designed to induce def-
erence to power and uses human rights as a stratagem. The 
standards of international law, by contrast, are designed to 
constrain excesses of power in order to promote human rights. 
In the one system, power is the primary value; in the other, hu-
man rights. The UN Charter’s prohibition on the international 
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threat and use of force, for example, is intended to reduce the 
resort to war, which unleashes the most fundamental violations 
of human rights.
Predictably there are sustained efforts to conflate the two 
systems. Powerful states hope to retain the advantages but 
escape the constraints of the international legal system. And 
the public, on whose approval all legitimate power depends, 
often have a preference for human rights priorities over those 
of state power. So publicists will often try to represent their 
government’s violations as being consistent with international 
law, however ridiculous these representations may be.
The legitimacy of empire and its cultural assumptions 
have been in retreat for more than half a century. Can clever 
public relations revive enthusiasm for this anachronism? If so, 
the costs will be staggering. A rule of law offers advantages 
over a state of lawlessness. It can promote trust, lower the 
costs of transactions, obviate expenditures on weapons and 
allow states to direct their resources to basic social needs and 
promotion of human creative potential. A rule of law can 
diminish the waste and carnage of the centuries-old pattern 
in which governments drive their countries toward bankruptcy 
through military expenditures and destructive international 
adventurism. Lawlessness, by contrast, encourages violent and 
criminal behaviour, wastes resources, and leaves the future to 
the arbitrariness of power and the hazards of chance.
Responsible Citizenship in the 
Twenty-first Century
Democracy is based on the concept that a government’s le-
gitimacy depends on consent of the citizens. Implicit in that 
concept is another: Citizens are responsible for the policies and 
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practices of their own government, including its atrocities and 
violations of law.
Governments would prefer that their citizens direct their 
attention only to the atrocities and violations committed 
by other governments, in particular a targeted enemy state. 
A game theorist might notice that perpetually identifying 
someone else as the source of problems can lead to perpetual 
animosity, distrust, irresponsibility, and conflict.
As a citizen of the United States and of Canada, I take 
responsible citizenship to mean engagement in democratic 
process to bring my own government into compliance with 
international law. I am familiar with the consumerism, 
careerism, and cynicism of our culture. I understand the 
challenges they present to “responsible citizenship,” as 
here defined. I am also closely familiar with a kind of 
“professionalism” that rejects taking a principled and active 
role in public affairs, particularly in foreign affairs. Under 
the terms of this “professionalism,” the professional should be 
politically neutral in public. But there is no such neutrality. By 
paying taxes we support government policy. The conditions of 
democracy require that we play a responsible role in shaping 
that policy. You cannot stand still on a moving train.11
Many will reject any personal responsibility of this kind. 
That is a choice, and the choice has consequences. Lawless 
violence carries a high cost. It has erosive effects economically, 
politically, ethically, psychologically, and socially.12 The 
human spirit is resilient and tends to tolerate this erosion, even 
support it or be oblivious to it. And thus we relinquish the 
far more constructive alternatives that are available. History 
will continue to present us with the choice of bringing our 
government’s foreign policy into compliance with international 
law, or not. If we choose wrongly we encourage our collective 
destruction. But year after year through our silence and 
passivity, or through more active complicity, we have tolerated 
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or supported major violations of that law. I write this to enable 
a better informed choice in the future than we have made in 
the past.
Notes
 1 Norman Cousins’ book The Pathology of Power (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1987) eloquently examines some of the problems associated 
with extraordinary political power.
 2 Propaganda for war and other forms of incitement to violence are 
prohibited under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights for good reason. In Rwanda in 1994, such 
incitement was successful in recruiting many Rwandans to support 
or even participate in acts of genocide. In North America after 1990, 
war propaganda recruited public support for the belligerent policies 
against Iraq that are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
environmental destruction, and a number of other crimes.
 3 One of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders who had not supported the insurgency 
reportedly responded angrily to accusations from the insurgents that 
he was a traitor: “My villages are still standing and are still wealthy, 
my people all dress as Kurds, speak Kurdish and have a good life. Look 
what your nationalism has done for you. Your villages are destroyed, 
your people have been forcibly resettled, you live in exile and you 
have nothing left. Why call me a traitor?” The statement is quoted 
in David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: I.B. 
Taurus, 1996), p. 377. The March 1970 agreement between the Iraqi 
government and the Kurdish leadership is extensively treated in Chapter 
5 of Edmund Ghareeb’s The Kurdish Question in Iraq.
 4 Although the Iraqi aggression against Iran is only briefly mentioned in 
this essay, it should be emphasized that this carnage simply would not 
have been possible without the support for that aggression from outside 
powers. Dilip Hiro’s books are outstanding sources on the Iran–Iraq 
War (The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict) and the Gulf 
War of 1991 (Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War).
 5 The Security Council resolution calling for Israel to withdraw from 
Lebanon was essentially ignored because Israel’s violation was in effect 
supported by the United States.
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 6 The Iraqi negotiating position for a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait 
was reported in New York Newsday on 3 January 1991. These offers 
generally remained behind the scenes; publicly Iraq was persistently 
refusing to withdraw from Kuwait. The events were well examined in a 
lecture delivered by Noam Chomsky to an audience at Bates College in 
late January 1991.
 7 The forged documents, purporting to be from Niger and dating 
from 1999–2000, are referred to in an article from The Washington 
Post for 22 March 2003: “CIA questioned documents linking Iraq, 
uranium ore.” I retrieved the text of that article through the website, 
www.commondreams.org, which has been an invaluable source for me. 
A useful article on the destructive effects of sanctions is by Mueller and 
Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” in the May/June 1999 issue 
of Foreign Affairs.
 8 A popular revolt, Kurdish independence, and the ascendancy of 
an Islamic state were apparently unacceptable means to the end of 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Instead the CIA worked with the Iraqi 
National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord to engineer a more 
controlled outcome. The resulting coup attempts were repeatedly foiled 
by the Iraqi regime.
 9 The level of Iraq’s “threat” after 1991 was well expressed in an article in 
the Globe and Mail of 13 November 1998. Entitled “Hussein Arsenal 
Still Impressive,” it carried the subtitle “Although a mere shadow of 
1990’s armaments, significant threat exists.” In the text, the reporter 
cited an interview with General Binford Peay, who said, “Mr. Hussein 
has been gradually improving the quality of his forces. Although he 
has not managed to even approximate the armament and manpower 
he wielded when his troops invaded Kuwait in 1990, he still poses 
a  significant threat to U.S. pilots who might bomb Iraq” [emphasis 
added]. In other words, Iraq’s capacity for self-defence (its right under 
international law) was still substantial, and that was a significant 
“threat” to future U.S. military plans for Iraq.
 10 In commenting on the recent bombing attack on the UN headquarters 
in Baghdad, Denis Halliday, former UN official in charge of the Oil-
for-Food program in Iraq, noted that “the UN Security Council has 
been taken over and corrupted by the U.S. and UK.… In Iraq, the UN 
imposed sustained sanctions that probably killed up to one million 
people.… It was a great crime against Iraq.” Halliday’s comments 
following the attack on the UN headquarters were reported by Neil 
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MacKay, 24 August 2003, The Sunday Herald (Scotland), accessed 
through www.commondreams.org on 24 August.
 11 “You cannot stand still on a moving train” is modified from Howard 
Zinn’s phrase, “You can’t be neutral on a moving train.”
 12 An article by Burns Weston, “The Logic and Utility of a Lawful 
United States Foreign Policy,” which appears in Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems (Iowa College of Law) 1 (1991): 1–14 points 
to the destructive power inherent in dismissing international law. The 
same issue of that journal is devoted to a symposium with a number of 
other useful essays, including Richard Falk’s “Making Foreign Policy 
Lawful: A Citizen’s Imperative” (225–40).
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DRUMBEATING FOR WAR?
MEDIA VERSUS PEACE AND 
DEMOCRACY1
Robert Hackett
Few Canadians, when they sit down to read a newspaper or 
watch television news or check the Internet, regard themselves 
as engaging in an activity relevant to international peace. 
Yet they may very well be doing just that. We need to ask 
ourselves if the dominant practices and institutions of public 
communication share any complicity in the bloody start to 
the third millennium. What difference do the media make in 
promoting war or peace? What are the shortcomings of media 
coverage of life-threatening conflict? These questions and 
what can be done to improve the shortcomings of the media 
are the basis of this article.
Media Framing of the War on Iraq in 2003
The prospects of war and peace globally are forged in American 
media and popular culture as much as anywhere else. Canada’s 
direct access and adherence to American media, especially 
in television, is omnipresent. Canadian-owned media, both 
print and broadcast, are dependent on U.S. news sources for 
copy, television images, and photos. The U.S. media tend to 
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accept the assumptions of empire – that the United States has 
a right to intervene where its interests are at stake and that it 
can overthrow governments by force without accountability to 
international law or the United Nations. The American media 
can argue that it is their patriotic duty to frame American 
motives as honourable.
Compared to 9/11, there was, until the invasion of Iraq 
in March 2003, a greater degree of debate in the American 
media over military and political options in Iraq, such as the 
issue of unilateral versus multilateral action. After the United 
States and Britain invaded Iraq, this debate largely evaporated 
as the media scrambled to “embed” themselves in flag-waving, 
soldier-glorifying patriotism. One example of how this played 
out in Canada is the comparison of coverage of Iraqi civilian 
casualties relegated to unillustrated back-page copy to the 
glorifying front-page headlines and photo coverage of the 
rescue of one American POW. (Calgary Sun, 2 April 2003). 
There are several factors that have contributed to how most 
American media and many Canadian media framed the post-
9/11 “war on terrorism,” including the attack on Iraq, resulting 
in blind spots for readers and viewers.
1. Threatening Events Themselves
Some events, such as the 9/11 terror attacks, readily lend them-
selves to an either/or, for us or against us, moral discourse. 
Building on the humanly and morally horrific nature of the 
event itself, American media coverage offered an emotionally 
compelling but ultimately dangerously simplistic story line 
built around the stuff of legend – heroes, villains, and victims. 
By contrast, the case for war in Iraq required much greater 
public relations efforts by the Bush administration. The pre-
war period, such as the UN weapons inspection process in Iraq 
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prior to invasion, left room for differing viewpoints on what 
is the right response. But the outbreak of war lent itself to an 
either/or moral discourse. Previous events, like the Iraqi re-
gime’s gas attack on Kurdish civilians fifteen years earlier, were 
selectively invoked by the administration and enthusiastically 
amplified by the media. Such a strategy of demonization is a 
crucial part of how the American media typically present their 
country’s wars to its population. Americans as potential vic-
tims (of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction) or heroes of a 
glorious military is contrasted to Iraq as a site of an evil threat. 
A sense of being threatened frames the “other” as a demon, al-
lowing all sorts of actions to be justified, including war.
2. The Views of Journalists and Editors and 
Their Notion of Professionalism
While the sense of threat contributes to a powerful “rally round 
the flag” effect, accelerating media concentration and commer-
cialization have yielded a corporate culture increasingly hostile 
to radical dissent, or even to the liberal public service ethos 
associated with the Walter Cronkite generation.
The ‘conservatizing’ impact of organizational media cul-
ture may be even more relevant to foreign correspondents. 
Reese Ehrlich, a freelance foreign correspondent writes:
By the time reporters are ready to become foreign corre-
spondents – a process that can take ten years or more – they 
understand how the game is played. Becoming a foreign 
correspondent is a plum job. It’s interesting and challeng-
ing. You travel frequently and meet international leaders. 
You may see your byline on the front page. The job has 
gravitas. And then there’s the money.... Money, prestige, 
career options, ideological predilections – combined with 
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the down sides of filing stories unpopular with the govern-
ment – all cast their influence on foreign correspondents. 
You don’t win a Pulitzer for challenging the basic assump-
tions of empire.2
With this being the norm for mainstream media reporting, it 
is not surprising that news stories are framed ideologically in a 
way in which the media owners, the state, and society in gen-
eral approve. When renowned U.S. reporter Peter Arnett gave 
an interview to Iraqi television in which he raised issues about 
the military strategy of the United States, he was fired.
3. News Routines
Establishment journalism does not want to contextualize 
news stories, seeking instead to dramatize them in the moral 
discourse of who is doing what is right and who is doing what 
is wrong.
With corporate journalism’s routine dependence on official 
sources, elected politicians, and establishment experts, the 
news stories are framed in a safe and predictable way, however 
self-serving. That doesn’t mean foreign correspondents are 
mere dupes. They may be well aware of the way their official 
sources try to manipulate them, and many do question what 
they are being told. But most do not try to discover what they 
are not being told. And they tend to accept their sources’ 
framing of conflict.
These practices of newsgathering (press conferences held 
by authorities, etc.) tend to reinforce existing power relations. 
Oppositional groups are covered but usually as actors rather 
than as sources. The so-called balanced presentation of an is-
sue usually favours conventional views, reduces complex issues 
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to a for/against format, and allows elite voices to define the 
limits of discussion.
4. News Organizations’ Needs and Policies
Since the 1980s U.S. and Canadian media have undergone 
massive mergers and consolidation into the hands of a small 
number of huge companies. For them, journalism is often only 
a small percentage of revenues. They have big debts to pay off 
for takeovers, and they want maximum returns from their 
assets. Except in time of war, cutting back on international 
news coverage makes economic sense.
In this corporate culture there is de facto censorship within 
the media. After 9/11, several columnists who offered even 
mild criticism of Bush were fired. In a country with fewer and 
fewer media employers, it doesn’t take too many such examples 
for journalists everywhere to feel the chill. The Fox TV news 
channel in the United States has significantly increased its 
ratings by its all-out support for the war on terrorism by 
encouraging its correspondents and presenters to express anger 
and a thirst for revenge and to present the conflict as a biblical 
battle of good versus evil. If Fox’s stance continues to increase 
ratings, then other TV channels and even the print media 
could find themselves under pressure to follow its line.3
5. Extra -Media Factors
In the bigger picture, establishment journalism is dependent 
on the political elite for orientation and the American political 
elite closed ranks after 9/11. Years of flak from conservatives, 
convinced despite all the contrary evidence that the media 
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contributed to defeat in Vietnam, have left the press anxious 
to prove its patriotism. But the press often does not need much 
pressure because the institutional context of corporate media 
makes them natural allies of U.S. militarism and capitalist 
globalization. These giant firms are among the primary ben-
eficiaries of neo-liberal globalization – their revenues outside 
the United States are increasing at a rapid pace – and the U.S. 
role as the pre-eminent world power gets them attention. 
Indeed, the U.S. government is the primary advocate for the 
global media firms when trade deals and intellectual property 
agreements are being negotiated. Coincidentally, at the very 
moment that the corporate broadcasters were drumbeating for 
America’s new war on terrorism, their lobbyists were appear-
ing before the FCC seeking radical relaxation of ownership 
regulations.4
We should recognize the domination of news flows by a 
handful of commercial, market-driven, corporate enterprises: 
AOL-Time-Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, News International. 
Bias towards commercial propaganda, consumerism, and neo-
liberalism is their underlying stance because they are increas-
ingly operating in global markets, undergoing conglomeration, 
privatization, and hyper-commercialism. Corporate media are 
integral to the ideology and process of global corporatization.
Those global media help create global public opinion, 
which can inhibit (albeit selectively) the violation of hu-
man rights by particular regimes; but they also promote a 
culture of consumerism, which arguably breeds inequality, 
declining sense of community, and ecological devastation. 
Notwithstanding the Internet and significant regional media 
production centres (India, Brazil, Egypt), global informa-
tion flows are still dominated by media corporations based in 
the developed West. While playing a crucial role outside the 
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United States, the dominant U.S. media largely insulate their 
own population from critical foreign perspectives, perspectives 
that might enable more informed judgments about their own 
government’s policies.
6. Ideology and Culture
It is small wonder that, on the fundamental question of war 
and peace after 9/11, American media have largely failed to 
play the role prescribed for them in liberal theory. This theory 
presents the media as a “watchdog” keeping powerholders 
accountable, a public forum helping to formulate a democratic 
consensus between alternatives, and a comprehensive news 
provider nurturing an informed citizenry. Those failures 
and blind spots have undoubtedly facilitated the escalating 
militarization of U.S. foreign policy. And yet in September 
2001, American public faith in the media reached the highest 
levels pollsters have recorded since 1968. What does this dismal 
combination – democratic failure and public approval – tell us? 
Media institutions are influenced by, as well as influence, the 
surrounding political culture. Just as audiences are part of the 
media system, so journalists are part of that culture.
The media’s pre-Iraq war framing of 9/11 meshed well with 
the dominant frame of America’s experience of war, which in 
turn is related to the foundational myths of American nation-
hood as the world’s singular beacon of freedom, happiness, 
and opportunity. In the “theology” of American nationalism, 
9/11 was not only an atrocity and a tragedy but also an act of 
sacrilege, one motivated by incomprehensible evil, outside the 
realm of politics and history. To the extent that audiences and 
media shared the assumptions of this frame, the U.S. media’s 
construction of the subsequent war in Afghanistan (2002) and 
then the war on Iraq (2003) was simply a continuation of the 
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ideology of threat and demonization. If the world is wired for 
violence, media framing of issues in America, the world’s 
hyperpower, is a huge part of the problem.
What about Canadian media? Canada is blessed not to 
have such a tightly woven foundational national myth of 
a chosen people in a Manichaean world of good and evil. 
Canada’s identities are more fragmented. As the Quebec sov-
ereignty debate shows, we can’t even agree on the territorial or 
emotional boundaries of the nation. We have five parties in 
our Parliament and not one and a half like in the United States 
(Republican and Republican-lite). We have a much stronger 
public broadcasting tradition in Canada. We have conditions 
for potentially greater pluralism in our media. But we must not 
be too smug. Media ownership is more concentrated than it is 
in the United States, and press barons like the late Israel Asper 
imposed their own political views on their far-flung properties. 
Canadian media spread the notion, more or less without chal-
lenge, that Canadian military spending is low and that security 
is lax. The media outrage against professor Sunera Thobani’s 
denunciation of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 became a 
lightning rod for those who considered criticism of the U.S. 
an outrageous affront to a noble ally and friend. She was ef-
fectively ostracized in the realm of public discourse, her views 
put beyond the pale.
What can we do?
There are three points of intervention where media’s framing 
can be challenged. First, there is the role of counter-informa-
tion. In contrast to the situation in the 1991 Gulf War, there 
is now a much greater undercurrent of counter-information, 
which probably contributed to the rejection by global public 
opinion of the war on Iraq. One factor is progressive websites 
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that have challenged dominant media in terms of setting agen-
das. This could be one reason that you sometimes see a growing 
discrepancy between public opinion and media owners’ poli-
tics. Among these websites are straightgoods.com, rabble.ca, 
znet, and alternet. In addition to counter-information, the Net 
is also an amazing organizing tool. The massive peace demon-
strations in February and March, even in the United States, 
came about with relatively little help from corporate media. To 
be sure, there is an ongoing digital divide. Neither access to the 
Net nor the ready availability of non-profit-oriented content 
can be assured. Progressive movements need to be more aware 
of the political, economic, and policy context of this ‘magical’ 
technology and be ready to intervene to protect their access.
The second point of intervention is the alternative 
journalistic ethos of “peace journalism.” It proposes that, in 
dealing with a life-threatening conflict or issue, it is important 
for the Canadian media to identify the views and interests of all 
parties and so avoid dualism. It is wrong to be hostage to one 
source. A good sense of skepticism is always valuable. Because 
bias is endemic to human beings, the media has to be self-
critical while giving voice to dissident views. When a report on 
a conflict seeks to talk about common ground and non-violent 
solutions, it becomes part of the solution. But these approaches 
run into obstacles – narrative conventions of polarization, 
commercial biases towards existing knowledge and values and 
towards affluent, and the ease and cost of accessing U.S.-based 
transnational news services like Associated Press.
The third point of intervention is media democratization. 
Since the 1990s, there has been an upsurge in activism directed 
towards not just using the media as conduits for political 
messages, but transforming the media themselves into more 
diverse, accessible, and accountable institutions. This project 
is fundamental to democracy. Genuinely democratic media 
would enable each significant social and cultural group to 
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circulate ideas, perspectives, and information in such a way as 
to reach all other segments of society. That project now needs 
to be conceptualized globally if we are to promote a productive 
dialogue rather than a destructive clash of civilizations. The 
censorship and repression of journalism by the remaining old-
style dictatorships of the world clearly need to be addressed. 
And they are. But we also need a parallel project to challenge the 
control over public space in the United States and elsewhere by 
huge transnational media corporations. We may have reached 
the point where the world’s single most important political 
problem is America’s telling stories to the rest of the world 
without hearing the voices and stories of the rest of the world 
in return. This engenders frustration and resentment outside 
the United States and a lack of awareness and sensitivity on the 
part of Americans to how their government’s policies affect the 
rest of the planet.
In Canadian and U.S. arenas, media democratization takes 
a number of forms. It means building independent media, 
outside of state and corporate control. It requires critical media 
education in schools and beyond. It necessitates continual 
media monitoring and pressing existing dominant media for 
better quality and more diverse international news, especially 
from non-Western sources. Opposition to media concentration 
and foreign ownership must go hand in hand with the demand 
for structural change and policy reform of media institutions. 
Media democratization is also dependent on re-invigorating 
public service broadcasting, while supporting local, non-profit, 
and community media. It is important to work on media 
democratization through advocacy groups and movements 
and to encourage the peace and anti-global corporatization 
movements to take on the issue of media democratization as 
crucial to their own goals.
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ON BEING TRAPPED IN THE 
AMERICAN PARADIGM OF 




In 2002 I co-edited Canada and September 11: Impact and 
Response. Editing that book convinced me that Canada had 
entered a serious and very dangerous moment in world history, 
in which the American paradigm of endless war was the new 
norm and Canadian foreign relations was its victim. I felt that 
this new reality had serious repercussions for Canada’s distinct 
civil society and its national identity. In the post-September 
11th world, Canada had become identified as a country fully 
supportive of American imperialist ambition when it gladly 
sent military forces to invade Afghanistan and overthrow 
its Taliban regime. At the time, this action was generally 
applauded by the Canadian population as an appropriate 
response to the attack on New York’s World Trade Center. 
When the United States continued its imperialist ambitions 
in 2003 by invading and then occupying Iraq in March and 
April 2003, Canada refused to join the invading army because 
the invasion lacked UN support and the public opposition to 
involvement was significant, particularly in Quebec.
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From 1991 (the first attack on Iraq) until 2002 (the invasion 
of Afghanistan), Canada participated in three American-
initiated wars. So why the abrupt about-face in 2003? Had we 
gone too far in our role as handmaiden? Had the Canadian 
government reached the proverbial turning point because of 
its perceived danger in continuing? Or had something else 
occurred, a new situation arisen? To answer these questions 
requires dividing the post-World War II Canadian–American 
relationship on invasions and war into three stages: first prior 
to 1991, second from 1991 to 2002, and third the current 
period. Each stage had and continues to have implications for 
Canadian sovereignty, in particular, and Canadian identity, in 
general.
From the end of the Korean War (1953), when Canada had 
joined the United States in a UN-mandated defence of South 
Korea, until the war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait (1991), Canada 
did not participate directly in any American military conflict. 
The Americans fought the Vietnam War for fifteen years, and 
Canada did not participate other than as a pro-American truce 
observer. The United States overthrew the elected government 
of Chile in 1973, defeated the Nicaraguan Revolution in 
the 1980s, and invaded Grenada and Panama in that same 
decade, overthrowing their governments, but Canada did 
not participate. And these regime changes only deal with the 
Caribbean. The period of the Cold War was one of hot wars 
between the two superpowers – the United States and the 
Soviet Union – fought by proxies. While Canada belonged 
to NATO and was in the anti-Soviet camp, it also showed 
favour to the Non-Aligned Movement of states that tried to 
distance themselves from the politics of the Cold War. Since 
it was the Liberal Party that dominated federal governments 
from the Korean War to the present, with only two periods 
of Conservative Party rule, one can conclude that the Liberal 
Party played an internationalist card in order to give its foreign 
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policy some wiggle room in the face of American dominance 
and obsession with communism.
Something changed in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
Canada gave up over three decades of being a semi-independent 
voice in international relations, devoted to assisting with UN 
peacekeeping and working to bring bloody conflicts to an end. 
When Canada joined the UN-sanctioned war on Iraq in 1991, 
it began a new identity as a military adjunct of the American 
empire. Canada became a state associated with military 
intervention, aggression, and war. Participation in this war 
undid its identity as a middle power proud of its international 
status as a peacekeeper. From 1953 to 1991, Canada maintained 
ongoing economic relations with the United States, but it did 
not provide military personnel to assist the U.S. In fact, during 
the Vietnam War, Canada protected those Americans who 
refused to fight. Since 1991 Canada has gone to war another 
two times on behalf of the United States – in Yugoslavia and 
Afghanistan, while playing an ongoing naval role in the Gulf 
region in the post-September 11th U.S. “war on terror.”
There are three major factors responsible for this move to 
war. The first is the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russian 
communism in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. The second 
is the U.S.–Canada free trade agreement of 1988 (FTA), fol-
lowed by the expanded trilateral (United States, Canada, and 
Mexico) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a 
few years later. These two factors combine the political and the 
economic in such a way as to push Canada toward American 
domination in international affairs. The third factor was the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which garnered global disapproval 
and UN condemnation.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world’s 
balancing superpower, Canada’s position shifted toward the 
American side. While the United States and the Soviet Union 
played an international balancing act, with each power at 
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either end of the teeter-totter, Canada tried to sit in the middle 
as much as possible. When the U.S. side became the only 
superpower, Canada slid inexorably toward the U.S. The space 
for neutrality created by the Cold War shrank appreciably 
when the diverse world of competing powers and ideologies 
came to an end. Up to this point, the United States had been 
loath to wage war directly using its own forces except in the 
Americas. Other than Lebanon in 1982 and numerous covert 
operations like Angola, the United States had, instead, used 
and supported proxy forces, both state and non-state, to fight 
for its interests in areas outside of South America and the 
Caribbean. The post-Soviet Union world of the 1990s, with 
its unopposed American hegemony, proved to be a magnet 
pulling Canada into American wars against Iraq, Yugoslavia, 
and Afghanistan. The military balance of power and nuclear 
deterrence that had once created a world of moving pieces 
on a chessboard was gone. The Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European satellites were replaced by the diminished Russian 
Federation and its NATO-membership and EU-begging 
former satellites. So Canada found itself face-to-face with a 
new and threatening geopolitical reality in which there was no 
real balance to U.S. imperialism.
Canada’s integration into the American economy under 
NAFTA was the second crucial factor pushing Canada 
toward war. Since the FTA, Canadian exports to the United 
States have risen to a total of 85 per cent of all exports, while 
Canada is America’s single largest trading partner. The 
result is dependent production and distribution. Promoted 
by Canada’s business interests and right-wing media, this 
economic vise has locked Canada into a situation where any 
attempt at a serious differentiation between the two countries 
is immediately painted as having negative economic effects on 
Canadian employment and trade. This was the central focus 
of the argument denouncing Canada’s refusal to invade Iraq in 
 186   Canada and the New American Empire    187  On Being Trapped in the American Paradigm of Endless War
2003. Because of Canada’s dependence on the U.S. economy, 
the rejection of any integrative measures that the United 
States demands can turn the border into a problem that has a 
very serious impact on employment. This economic situation 
seemed to have sealed our new identity as a supporter of U.S. 
imperialism around the world, at least until 2003, when 
Canada’s war involvement was obviously reaching a tipping 
point that the government wanted to avoid.
The third factor that brought Canada into the 1991 war 
on Iraq (the so-called Gulf War) was its being sanctioned by 
the UN. With the UN umbrella of Security Council support 
for driving Iraq from Kuwait, Canada, with its decades-long 
pro-UN stance, felt it had a perfect excuse to go to war, and 
since the Americans with their oil interests were keen to ensure 
the status quo ante bellum, the decision was an easy one because 
no one was asking why this invasion demanded intervention, 
when other invasions, like those initiated by the Americans in 
the 1980s, were perfectly fine.
From 1991 to 2002, war was being presented by Canada’s 
right-wing media as a natural condition and something to be 
proud of. When our “ally” the United States called, we should 
jump was the message. The media glorified American warrior 
culture and demanded that Canada emulate it. This was par-
ticularly true of the media associated with the pro-American 
Alliance Party (formerly Reform) position. This position 
continually harped on Canada’s lack of military prepared-
ness for overseas assignments, poor equipment, especially air 
transport, and inadequate military budgets. It was all part of 
the pro-American, pro-capitalist, pro-militarist stance of the 
Canadian Right as it sought to create an American-like society 
in Canada. According to the Canadian Right, a strong and ag-
gressive military such as that of the United States is the one of 
the few legitimate activities of the Canadian state (the other is 
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protection of business interests). The only option that makes 
business sense, according to them, is the war option.
A Brief History of Pro -American War 
Propaganda
In the context of our NAFTA dependency, pursuing an alter-
native peace option has serious economic ramifications, but it 
also has a strong moral dimension. Of course, morality is often 
thought to be irrelevant to foreign affairs because the concept 
of “interests” is considered the guiding reality. But when one 
listens to the rhetoric of war, one finds innumerable moralistic 
terms being invoked – freedom, democracy, self-determina-
tion, human rights, etc. If the war paradigm can invoke moral-
ity, so can the peace paradigm. A peace morality would help 
Canada redefine itself as a nation in the global community as a 
country that stands outside American imperialism.
A peace identity is based on the principle that all human 
life is of equal value. By adopting this principle, Canada would 
ensure a permanent, non-warring stance in the world. The 
moral principle that all human life is of equal value and that 
glorifying one human life or group over another is wrong may 
seem self-evident, but, in a culture of war, it is the opposite 
view that is most widely held and promoted. In the latest 
war on Iraq, Canadian media generally ignored Iraqi civilian 
casualties or turned them into relatively faceless statistics of 
so many hundreds or thousands killed, while American or 
British casualties were often named and individualized. This 
is the public morality of warrior states that individualizes and 
glorifies its own. This rhetorical morality leads Canadians to 
regret the death of one Canadian in battle while ignoring or 
cheering on the death of Canada’s supposed enemies. When 
four Canadians were killed by U.S. bombing in Afghanistan 
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in 2002, the media was filled with in-your-face coverage, while 
the thousands of Afghani casualties were made more or less 
irrelevant. One Canadian life, as far as Canadians were led to 
believe, was worth innumerable lives of “the other” – enemy 
or not.
In the wars that Canada has fought from 1991 to 2002, 
Iraqis, Yugoslavs, and Afghanis were turned into enemies, 
although they had never done any harm to Canada. None 
of these countries had attacked Canada, though some 
Canadians had died in the World Trade Center attack, and 
Canada had no substantive geopolitical interests in Iraq, 
Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan. Endless propaganda encouraged 
Canadians to support participation in wars that made sense 
to the Americans because of their interests. Pro-war rhetoric 
claimed that Canada, as a taken-for-granted ally of the United 
States, must automatically jump on the war wagon. When the 
Americans seized control of Baghdad in mid-April 2003, the 
Canadian media went ballistic with excitement and praise. The 
Iraqis were war criminals rather than the American and British 
invaders.
When some human beings are demonized as evil by the 
media or the state, they are effectively removed from the 
principle of equality of all human beings. They are no longer 
human. Since they no longer have lives of equal value to those 
of “our side,” their death and destruction is acceptable. War is 
always constructed as an either/or situation and as a life and 
death struggle no matter how puny the opponent. The hor-
rible things that “our” wars have heaped on Iraqi, Yugoslav, 
and Afghani civilians are justified and even applauded because 
the foe is portrayed as evil and a monster. Since people know 
that war is a brutal reality and a scourge on humankind, politi-
cal propaganda for war needs to be relentless to overcome our 
natural reluctance to wage war. The easiest way is to dehuman-
ize the enemy while glorifying our actions as morally superior. 
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The Americans can do no wrong, the argument goes, so we 
who help them do no wrong.
War is politics by another name. And politics is about power 
and not about justice. Justifications for war are numerous, 
especially when the public needs to be led into accepting war 
against others as legitimate and necessary. The resources of a 
state in mobilizing public opinion against someone or some 
group are simply immense. In wartime, all the other problems 
associated with political leaders are forgotten and their role and 
identity is turned into something beyond reproach. If political 
rhetoric and propaganda is not enough, then the state will 
impose censorship so that only its message of unchallenged 
patriotism is heard. This message is filled with the binary logic 
of war in which there are only good guys and bad guys. “They” 
are the black monsters, and “we” are the knights in shining 
armour. This attitude leads people to consider the killing of 
others, however many, as something good or, at minimum, 
necessary. None of the three countries attacked in part by 
Canada in 1991, 1999, and 2002 was ever a threat to Canada; 
yet we attacked them all the same because the Americans had 
designated them as evil.
If Canada had rejected war and embraced the peace option 
in 1991, 1999, and 2002, it would have said that it does not 
buy into the devaluing of human beings by war propaganda. 
It would have said that it accepts the equal value of all human 
life, whatever its nationality, race, or religion. It would have 
made a further political statement that it does not attack other 
countries unless it is attacked. Embracing offensive war, as 
Canada did between 1991 and 2002, undermined the concept 
of the Canadian military as a defensive force.
A review of the American-led wars that Canada joined (it 
would never have initiated them itself because of its lack of 
power) is a stark reminder of how the logic of war works. In 
1991 Canada joined the United States in an attack on Iraq, 
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which had threatened American control of Middle East oil by 
invading Kuwait, a dependency of the United States. Canada is 
not dependent on Middle East oil, so it had no “interest” there 
other than the claim that it was upholding the authority of the 
Security Council that authorized a show of force to make Iraq 
quit Kuwait. Not only did the Coalition’s bombing devastate 
Iraq and cause substantial civilian deaths, the massacre of 
retreating Iraqi soldiers by American forces is one of the 
war crimes of the late twentieth century. While Coalition 
casualties in that war were only a few hundred, half of them 
from friendly fire, figures for the Iraqi side vary from 30,000 
to 100,000 and more. This was basically a bloodbath on the 
scale of British imperial wars of the nineteenth century against 
poorly armed opponents. In those days, like today, the deaths 
on the other side were accepted as normal and perfectly valid.
In 1999 Canada increased its war participation on behalf of 
the United States by bombing Yugoslavia. This time, there was 
no United Nations excuse, so Canada played the NATO card. 
The war was promoted as a war to stop genocide in Kosovo. 
There was expulsion, an attempt at ethnic cleansing, but 
no genocide, just the well-oiled propaganda machine of the 
United States. What was the politics here? It was the politics 
of ending the rule of the last socialist in Europe, which it did. 
In the process, over a thousand Yugoslavs died, and Kosovars 
today are still dying from the cluster bombs that the Americans 
left behind. But nobody in our society mourns these deaths. 
Instead we were asked to cheer “our boys” as they bombed and 
strafed an enemy that didn’t have the power to shoot down 
one enemy plane and in 1999 didn’t even have enough fuel to 
remove its troops and vehicles from Kosovo.
In 2002 Canada again went to war on behalf of the 
United States. This time, we attacked Afghanistan. Instead of 
Canadian naval power in the Gulf War and air power in the 
Yugoslav war, we upped the ante by using ground troops in 
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Afghanistan. In doing so, we became party to the American 
violation of human rights and the Geneva Convention on 
treatment of prisoners of war. We stood behind the United 
States as it killed over three thousand Afghani civilians in its 
bombing, and Canada said nothing. We also supported the 
Americans in the war crime of butchering Taliban prisoners, 
either directly or through their Northern Alliance allies. The 
most infamous case was the massacre of prisoners at Mazar-I-
Sharif, when hundreds were mowed down. The fight against 
al-Qaeda was the excuse for barbaric and inhuman treatment 
of others. If what had been done by the Americans to their 
opponents (hooding, drugging, and imprisoning in cages) had 
been done to Americans, there would be a horrendous outcry 
of barbarism. But doing it to the other side was just fine. This 
is what happens when you buy into the war option, when you 
say that the enemy is evil and his life should be extinguished 
and that whatever we do is acceptable.
How many Canadians cared about the innumerable deaths 
brought on Iraq by American-forced United Nations sanctions 
from 1991 to 2003? Very few. These figures are comparable to 
half a million Canadians being killed. Surely this is a monstrous 
figure that horrifies us when applied to us. But when applied 
to Iraqis we are taught to just shrug. We have been taught to 
consider all and every action against Iraq as moral, civilized, 
and proper. It is the Iraqi side that is monstrous, not us.
In 2003 Canada said that that the second war on Iraq was 
wrong because the United Nations had not approved it. It did 
not say it was evil and motivated by imperialist designs. It did 
not adopt a moral anti-war principle. It did nothing to have 
the invasion condemned once it began, and the Liberal govern-
ment even asked the public and its party members to refrain 
from criticizing the U.S. invasion so as not to harm relations.
Canada’s non-participation in the 2003 Iraq war could be 
considered a major shift away from the war paradigm, but that 
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would be a false appraisal. Canada’s decision was based on four 
distinct factors. First, it offered the United States thousands of 
Canadian troops to assist with the occupation of Afghanistan 
as a substitute for its failure to join the invasion of Iraq – an 
offer that was readily accepted with the result that now three 
thousand Canadian troops are now pacifying the country and 
propping up the American-sanctioned government. Second, 
it continued to provide naval support in the Gulf for the 
“war on terror.” Third, it was bolstered by the opposition of 
most of the world plus the UN Security Council that gave 
the Canadian government enough backbone to say no to 
participation. Fourth, Canadian public opinion was against 
participation initially and even after the war was launched a 
small overall majority supported non-participation. In Quebec 
the figures against the war and involvement were very high, 
and with a Quebec provincial election during the war, the 
federal government’s stance boosted the electoral chances of 
the provincial Liberals. When the federal government was put 
on the defensive for its non-participation by the attacks of pro-
American English Canadian media and interest groups, plus 
American officials, it did not condemn American and British 
imperialism, just as the UN did not.
The Peace Option
How would a peace option affect Canada’s role in the world 
community? Let’s take the case of Afghanistan. If Canada had 
sent three thousand people to help to rebuild civil society in 
that country, instead of sending three thousand soldiers, we 
would have been a shining example of a new moral stance 
in the world. If we had worked to build roads, schools, and 
electrical and medical facilities in an impoverished country, 
Canada would have become a symbol of hope in international 
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relations. While the Americans continue their “imperialism 
lite” occupation, no country is making a serious effort to 
rebuild Afghanistan. Because we don’t care about building a 
civil society in Afghanistan, opium production has return to 
pre-Taliban levels. Some even say that the United States wants 
opium production to increase because it encourages drug ad-
diction in Iran and Pakistan. It’s what British imperialism did 
in China a hundred years ago.
If we had said that the Iraqi people, the Yugoslavs, and 
the Afghanis were human beings of equal value to us, as the 
peace option claims, then their deaths and destruction would 
be as unacceptable as our own. We would stop participating 
in endless American wars. To establish the peace option in 
Canada, Canadians must first require that its government stop 
going to war every time the Americans do. With a military 
force of 1.3 million men and women, near invincibility in 
military technology, and a war budget exceeding that of the 
next fifteen countries combined, the United States does not 
need our military effort except for political reasons. Public 
opposition to the war on Iraq was a factor in keeping Canada 
out of war in 2003 because the public read the invasion of Iraq 
as the same as the invasion of Kuwait. Canadians must further 
demand that our government stand up for human rights and 
conventions for international conduct. This would mean more 
than not going to war. It would mean condemning the United 
States for its war crimes and its imperialism.
If we are to be seen as objective and just, we must not be 
seen as apologists for American war crimes and actions, silently 
tolerating inexcusable conduct.
Canadians must also insist that our government provide 
alternative forms of action to that of war. When an all-
powerful nation like the United States says to the world that 
either you are for us or you are against us, Canada must reject 
this intimidation. This division of the world into friend or foe 
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is exactly what the paradigm of war is all about. The peace 
option values diversity and rejects political monocultures. 
The Canadian Government needs to improve the climate of 
international relations today by returning to its former, and 
now tarnished, peacekeeper image so that it can be counted as 
a partner in rebuilding war-torn societies. Canadians cannot 
depend on Canadian business or media or government to make 
this happen. We have to do it ourselves as citizens concerned 
about what is happening to our country.
The argument that Canada cannot embrace the peace 
option because we are dependent on a warrior state for our 
economic survival is a very powerful one. It appeals to all 
classes in society from the blue-collar truck driver crossing 
the border with branch plant products to the businessman 
on Bay Street watching the NYSE. Economic integration has 
made the war option the logical one for Canada because it 
touches on employment and profits. It is economic integration 
that is the rope (some might say the noose) that binds us to 
American wars. It is this rope that must be unraveled, slowly, 
carefully, and inexorably, if the peace option is to ever become 
a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy.
A Peace Boycott
Canadians need to launch an economic boycott of the United 
States until such time as that country drops the paradigm of 
endless war, which may be a very long time indeed. Through 
a boycott Canadians will educate themselves about how 
completely linked our two economies have become. No 
more buying of American automobiles and other American 
corporate products and brandname items, nor shopping at 
American chains in Canada. It would mean no travel to the 
United States. It would mean no more buying of California 
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vegetables or fruit. In short it would mean no more business 
dealings by individual Canadians with the American economy. 
This would result in hardship and increased costs to Canadians 
who participate. But it is the only way in which we can rid 
ourselves of the American economic addiction – an addiction 
that has led us to participate in American wars.
I am proposing a Gandhi-inspired model in which the 
supporters of a boycott bring hardship upon themselves. Even 
if every Canadian joined the boycott, the economic impact on 
the United States would be modest, while the economic impact 
on Canadians would be massive, even revolutionary. Only if 
citizens in other countries joined in this boycott would the 
United States pay some economic attention, and the possibility 
of that happening is very slim, if non-existent. But the political 
message of a boycott would be powerful threat to the United 
States. Boycott U.S.A. would affirm Canadian independence 
and the peace option in international affairs.
Because a majority of the Canadian public has been con-
vinced of the value of the U.S. relation, the supporters of an 
economic boycott would be a tiny minority. So the impact of 
the boycott on the United States would be marginal, if any, 
unless of course the boycott became a popular movement. 
Boycott U.S.A. would have to view itself as a moral movement 
whose profile in the Canadian consciousness would be greater 
than its economic impact because of its principles. The move-
ment would have four organized levels, as well as an unorgan-
ized level. The unorganized level involves anyone who wishes 
to boycott the United States economically to as little or great a 
degree as they privately desire. The organized levels include the 
lowest level of associate boycotters, who support the movement 
but participate in an informal and ad hoc manner, picking and 
choosing what they wish to boycott. The level above associate 
are the “lite” boycotters, who adhere to a program that has the 
least hardship associated with it. The next level is the “regu-
 196   Canada and the New American Empire    197  On Being Trapped in the American Paradigm of Endless War
lar” boycott, while the highest level is “total” boycott. The 
movement would set the standards for each level of boycott 
and support people involved in a variety of formal ways. The 
movement would also promote the peace boycott concept na-
tionally and establish mechanisms to assist people by providing 
information on American products, services, and companies 
while offering alternative non-American sources and group 
support. The boycott would not preclude other activities to 
end Canada’s participation in the American war machine.
Participation in Boycott U.S.A. reminds Canadians how 
easily we have been drawn into the dark crusade of ever more 
war, murder, destruction, and even annihilation. If Canada is 
to regain its former peacemaker role, it needs a population that 
is active in resisting war, and Boycott U.S.A. is a fundamental 
expression of a new direction. Just as our participation in 
American wars has weakened Canada’s ability to represent 
alternatives to war, a failure to provide alternatives encourages 
more war and human suffering. If Canada had accepted the 
principle of every life being of equal value as public policy, 
we would be one of the few nations in the world on the path 
of creating peaceful reconciliation. We cannot expect the 
state or capitalism or the media to embrace the peace option. 
This is an initiative of the citizenry – as were the great anti-
war demonstrations of February and March 2003. These 
demonstrations did not stop the invasion and conquest of 
Iraq nor the culture of endless war that the U.S. government 
embraces, but they did show that only people, inside and 
outside the United States, can offer an alternative that is just 
and peaceful. Boycott U.S.A. would show Canadians and the 
many Americans opposed to war-mongering that democracy is 
strengthened by peaceful opposition. In the end, working for 
the peace option makes Canadians stronger as individuals and 
as a nation. In terms of Canadian sovereignty, the peace option 
is the only patriotic alternative.
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Notes
 1 This article is based on a presentation made at the Trading in 
Violence/Building for Peace: Challenging the Corporate State, Annual 
Parkland Institute Conference, University of Alberta, 15 November 
2002. It has been expanded, updated, and revised to take into 
account the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
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SQUANDERED RESPONSIBILITY: 
CANADA AND THE DISARMING 
OF IRAQ
Scott Ritter
The Canadian reputation regarding its support of the United 
Nations is well deserved. This reputation has been paid for with 
the service and sacrifice of its armed forces, who participated in 
many peacekeeping operations around the world. In contrast, 
Canadian participation in perhaps the boldest experiment 
in disarmament ever attempted in the history of the United 
Nations – the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
programs – is more an accident of history than design.
Canada served as a non-permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council when the operative resolution 
regarding Iraqi disarmament, 687 (1991), was passed, and as 
such earned a seat on the Special Commission established by 
that resolution to oversee the implementation of its provisions. 
Headed by an Executive Chairman appointed by the Secretary 
General, who reported directly to the Security Council, the 
fifteen Commissioners of the Special Commission provided 
advice and expertise but had little influence over executive 
decision-making. The executive chairman turned to the Office 
of the Special Commission for the day-to-day implementation 
of the Council’s disarmament mandate. The Office of the 
Special Commission was where the administrative and 
functional expertise regarding weapons of mass destruction 
 202   Canada and the New American Empire    203  Squandered Responsibility: Canada and the Disarming of Iraq
and disarmament affairs resided, and it is where the technical 
and operational aspects of the weapons inspection process 
were directed. The influence of the Commissioners was more 
indirect than direct, reflecting their status as representatives 
of nations serving on the Security Council. However, 
representative membership on the Commission did not change 
with the evolving makeup of the Security Council. Once 
appointed to the Special Commission, Canada retained its seat 
even when its term on the Security Council expired.
The original intent behind the formation of the Special 
Commission was the maintenance of a direct link between it 
and the Security Council. Hardly anyone anticipated a situation 
that had the work of the Special Commission lasting more than 
six months. As the reality of the difficulty entailed in bringing 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs to heal became 
apparent, the envisioned six-month mission expanded into a 
year and beyond. The link between the Special Commission 
and the Security Council became increasingly diluted as the 
membership of the Security Council changed over time. 
Canada, like many nations, found itself participating in an 
advisory capacity to an organ of a Security Council in which 
it no longer had status. The result was an increasing Canadian 
detachment from the process of disarmament in Iraq because 
of dependence on specialists at the tactical level of inspection 
operations and an indifference concerning the strategic aspects 
of the commission’s work.
The ramifications of this slide into irrelevancy has been 
tragically exposed by the inability of the Canadian government 
to formulate a coherent position regarding Iraqi compliance 
with its disarmament obligation based upon independent 
assessment and analysis. Instead, the Canadian government 
was compelled to rely upon information of questionable 
objectivity and reliability provided by the United States. As 
a result, when the United Nations could have most used an 
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independent and credible voice to provide alternative analysis 
and solutions to the Iraqi crisis other than the path of war being 
pushed by the United States and Great Britain, Canada was 
mute. True, Canada opposed the war. But its opposition came 
very late in the process, was inconsistent in its substance, and 
lacked any sound alternative solution. Given the commitment 
of the United States to a unilateral policy of regime removal 
in Iraq that deviated from the mandate of disarmament set 
forth by the Security Council, the subordination of Canadian 
Iraq policy formulation to the United States is not only 
embarrassing but tragically so, especially when one considers 
that Canada had been given an historic opportunity to play 
a completely different and more independent role in the 
affairs of the Special Commission. How Canada squandered 
that opportunity needs to be studied by those who make and 
oversee foreign policy in Canada today so that any lessons 
drawn from this unfortunate episode of neglect will not be 
repeated in the future.
The opportunity granted to Canada in 1991 came in the 
form of three positions of considerable influence filled by 
Canadian officials. The first, that of a Commissioner of the 
Special Commission, was filled by Ron Clemenson, a retired 
Royal Canadian Air Force officer with a specialization in 
aerial surveillance. The second was the position of Chief of 
the Information Assessment Unit, an intelligence cell created 
within the Office of the Special Commission in the fall of 1991 
in response to Iraq’s inadequate declarations concerning its 
weapons of mass destruction programs, its obstruction of the 
work of weapons inspectors in Iraq, and ongoing concealment 
activity designed to hide proscribed materials and programs 
from the Special Commission. In an effort to diversify the 
national composition of the Office of the Special Commission, 
as well as retain the ability to interface with the United States 
on matters pertaining to the sharing of classified intelligence, 
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the executive chairman requested that Canada fill this position 
with seconded staff (someone who works for the Special 
Commission but is paid for by the providing government). 
Lieutenant-Colonel Geoff St. John was selected for this 
assignment and assumed his post in November 1991.
The third position was on the staff of a shadowy intelligence 
organization known as “Gateway,” run out of a United States 
Central Intelligence Agency facility in Bahrain. Although not 
part of the United Nations or directly affiliated with the Special 
Commission, “Gateway” was a critical component in the chain 
of intelligence support and analysis associated with the work 
of UN weapons inspectors inside Iraq. Bahrain was home to 
the Special Commission’s field office, where inspection teams 
assembled and were trained prior to being dispatched to Iraq. 
Post-mission debriefing of inspection teams, perhaps the most 
important source of raw intelligence data concerning Iraq’s 
disarmament status, was likewise conducted in Bahrain. The 
“Gateway” facility and staff were provided by the CIA to the 
Special Commission as a vehicle for the provision of sensitive 
intelligence support to the inspectors and gradually expanded 
into an all-purpose intelligence resource for the inspectors 
where pre- and post-mission work was conducted in a secure 
environment. Canada, together with Australia and the United 
Kingdom, was invited by the United States to participate in 
the “Gateway” operation, and the Canadian Secret Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) assigned officers on a rotational basis to Bahrain 
for that work.
Canada also made significant contributions to the weap-
ons inspections themselves, providing Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) teams who carried out extremely dangerous 
work inside Iraq, safeguarding the other members of the in-
spection team who were oftentimes operating in areas inun-
dated with unexploded munitions, including unstable cluster 
bomb units left over from the 1991 Gulf War. These EOD 
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personnel also doubled as site exploitation specialists, assisting 
the inspection teams by serving as ground security and by pro-
viding documentation exploitation and aerial observers (riding 
in German-provided CH-53 helicopters to provide overhead 
surveillance and observation support to teams working on the 
ground). The result of this considerable scope and depth of 
involvement in the work of the Special Commission was that 
Canada was in a position to participate in every phase of the 
inspection cycle, from political support to inception, imple-
mentation, and post-mission analysis and feedback.
Due to the nature of my own assignment and 
responsibilities with the Office of the Special Commission, 
I was in a unique position to observe all of this. I first met 
Ron Clemenson in September 1991, when I was brought into 
the Office of the Special Commission to assist in setting up 
the Information Assessment Unit (Lt. Col. St. John assumed 
command in November 1991). Ron Clemenson was very keen 
on assisting the Special Commission in developing aerial 
surveillance monitoring strategies for Iraq. The Information 
Assessment Unit was tasked with overseeing the U-2 high 
altitude surveillance program. The United States provided the 
U-2 spy plane and flew it on behalf of the Special Commission, 
who determined the reconnaissance targets and received the 
imagery product, together with imagery exploitation support 
from the CIA.
Ron and I met on numerous occasions to discuss the 
integration of the U-2 into a wider, more independent program 
of aerial monitoring of Iraq. Lt. Col. Geoff St. John and I 
worked together for the entire duration of his assignment to 
the Special Commission, defining the role and mission of the 
Information Assessment Unit and supervising the transition of 
that unit from a simple analytical support cell into a genuine 
international intelligence service that not only assumed 
primacy in the international community regarding intelligence 
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analysis regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction but also 
became involved in liaison with intelligence services around 
the world and developed its own independent multi-source 
intelligence collection capability. As an operational planner 
and later chief inspector for weapons inspection teams, I not 
only helped define the inter-operability between the Special 
Commission and “Gateway” but was directly involved in 
participating in the process of intelligence support conducted 
there. This put me in regular contact with the CSIS personnel 
assigned to “Gateway.” And, as an inspector, I had the honour 
and privilege to serve with the fine representatives of the 
Canadian Armed Forces who were seconded on a regular basis 
as members of Special Commission inspection teams on duty 
inside Iraq.
The role and influence of the IAU in shaping the work 
of the Special Commission cannot be underestimated. Not 
only was the IAU the source for the fundamental assessments 
regarding Iraqi compliance, but it was also the originator 
of every innovation in terms of intelligence collection and 
operational employment of inspection teams. The IAU was 
behind large document search inspections, the incorporation 
of helicopter-borne cameras into the Special Commission’s 
aerial surveillance program, the tactical use of U-2 imagery, 
utilization of ground-penetrating radar in the search for 
underground facilities, the use of communications intercept 
teams embedded with the weapons inspectors to detect Iraqi 
command and control of concealment activities, the debriefing 
of Iraqi defectors, and other, more sensitive programs. With 
a Canadian at the helm of the IAU, Canada was in a unique 
position not only to be aware of every aspect of the Special 
Commission’s disarmament work but to influence how this 
work was carried out. Canada has long prided itself as a defender 
of the legitimacy of an impartial and objective United Nations. 
Lt. Col. St. John’s tenure as chief of the IAU epitomized this 
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standard. He worked hard to build a viable, independent 
intelligence capability for the Special Commission, one 
that was dedicated to the Security Council’s disarmament 
mandate. He struggled to overcome not only Iraqi duplicity 
and obstruction but also the sustained efforts of the United 
States to undermine his efforts. The regime removal policy 
of the United States regarding Iraq’s president meant that the 
United States only viewed the weapons inspection mandate 
of the Special Commission as useful insofar as it facilitated 
the containment, destabilization, and eventual elimination 
of the Saddam regime. While much of the world’s attention 
was focused on the struggle between weapons inspectors and 
Iraq, an equally titanic battle to preserve the integrity of the 
Special Commission’s mandate was waged between the IAU 
and CIA over the independence of the Special Commission’s 
intelligence functions and capabilities. Lt. Col. Geoff St. John 
was at the forefront of this struggle and deserves great credit 
for persevering in the cause of the United Nations while under 
tremendous pressure to do otherwise.
Ron Clemenson was also a champion of independence and 
viability in regard to the Special Commission, especially as 
it pertained to imagery collection and analysis in support of 
inspection operations. In the spring of 1993, when the Special 
Commission, through the IAU, was exploring the expansion 
of its in-country aerial surveillance operations beyond the 
rudimentary helicopter-borne Aerial Inspection Team (AIT) to 
a more robust Aerial Inspection Group (AIG) that incorporated 
the AIT, a Russian AN-30 multi-sensor collection platform, 
and Iraqi Mirage F-1 aircraft flying under UNSCOM control, 
Ron Clemenson provided critical support in obtaining a 
qualified officer from the Canadian Air Force to be seconded 
to the Special Commission to head up AIG operations inside 
Iraq. This type of support was the ideal utilization of the 
members of the Special Commission. While the Commission 
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itself met only twice a year to discuss the work of the inspectors 
in Iraq, individual commissioners were repeatedly called upon 
by the Office of the Special Commission to intercede on behalf 
of the inspectors with their respective governments on matters 
pertaining to support. Ron Clemenson’s intervention on behalf 
of the AIG is representative of this.
With Canadian support leading the way in terms of 
intelligence and aerial surveillance operations inside Iraq 
on behalf of the Special Commission, and with Canadian 
personnel embedded on almost every ground inspection of 
note, the CSIS representative at “Gateway” was in a position 
to be involved in the assembly of a comprehensive picture 
of the overall disarmament effort being implemented by the 
inspectors. Given the senior level of Canadian representation 
in critical nodes of the Special Commission’s inspection efforts, 
the potential of CSIS to influence and shape implementation of 
Iraq’s disarmament exceeded that of even the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, the ability of the CSIS “Gateway” representative 
to provide first-hand intelligence reporting on the intimate 
details of the Special Commission’s work inside Iraq meant 
that Canadian decision-makers would have access to all the 
data necessary to formulate effective policy in support of the 
United Nation’s disarmament mandate.
Sadly, the Canadian government squandered this unique 
position. By the summer of 1993, the Canadian government 
no longer held its seat on the Security Council, and interest in 
supporting the work of the Special Commission waned as other 
fiscal priorities emerged that competed with those resources 
then being dedicated to Iraq’s disarmament. Lt. Col. Geoff 
St. John’s period of assignment expired in May 1993, and the 
Canadian Government chose neither to extend Lt. Col. St. John 
nor to provide a replacement. Canada lost its seat at the head 
of the IAU. Likewise, Canada stopped filling its CSIS position 
at “Gateway” on a full-time basis. Inspection teams would 
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thereafter be dispatched and debriefed from the “Gateway” 
facility in Bahrain without any direct Canadian involvement. 
Not only did Canada lose its ability to influence inspection 
decision-making, but the Canadian Government was put 
in the position where it became dependent on intelligence 
reporting from the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Given the competing and contradictory policy objectives of the 
United States (regime change versus disarmament), this was 
not a good position for Canada to be in, if it was in fact serious 
about an independent, objective United Nations.
The dramatic reduction in Canadian presence and 
support for the Special Commission severely impacted 
Ron Clemenson’s role as commissioner as well. Without 
major backing from the Canadian Government, the AIG 
initiative fizzled and with it Mr. Clemenson’s influence as a 
commissioner. My last impression of Mr. Clemenson in that 
role was in November 1997, during an emergency meeting of 
the Special Commission, when his comments on the imagery 
collection and analysis conducted by the IAU in support of a 
series of controversial inspections reflected his then isolation 
from and lack of knowledge regarding the work of the Special 
Commission. When I compared that performance with the 
more dynamic interventions that he made in the period 1991–
93, the contrast was considerable.
The work of the Special Commission underwent dramatic 
transformation between the years 1994 and 1998. Major 
events and developments took place, which shaped the 
commission’s disarmament mandate. These included the Iraqi 
acknowledgment of a biological weapons program in April 
1995; the defection of Hussein Kamal (Saddam Hussein’s 
son-in-law and mastermind behind Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction programs) in August 1995; the interception 
of Russian missile parts in Jordan in November 1995 (and 
the unspoken role of the Special Commission’s relationship 
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with Israeli intelligence in that and other IAU-affiliated 
operations); the counter-concealment inspection campaign 
targeting Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus which started 
in 1996 and continued through 1998; sensitive site inspection 
modalities agreed upon in June 1996; communications 
intercept operations carried out by the Special Commission 
from 1996 to 1998; the fracturing of relations between the 
Special Commission and Iraq in 1997 and 1998 and the 
corresponding demise of the Special Commission’s relations 
with the United States. All took place without Canada’s direct 
involvement or knowledge.
The demise of the Special Commission as an inspection 
organization in 1998 took Canada by surprise with resulting 
uncertainty how next to proceed. The slide into policy 
impotence was evident as early as the spring of 2000, when 
I met with a Canadian Government representative at the 
Canadian embassy in Washington, D.C. This representative 
all but acknowledged that Canada was completely beholden to 
the United States for information regarding Iraq’s disarmament 
status and as a result was unable to meaningfully influence 
United Nations policy formulation, which was then heavily 
influenced by the position of the United States and United 
Kingdom. The level of American influence was still very 
much in evidence when I travelled to Ottawa in June 2002 for 
meetings with Canadian defence and intelligence specialists, 
as well as Canadian Parliamentarians. The Canadian 
government had no ability to independently comment on the 
situation in Iraq and was forced to simply parrot the position 
of their more powerful U.S. ally. This lack of independence 
of data manifested itself most recently and tragically when 
Canada proved incapable of mounting any serious opposition 
to the United States’ drive towards war with Iraq. Despite a 
Canadian population overwhelmingly opposed to war with 
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Iraq, the Canadian government proved to be capable of doing 
nothing more than voicing qualified words of caution.
When one considers the unique position Canada found 
itself in in 1993, when it 1) headed the Special Commission’s 
intelligence function, 2) had a Canadian commissioner who 
was a player of note in the affairs of the Special Commission, 
3) had an intelligence officer deeply embedded in the centre 
of intelligence data collection efforts carried out by the CIA, 
and 4) contributed Canadian inspectors involved throughout 
the scope of disarmament activities inside Iraq, the fact that 
Canada found itself reduced to the status of impotent observer 
as the Iraq situation devolved in 2002–03 is inexcusable. Given 
Canada’s stated goal of being a defender of the United Nations 
Charter and the rule of international law contained within it, 
this inability on the part of Canada to influence events of such 
global importance represents not only a squandered opportu-
nity but, more critically, a gross dereliction of international 
duty.
While nothing can be done to undo the damage caused 
to the United Nations Charter as a result of the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq in the spring of 2003, maintenance of the Charter 
and the UN as a viable force in preserving global peace and 
security in the years to come can only come about when 
the UN’s individual members reflect on where they went 
wrong in defending the Charter and what they can do in the 
future to improve upon their respective records. Given the 
missed opportunities afforded Canada during the decade of 
inspections in Iraq, there is much to be discussed in Ottawa 
today.
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The U.S. battlefield strategy of “shock and awe” also rocks di-
plomacy! Against a post-9/11 “with-us-or-against-us” U.S. at-
titude, countries economically dependent on the United States 
make reluctant foreign policy choices! Whether these countries 
transacted with pre-war Iraq as Russia and Syria allegedly did, 
hindered military movements like Turkey, or opposed the war 
as Canada and Mexico boldly opted to, each faces a “damned-
if-I-do; damned-if-I-don’t” predicament.1 Accenting Mexico’s 
and Canada’s cases, I argue how and why twenty-first century 
diplomatic imperatives of other countries also carry symptoms 
of this malaise!
Mexico’s telltale experiences were ill-timed. On the eve of 9/
11, President Vicente Fox Quesada not only got away by propos-
ing the unthinkable – relaxing border controls for U.S.-bound 
migrants – but also assertively seating Mexico on the Security 
Council as a non-permanent member as part of his activist 
foreign policy. Confusion in formulating a coherent UN Iraq 
policy approach made Mexico’s third Security Council appear-
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ance both unlucky and ironic. The French/Russian threat to 
veto UN Resolution 1441 if a military ultimatum was imposed 
upon Iraq found Mexico’s sympathy but also revived memories 
of Mexico’s staunch opposition to adopting the veto itself as an 
instrument in 1946, when it first took a Security Council seat.2 
Mexico’s second stint in the Security Council, under President 
José Lopéz Portillo during 1980–81, sought to balance rather 
than embrace U.S. interests. By reversing this order, instead 
of strengthening Mexico’s special relationship with the United 
States, as was actually intended, Fox discovered its seamy side. 
His own foreign policy incongruencies paralleled the ups and 
downs of UN Resolution 1441 itself.
The Ghost of UN Resolution 1441
Mexico’s foreign policy activism under Fox literally meant 
putting all his eggs in the U.S. basket! One casualty was 
Mexico’s remarkable historical relationship with Fidel Castro’s 
Cuba. Yet, by the time Resolution 1441 was tabled in autumn 
2002, Mexico had shifted from the centre of George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy radar to a distant blip. Fox and Foreign 
Secretary Jorge Castañeda were left with three options: 
(a) unambiguously support the United States, like Great 
Britain’s Tony Blair and Jack Straw; (b) passively support 
non-interventionism, thus swaying with public opinion; or 
(c) actively promote multilateralism over U.S. unilateralism, 
whatever the consequences. Mexico’s Cuban volte-face after 
Fox’s election in 2000 pursued the first track and even 
erroneously assumed the United States would drop barriers on 
Mexican migrants as a quid pro quo.3 Yet, even before 9/11, the 
U.S. Congress was resistant. The second route of passivity just 
did not mesh with the styles of either Fox or Castañeda but 
briefly explained reality anyway; and the third option became 
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increasingly impossible, given Mexico’s dependence on the 
United States and its history of introversion with little or no 
experience in high-voltage international politics.
Five actual Mexican responses can be identified during 
the Iraq crisis at the UN, as Table 1 profiles. First, Mexico 
sought to act as a balancer until 8 November 2002. Whereas 
France sought more discretion and time for the UN inspection 
process, the United States arm-twisted Security Council 
members to put Iraq on a short deadline. Mexico sympathized 
with the former but fell prey to U.S. pressure. Second, Mexico’s 
shift to neutrality when Hans Blix reported on the progress of 
the weapon’s inspection process on 27 January 2003 was built 
on a three-tiered approach: leave the issues to the protagonists 
– France, Germany, Britain, and the United States; 4 officially 
urge Iraqi compliance, which appeased the United States; and 
simultaneously magnify the role the UN should have to a wary 
public. On the positive side, this thwarted charges of Mexico 
abdicating its Security Council responsibilities to an equally 
wary South America; played to public opinion; and permitted 
diplomatic piggy-backing. On the negative side, it exposed the 
constraints of dependence on the United States.
Mexico moved from second-stage neutrality to third-stage 
ambiguity after Blix’s second report on 14 February 2003. As it 
scrambled to define a coherent position, other Security Council 
members scurried in three different but decisive directions: 
support for continued UN inspection, rally behind a U.S.-led 
invasion, or play France and the United States off for economic 
rewards. Under new foreign secretary Luís Ernesto Derbez, 
Mexico’s ambiguity meant supporting the UN and appeasing 
U.S. interests by urging Iraqi compliance. Meanwhile, a 
British-Spanish-U.S. initiative for a second resolution found 
support from only Bulgaria, while China, France, Germany, 
Pakistan, Russia, and Syria remained opposed, leaving Angola, 
Cameroon, and Guinea in search of the highest economic 
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bidder. As Chile pursued a compromise initiative of its own, 
Mexico faced its worst Security Council nightmare, enduring 
diplomatic isolation in the process.
Inconsistent domestic and external developments produced 
a fourth Mexican response of abnegation after Blix’s 7 March 
report, which paved the way for its fifth response of officially 
opposing the U.S. war declaration. Fox shifted from ambiguity 
towards subordinating the U.S. call to arms because of 
growing domestic disenchantment and restlessness. When the 
Bush–Blair 16 March Azores decision to wage war eliminated 
even the faintest hope of a no-border migration deal with the 
United States, Fox had no choice but to be counted among 
the opponents. Consequently, Mexico’s routine turn to preside 
over the Security Council during the month of April was 
tantamount to a lost opportunity: It could not pursue any 
initiative in peacekeeping, balance U.S. interests, coattail 
its northern neighbour, or espouse other widely felt needs to 
its fellow members. All that was left for it to do was to call 
for supporting humanitarian issues, even then a posteriori. 
The resultant message is significant: Without diversifying 
economic and political partners, when push turns to shove, the 
weaker partner is condemned, often twice over – first for lack 
of principles such as loyality and second for a supposed lack of 
realism about the consequences to itself.
Extending the Argument to Canada
To what extent is this “damned-if-I-do; damned-if-I-don’t” 
argument valid for the other U.S. neighbour, Canada? A 
comparative survey of Canadian responses to Resolution 1441 is 
insightful. Like Mexico, Canada is a U.S. neighbour, and under 
greater U.S. scrutiny for being an alleged gateway to would-
be terrorists. It is not part of the current Security Council.
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Although its final word on Resolution 1441 was identical 
to Mexico’s, the route taken was not similar. How Canada 
tossed and turned between neutrality and ambiguity echoed 
Mexico’s predicament. Although balancing was not attempted, 
Canada differed most radically from Mexico because it was 
partially engaged militarily. Jean Chrétien’s “Canada will 
not participate” affirmation in the House of Commons after 
the Azores die had been cast was true to the bone: Canada 
refrained from a combat role. 
Yet other roles lay in waiting in terms of preparatory work, 
psychological boost, and participating in the broader campaign 
against terrorism as well as supplementing Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. However, Canada jumped in with both feet: It 
deployed three naval vessels to join the U.S.-led coalition 
fleet in the region, dispatched twenty-three military officers 
to parley with their U.S. counterparts in the Qatar command-
control centre from February, provided thirty-odd AWAC 
officers for sorties in or near the Iraqi combat zone, desired 
to be part of any post-war reconstruction plans and provide 
post-war security forces, and currently supervises, with over 
two thousand soldiers, the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Canada 
and Canadians cannot forget how four of their soliders were 
killed by friendly U.S. fire in Afghanistan – worse still, how 
the culprits escaped court-martial. At the same time, Canada 
worked diligently with UN Security Council members both 
before Resolution 1441 was unanimously passed in November 
2002 and after. When a breakdown looked likely in February 
2003, its UN ambassador, Paul Heinbecker, canvassed the ten 
non-permanent members with a bridging deadline proposal. 
This didn’t work, and probably none of the representatives 
were listening anyway. As a previous section indicated, 
their preferences and preoccupations were elsewhere. Lost 
in this maelstrom was a Canadian-Mexican opportunity, if 
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not to slow its preponderant neighbour, then to initiate an 
independent, long-term bilateral compact.
Far from being chimerical, a thriving Canada–Mexico 
political understanding may become the most feasible exit 
option for both from their utter U.S. dependence. To be 
sure, neither of these relationships with the United States are 
drastically Machiavellian: Both have enjoyed spells of special 
status, and the United States did not force either into any 
commercial engagement. Just as Brian Mulroney proposed a 
free trade agreement to the United States at the ‘Shamrock’ 
Summit, September 1986, Carlos Salinas de Gortari did 
likewise in Davos, February 1990.5 The Mexican proposal, 
interestingly, was fully rejected by Canada – for six months 
or so. Since then, relations have spiralled at both societal and 
state levels, as Chrétien himself acknowledged at the 450th 
anniversary of Mexico City’s Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de México in late February 2003.6 He highlighted the million-
or-so Canadians who visit Mexico each year, more than ten 
thousand Mexican students studying in Canadian institutions 
of higher learning, over four hundred agreements bringing 
universities of the two countries together, and growing cultural 
exchanges between them, for example, Canada’s strong 
participation in Mexico’s annual Cervantino Festival. Canada 
had become Mexico’s second largest trading partner, Mexico 
Canada’s fourth best customer, and both currently accounting 
for almost one-third of the U.S. market. In reality, both 
bilateral trade and investments are small: Bilateral Canadian-
Mexican trade accounts for less than 5 per cent of Mexico’s 
overall transactions, and European investments far outweigh 
Canadian, especially in the lucrative, denationalized banking 
sector. Without expansion in both areas, diversification 
possibilities remain limited; and formidable barriers await 
such expansion anyway: A large portion of exports to the 
other could more easily be marketed in the United States; both 
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naturally gravitate towards the United States, which is partly 
why a “damned-if-I-do; damned-if-I-don’t” predicament 
prevails; and, as a huge tract of land between the two, the 
United States remains a natural barrier to bilateral transactions 
between the two countries
Argument in Even Broader Light
Although the degree varies, helplessness against the United 
States is a common Mexican and Canadian fraility. What 
specific features of their “damned-if-I-do; damned-if-I-don’t” 
helplessness may be of general relevance to other countries, or 
even predict their own specific futures? Four specific issues are 
explored before identifying some general features:
First, domestic politics influence foreign policy outcomes. 
For Fox this involved electoral considerations, while for 
Chrétien it was his retirement. With the public overwhelmingly 
against a war before Mexico’s mid-term legislative elections in 
July 2003, Fox pragmatically trimmed his external interests to 
suit domestic realities. It didn’t help, since his PAN party lost 
anyway, and precisely because external interests in the United 
States had soured: U.S. unilateralism and recession prevented 
much needed domestic reforms.7 Similarly, Chrétien’s greater 
manoeuvrability in opposing the war, stemming to some 
degree from his impending departure from politics, not only 
jeopardized relations with the United States, but also left other 
Canadian sectors unhappy, especially the business community 
and media. Paul Martin’s prime ministership suggests a return 
to an antebellum Canadian–U.S. camaraderie.8
Second, deep trade dependence on the United States 
also reduces foreign policy options and initiatives of both 
neighbours. Although any significant U.S. retaliation against 
Mexico or Canada would undoubtedly prove costly for 
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the United States too, given the high degree of economic 
complementarity in both bilateral relations, the United States 
is less exposed and vulnerable than its two neighbours by 
virtue of its greater size and diversity in partners. Nevertheless, 
North America’s hitherto win–win progression under NAFTA 
is expected to be negatively affected, if not by the Iraqi fallout, 
then by a recessionary U.S. economy.
Third, an oppositional foreign policy doesn’t help if the 
goal is to strengthen ties with the United States. Fox’s strong 
support of democratization and liberalization, two core U.S. 
ideologies, while reducing Fox’s personal political fortunes do-
mestically, had little currency in a belligerent U.S. Canadians 
could also learn from Pierre Trudeau’s ill-fated Third Option.9 
Pursued vigorously during the 1970s to diversify economic 
partners beyond just Great Britain and the United States, 
it simply could not overcome the U.S. gravitational pull on 
Canadian trade and investment. As its failure was being rec-
ognized in the early 1980s, the MacDonald Report also found 
the Canadian–U.S. economic relationship to be the spring-
board of Canadian economic growth.
Finally, the replacement of long-cherished principles or 
constitutional provisions by pragmatic amendments is unlikely 
to always bring desired results. Fox’s plans to eventually 
privatize such sensitive sectors as electricity and petroleum 
are also likely to leave him embattled for the remainder of his 
tenure.
Four features of general relevance emerge from the 
discussions: (a) the nature of special relations with the United 
States amidst a global crusade; (b) the growing state-society 
disjuncture; (c) balancing reciprocal domestic-external 
determinants; and (d) adjusting long-cherished principles to 
pragmatic needs.
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Ordinary rather than Extraordinary
How Mexico’s and Canada’s special U.S. relationships 
broke down alerts us against taking them for granted or as 
a permanent feature of the political landscape for several 
reasons: policy divergences are as routine as convergences; 
special relationships are not immune to business swings, which 
generate even sour moods; the presence of resilient binational 
populations in all three North American countries complicate 
post-9/11 economic liberalism more than they help; and 
embedded asymmetry softens neither the growing dependence 
of Canada and Mexico on the United States nor the plight 
both countries may face under difficult circumstances.
Prior to 9/11, Fox’s relationship with Bush even 
outshone Blair’s with Bush. Even the cinco mayo Mexican 
commemoration of the eviction of the French monarch in the 
1860s was celebrated, for the first time, in the White House, 
while rancho politics between the two presidents led many 
Mexicans to actually believe bilateral relations were being 
structurally altered for the better. No single issue epitomized 
these sentiments, and the resultant miscalculations, better 
than Mexican emigration.10 By inducing the United States 
to relax border controls, the Fox-Castañeda team increased 
the salience of the ever-growing binational population in 
both Mexican and U.S. politics.11 This also helped dampen 
nationalistic resistance to privatizing key public sectors and 
marketizing agriculture in Mexico.12 What may be critical is 
not the expected congressional opposition to any such plan in 
the United States or how severely it was undermined by 9/11, 
but the sheer absence of any Mexican alternative. Astute as 
he was, Castañeda only began to fill the missing blank with 
Resolution 1441, by which time, for at least three reasons, 
miscalculation was inevitable: the costs of balancing U.S. 
interests were too prohibitive for a country as dependent as 
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Mexico; the benefits of bandwagoning on the United States 
did not match the loss of Mexican reputation; and the only 
remaining role for Mexico was to straddle. His New Year’s 
resignation became the dividing line between Fox’s activist 
foreign policy epoch and an uncertain era of reluctant support, 
indicating a foreign policy bereft of meaningful purpose.13 
Luis Ernesto Derbez, the new foreign secretary, toned down 
the country’s voice, but indecisiveness, for example, in both 
supporting the UN and appeasing U.S. interests by urging Iraq 
to comply, reiterated how meaningless the Security Council 
membership had become.14 On the Canadian–U.S. front, the 
two countries share the longest unfortified boundary in the 
world. That it also witnesses the largest flows of goods and 
merchandise between any two countries adds to the specialty 
of the relationship. In the final analysis, both Canada and 
Mexico are among the top three trading partners of the largest 
economy in the world today; and the United States alone 
absorbs over three-quarters or more of the exports of the two 
neighbours! With 9/11, but more particularly Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, while many of these long-term trends are unlikely to 
change significantly, the special status they acquired for both 
U.S.-based bilateral relationships are expected to dim to some 
extent. To what extent remains the puzzle, not just for these 
two countries, but also for the dozens of others for which the 
United States is the largest market or source of investment 
funds.
State–Society Disjunctures
Arguments about an overloaded state are not new but assume 
new meanings in the wake of the stupendous information 
revolutions underway.15 With even the most rigid boundaries 
collapsing, the emerging global village and rapidity of 
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technological innovations only predict greater anomie and 
further anarchy even in very stable societies.
Three impacts are noteworthy. First, states and societies 
no longer move in the same direction, and the widening gap 
between them exacerbates the democratic deficit between 
policy demands and supplies. Secondly, in turn, especially in 
emerging democracies, tenures of elected officials may become 
shorter than before, thus adding to the flux. Finally, just as 
both of the above dynamics challenge the legitimacy of the 
domestic order, it is but one short step towards challenging 
the international order! Behind the ricocheting effects of 
internal-external reciprocal dynamics stands a more robust 
version of public opinion than hitherto. It is a critical emerging 
force in many countries of the world, while in other countries 
more subtle struggles persist in manipulating it. Whether 
the media constitute a fourth branch of government or not, 
they can cast a spell on the public faster than any politicians 
or most policies and hold both politicians and policies at bay 
almost as effectively as electoral votes can. How Resolution 
1441 exposed the gap between policy positions and public 
preferences in various countries alerted us to both the power 
of the latter over foreign policy and the potentially disruptive 
effects of state-society divergences. 
Reciprocating Domestic–External Dynamics
Under the onslaught of boundary-eroding globalization, 
liberalization, and democratization (GLAD) forces, 
nationalistic tendencies do not necessarily help. Not only that, 
but increasing state porosity and transparency also lets the 
proverbial cat out of the bag, for whatever the results may be!
Mexico’s disoriented foreign policy today is an example of 
the GLAD-induced results. Its hallowed strategy of import 
 224   Canada and the New American Empire    225  Doggone Diplomacy?
substitution was abandoned from the 1980s precisely because 
global competitiveness had significantly chipped away at 
Mexican nationalism, isolation, and economic viability. 
In turn, enormous democratic pressures were released in 
what the Peruvian poet Mario Llosa Vargas dubbed the 
“perfect dictatorship.” Against these forces, like Trudeau’s 
Third Option, Mexico’s President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
also sought, through his complementation policy in 1989, 
diversified economic partners in the European Community 
and Japan to lessen the dependence on the United States. Yet, 
German unification and the start of Japan’s first post-World 
War II recession thwarted his initiative. His free trade proposal 
to George Bush Sr. dittoed Mulroney’s to Ronald Reagan four 
years earlier, and for similar reasons. Unpredictable domestic-
external intertwinings affect not just Mexico and Canada, but 
all countries!
Principles versus Pragmatism
Adjusting to the rapidly moving post-Cold War world creates 
strange bedfellows, not the least between revered principles 
and ad hoc pragmatism. Mexico’s 180-degree turn towards the 
United States since the 1980s buried the import substitution 
culture, first institutionalized by Lazáro Cardenás in the 
1930s, then reaffirmed by every subsequent president until 
Miguel de la Madrid in the 1980s. It generated national pride 
and inflated nationalism. Even by embracing liberalization 
these deep nationalistic chords are not being tempered. The 
result is a half-breed circumstance almost every country of 
the world recognizes in one way or another. It is experienced 
by transitional countries like China, India, or Malaysia, their 
developed counterparts, such as Canada, Japan, or Switzerland, 
even underdeveloped states such as Bangladesh, Nepal, or 
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Somalia, not to mention today’s outliers, Afghanistan, Cuba, or 
North Korea. Routine adjustments are themselves problematic 
enough, but when they are forced, reactions and a more 
deteriorating atmosphere seem inevitable.
Conclusions
Trapped as they are between a rock and the United States, 
countries such as Canada, Mexico, and several others need 
to reinvent the wheel, if need be, to find an escape route. On 
the one hand, policymakers under GLAD circumstances must 
respond to a fair share of public desires, if only to be re-elected. 
On the other is the desire to profit from the largest economy 
in human history, and with it all sorts of problems of how 
to balance domestic welfare considerations or sentimental 
outbursts with the efficiency imperatives or cutthroat 
approaches of global competitiveness. The circumstance is an 
old puzzle fated to continue well into the forseeable future. 
Two previously tried options remain: diversifying economic 
partners or accepting vulnerability. Either way, Mexican 
President Porfírio Díaz’s lament at the start of the twentieth 
century of his country being too far from God and too close to 
the United States resonates even louder in the twenty-first, not 
just for Mexico, but also for Canada.
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THE MORAL SUPERIORITY COMPLEX 
IN THE UNITED STATES POSES 
A MORAL DILEMMA FOR CANADA
Satya R. Pattnayak
The recent U.S.-led war in Iraq and its aftermath have the 
potential to change the world balance of power in the next few 
years. Canada as the most important neighbour of the United 
States faces a moral dilemma. On the one hand, it strives to 
stabilize and even strengthen the multilateral institutional 
structure of the United Nations so that world conflicts can be 
diffused and resolved effectively. On the other hand, however, 
the Canadian leadership is at pains to see its most important 
economic partner embark upon a path separate from most 
members of the UN Security Council. What course of action 
could Canada possibly have? This chapter contemplates a series 
of scenarios in which Canada could play a more effective role 
in the world and hemispheric affairs in the post-war scenario 
in Iraq.
Canada Faces a Moral Dilemma
The war in Iraq was consistently characterized by the Bush 
administration as a moral cause. The United States and its 
allies, as we were told, took a moral stand against a brutal 
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dictator who had defied the UN since the end of Gulf War I in 
1991.1 The official logic was that, unless dealt with immediately, 
Iraq was likely to use its suspected arsenal of biological, 
chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and could strike at the 
heart of the United States either directly or through surrogates 
like Osama bin Laden’s notorious terrorist organization – al-
Qaeda. The British prime minister, Tony Blair, even predicted 
a scary picture in which Iraq was indeed capable of striking 
its western enemies with the weapons of mass destruction in a 
matter of only forty-five minutes. But as a consequence of this 
“either/or” logic, nations that did not support a pre-emptive 
military strike against Iraq were demonized not only by key 
members of the Bush administration but also by the media, in 
particular the major television networks based in the United 
States.2 Of course, the Bush administration probably believed 
that once the Iraq issue was dealt with in moral terms, then, 
nations would have to take a stand, and the expectation was 
that they would support the military campaign.
In order to mobilize a sufficient number of nations behind 
its military policy in Iraq, or an alliance of the willing, the Bush 
administration put considerable pressure on many countries, 
including Canada. It used intimidating language through 
public announcements by some of the key members of the 
administration. The characterization of Germany and France 
as “Old” Europe and being less relevant to the United States 
contributed to a trans-Atlantic impasse between Washington 
on the one hand and Berlin and Paris on the other, not seen 
since the Suez Crisis in 1956. Of all nations that were against 
the immediate military strike in Iraq, France in particular was 
subjected to the most embarrassing negative campaign in the 
United States. Even the speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, 
advocated a boycott of French products in the United States. 
But this was only the tip of the iceberg of a “we don’t really 
need any of them” attitude.
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Countries not as economically or politically powerful as 
Germany and France were subjected to more open political 
and diplomatic intimidation by members of the Bush adminis-
tration. In some instances, financial incentives were offered to 
stand in line behind the U.S. military strike in Iraq, which was 
subsequently characterized as one intended to liberate the Iraqi 
people from a cruel and brutal dictatorship.
If a given nation considered important by the U.S. ad-
ministration did not openly commit itself to stand behind the 
United States in this simplistic but monstrous battle of bibli-
cal proportions between “good” and “evil,” then, a significant 
portion of the media in the United States characterized that 
country as a “traitor” to the cause of Western civilization.3 In 
particular, Canada as the immediate neighbour was put in a re-
ally difficult situation. In many ways, the Iraqi problem posed 
a moral dilemma for Canada.
Based on the newspaper and television coverage in the 
U.S. of Canada, as limited as it had been, one could say that 
the public sentiment in Canada was divided to a significant 
degree. On the one hand, according to some Canadian polls 
before the war, most “Canadians … found American foreign 
policy overtly aggressive and thought American leaders took 
them for granted.”4 But, on the other hand, “Canadians also 
thought of themselves as friends of the United States, so at 
times when anti-Americanism appeared to have been growing, 
there was always a snap-back reaction. More often than not, 
Canadian emotions and policies toward the United States were 
characterized by ambiguity.”5 It was more than just that; it 
presented a real problem for Canada.
This dilemma was sustained by several hard facts: (1) 
Canada had had a long-standing commitment to using 
multilateral forums to resolve international disputes; (2) a 
long, open border with the United States; (3) an economic 
partnership that had created the world’s two largest trading 
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partners of each other’s products; and (4) to people living 
outside of the North American continent, Canadians, with 
the exception of Quebec, were not very distinguishable from 
Americans culturally and linguistically. Of course, Canadians 
and Americans would dispute this simplistic version of their 
respective national existence. But the truth is that in order to 
maintain some semblance of independence from the colossus 
to the south, successive Canadian governments, although they 
have cooperated with armed campaigns overseas alongside the 
United States, at times have done so only grudgingly. In that 
respect, the recent Canadian cooperation in the campaign 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 
aftermath of September 11 was noteworthy. Unfortunately, 
that cooperation also had produced Canadian casualties. Four 
Canadian soldiers died when they came under fire by mistake 
from a U.S. National Guard F-16 fighter jet during a training 
exercise.6
The general feeling in some sections in the United States 
was that, if it could be avoided, Canada would rather use 
multilateral forums of negotiation and bargaining and not 
hard military power. In that context, Canada’s insistence 
that the United States use the United Nations in its quest for 
international legitimacy did not come as a surprise.7 When 
that did not materialize, largely due to the intransigence of 
the U.S. diplomats, Canadian leadership found itself in a 
difficult situation. In early February of 2003, Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien delivered a major speech at the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations in which he had advised that, in spite 
of U.S. frustrations with the UN, “the long-term interests of 
the United States would be better served by acting through 
the United Nations, than by acting alone.”8 In this sense, 
Canadian preference to act through multilateral organizations 
such as the United Nations was quite similar to that of 
Germany and France. The prime minister’s speech turned out 
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to be prophetic by the late summer of 2003. Due to sustained 
hostilities to the U.S. military presence and casualties in Iraq, 
the American Secretary of State Colin Powell returned to 
New York to ask for the UN support so that the problems in 
administering a fragmented Iraq would be minimized. It is to 
be noted that the same U.S. secretary of state had admonished 
the UN a few months earlier, when the war talk was heating up 
in Washington, for not acting on its resolutions aggressively.
Evidence of Hard Power
According to many scholars of the U.S. security policy, this 
divergence could be explained on the basis of stark differences in 
hard power.9 After the end of the Cold War and the realignment 
of the East Bloc countries, the new Russian Federation was, 
and remains, neither an economic nor a political challenge 
to the United States. In addition, the gap between the major 
NATO countries and the United States also widened, more 
starkly so since the late 1980s. These vast differences could 
be explained in terms of the respective perceptions of threat 
and priorities.10 While NATO and its European member states 
focused on creating a European economic powerhouse that 
would rival the economic dominance of the United States, they 
had indeed neglected the military component of such power. 
That disparity has only increased in recent years.11
According to the World Bank, the Canadian economy is 
about 2.2 per cent of the world economy. With 31 million 
people, the ratio of the size of the economy to the population is 
0.071. Compared to this, the U.S. economy is about one-third 
of the world economy (32.6%) while it caters to a population 
of 284 million. The corresponding ratio for the United States 
amounts to 0.115, a much more favourable ratio indicating 
a more solid base. In plain language, it came down to this: 
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while the United States possessed 9.2 times the population of 
Canada, its economy was 14.8 times larger than the Canadian 
economy.12 Of course, this asymmetry in hard power becomes 
much too large to ignore if the preponderance of the U.S. 
military power is taken into account.
After Gulf War I, the U.S. military spending declined 
somewhat until 2000, but in the aftermath of 9/11 it increased 
significantly. Based on the 2003 estimates, the U.S. military 
spending is now about 40 to 45 per cent of the world military 
spending.13 This asymmetry in economic and military power 
does not end with Canada. The United States also enjoys a 
disproportionate amount of advantage vis-à-vis Germany and 
France as well. For example, the economies of Germany and 
France together constitute about 10.2 per cent of the world 
economy, which is less than one-third of the U.S. economy. 
Germany and France cater to a combined population of 141 
million. For comparison sake, the U.S. population is about 
twice the combined population of Germany and France, but 
its economy is more than three times that of the two economies 
put together.14 This power asymmetry is magnified when the 
military dimension is added. While the NATO economies have 
been intent on stabilizing or reducing military spending in the 
aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the United States 
has indeed consolidated and actually augmented its military 
striking power vis-à-vis the rest of the world combined, 
commensurate with its unchallenged superpower status.15 
Hence, in U.S. thinking, the military option is likely to be 
entertained sooner, as only the United States has the capacity 
to intervene and neutralize threats to its security across this 
universe, in multiple places simultaneously if necessary. In 
such a scenario of drastic imbalance of hard power, what could 
Canada possibly do?
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Canada’s Place in the Future Balance of 
Power
Despite its limits in terms of the economic and military power, 
Canada is no ordinary country for the United States. As stated 
earlier, it is the biggest trading partner for the United States, 
but looking at it from the Canadian perspective, the United 
States imports more than 80 per cent of all Canadian exports, 
leaving it vulnerable to possible reprisal from Washington. The 
economic stakes have been ominous in the pronouncements 
by prominent members of the Canadian political landscape.16 
For example, Canadian Alliance leader Stephen Harper and 
others had repeatedly asked that Canada should support the 
American plans for military strikes against Iraq regardless of 
whether or not it had UN support. These tensions have strong 
economic undertones. The world’s longest open border is 
also the world’s busiest. Despite the dilemma in moral terms, 
Canadian leaders are aware of the negative economic implica-
tions of any protracted disagreement with the United States.
Yet, there are theoretical and, by implication, futuristic 
limits to the Bush administration’s hypothesis that Iraq was 
a moral problem and that the United States and Britain were 
on the morally superior side. The reverse logic behind such an 
hypothesis was that those nations that opposed the 17 March 
deadline proposed by the Bush administration were immoral 
by implication, in particular France.
First of all, the demonizing of France and, to a lesser extent, 
Germany by the Bush administration and the popular media 
in light of the gridlock in the UN Security Council is only a 
small problem compared to what might develop in the next 
three to five years in the form of a competing power bloc, a 
real counter weight to the United States in the world balance 
of power.
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Since the end of the Cold War, the successive U.S. 
administrations from Bush I to Clinton to Bush II have 
created an aura of invincibility around themselves. That aura is 
sustained by default, meaning that no real competition exists 
in terms of any worrisome challenge to the U.S. dominance 
in economic, technological, and military matters. That is at 
least the perception perpetuated by the hawks in the Bush 
administration, resulting in an extraordinary amount of 
arrogance, but not statesmanship and diplomacy. Of course, 
by comparison with the current Bush administration, the 
Clintonians look like the nicest people on earth. However, 
remembering the hawkish posture of the former secretary of 
state, Madeline Albright, over the war in Serbia, one could 
make the argument that there has indeed been a greater 
willingness on the part of the U.S. policy-makers in recent 
years toward a military solution to a crisis overseas. But 
that is nothing compared to what might unravel because of 
an apparent lack of understanding of or patience over the 
intricacies of international diplomacy.
The temporary spring 2003 alliance of France, Germany, 
Russia, and China – countries that had opposed the U.S.-
British-Spanish proposal in the UN Security Council to wage 
war in Iraq – could very well become a real, strategic economic, 
technological, and military alliance. This has an even greater 
potential as a rival power bloc if Japan joins them in the next 
few years. Japan has been quite uncomfortable with the current 
situation in Iraq, and its continued dependence on Mideast oil 
complicates the issue. Japan has been quietly but seriously in-
terested in signing contracts with Russia that, once successful, 
would build a pipeline from the Russian oil-rich provinces to 
the eastern ports, and then on to Japan.
Economically, the alliance of France, Germany, Russia, 
China, and Japan would be as powerful as that of the U.S.-led 
alliance. Based on the 2002 data, France and these allies would 
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account for about 30 per cent of the world economy while the 
U.S.-led alliance (U.S.-UK-Spain) would control 39 per cent 
of the world economy. Technologically, this rival alliance will 
have the German, French, and the Japanese know-how and, 
although it may be slightly behind that of the United States 
in some areas, would be quite at par in electronics, robotics, 
and communication. Militarily, the United States cannot re-
ally threaten the alliance, as Russia still possesses at least as 
many nuclear weapons as the United States.17 The Chinese 
armed forces by most accounts are the largest in the world. 
This alliance, if it takes shape, would indeed become a compet-
ing power bloc in all major dimensions of power – economic, 
technological, military, and political. With the exception of 
China, the U.S.-led alliance cannot claim that the competition 
is between democracy and free market versus totalitarianism 
and state socialism.
In this possible scenario, Canada could play an effective 
bridge between the two power blocs, thus becoming more im-
portant than at the present for the U.S. policy-makers. With 
its close political contact with European nations, in particular 
France and the United Kingdom, this is a likely scenario. 
The second possible scenario for Canada, although not as 
glamorous, could be effective as well. Since Canadian refiner-
ies process a significant amount of crude oil destined for the 
U.S. market, it would make prudent sense for the Canadian 
leadership to work closely with Mexico and Venezuela in the 
area of oil exploration and distribution. In fact, the recent U.S. 
Department of Energy data show that Canada, Mexico, and 
Central and South America together account for more than 
half of the daily oil imports to the United States.18 A coordi-
nated platform of Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela together 
with continued U.S. dependence on foreign oil is bound to 
accord Canada a greater weight than it currently gets from the 
United States. Finally, an organized campaign in concert with 
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the various U.S. business houses and chambers of commerce 
to keep politics out of economics would also be a start. Since 
the Canadian economy is strongly embedded with the U.S. 
economy, this option may actually be easier to realize. All of 
these formations take time, but if played judiciously, Canada 
would have a more important role to play than at the present in 
world peace and stability.
As things stand at this critical juncture, there are very few 
takers of U.S. arrogance internationally. It defies logic when the 
U.S. administration declares a deadline on Iraq and asks the 
UN Security Council to vote on it and yet threatens reprisal 
for non-support. For example, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico 
hinted at possible reprisals when Mexico could not make up its 
mind on the U.S.-led proposal.19 When nations are insulted 
and are taken for granted, they are likely to organize and make 
efforts to change the balance of power. That would mean of 
course that NATO would break up in the next three to five 
years, and if the current attitude of belligerence continues in 
the U.S. administration, it will only pave the way for a rival 
power bloc in the making. And that would spell bad things for 
the real U.S. national interest. But it could make things more 
interesting for Canada in a positive way.
In a Post -War Scenario
What is contemplated in the earlier section is theoretical. 
Scholars writing on the international balance of power among 
states have consistently predicted the rise of a rival power 
bloc from an essentially unipolar world, due to a number of 
game-theory calculations toward gaining economic, political, 
strategic, and diplomatic advantage over rival states.20 But there 
are signs that many of the members of the contemplated rival 
power bloc are mending fences with the United States. For 
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example, the UN Security Council voted overwhelmingly to 
recognize the U.S.-imposed Iraqi Governing Council and even 
agreed to get involved in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. 
Canada has already manifested its willingness to work with the 
United States in the post-war reconstruction efforts. Although 
these do not include the sending of Canadian soldiers, the 
Canadian leadership has promised significant help in some key 
areas. For example, the Canadian prime minister has promised 
significant help in infrastructure building, humanitarian help, 
and educating Iraqis in democratic governance.21
Both France and Germany are on a “kiss and make up” 
mode. Both President Chirac of France and Chancellor 
Schroeder of Germany have been publicly sympathetic toward 
offering a helping hand in the rebuilding of Iraq. The United 
States is also facing a rising opposition to the fast-increasing 
human and financial costs of rebuilding in Iraq. As U.S. 
soldiers die almost daily in scattered resistance and the cost of 
maintaining an administration and military presence amount 
to 4 billion dollars a month, popular opposition is showing 
signs of emerging. The Democratic Party has also picked 
up on its opposition to the post-war developments. In this 
changed scenario, it would also be advantageous for the U.S. 
administration to get some support from both the UN and 
its former opponents. In such a situation it is quite easy for 
Canadian policy makers to forget the long-term repercussions 
of the U.S.-led war in Iraq without a UN Security Council 
mandate and, instead, concentrate on the good things Canada 
shares with the United States, albeit in an asymmetrical 
fashion.
Without publicly acknowledging it, the U.S. administration 
has been campaigning for a multilateral military force that 
would slowly relieve some of the work now being done by the 
British and American forces. The Central American countries 
of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have recently sent 
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about 900 soldiers to join the military peacekeeping operations 
in Iraq.22 Soldiers from Georgia, Ukraine and Poland are 
already on the ground. With the UN resolution now in favour 
of a multilateral involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq, 
it is entirely possible that countries such as Jordan, Turkey, 
Bangladesh, and India could send their military personnel 
to Iraq to relieve some members of the U.S. forces. It seems 
there is a grudging acceptance by both sides of the pre-war 
debate of the new ground realities in post-war Iraq. The 
post-war Canadian overture to help out the United States in 
supplying transport aircraft, disaster management assistance, 
and even hard dollars in the amount of $106 million in Iraq 
indicates that the larger relevance of the multilateral conflict 
management through the UN is being compromised by the 
desire to return to the status quo antebellum. The U.S., by 
turning to the global community for support in re-creating 
Iraq under its mandate, also acknowledges that its unilateral 
approach cannot be sustained without serious cost to itself. It 
would seem that American isolation during the war is coming 
to an end and that Canada is playing a role in the thaw.
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FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY 
INDEPENDENCE: WILL THIS BE 
OUR VERY LAST CHANCE?
Mel Hurtig
The Chrétien government’s decision not to join the American 
invasion of Iraq surprised and pleased most Canadians. Since 
the invasion, public opinion polls have consistently shown the 
majority of Canadians supported the government’s decision 
and in recent months that support has grown even stronger. 
Here and elsewhere the invasion is increasingly seen as an 
illegal and tragic imperialistic blunder, which is well on the 
way to producing a Vietnam-like quagmire while generating 
widespread hatred and increasing terrorism around the world, 
with more and worse certain to come in the future.
The pressure on the Chrétien government to join George W. 
Bush’s ill-advised “pre-emptive” aggression was unrelenting. 
The threats from the likes of U.S. ambassadors Paul Cellucci 
and Gordon Giffin and Condoleezza Rice were blunt and 
arrogant. Canada was expected to join in and it would be 
“unthinkable” if we did not. Time magazine said, “Canada 
could play a hefty price for the government’s anti-war stance.” 
Meanwhile, our own plutocratic Americanizers were vociferous 
in their support for Bush, Rumsfeld and the Pentagon. Most 
of our press weren’t far behind. A Globe and Mail columnist 
wrote, “Simply put, if we get too far from the Americans, we 
get punished.” Continentalist historian Jack Granatstein said 
AFTERWORD
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that Canada has “no choice” but to co-operate fully with the 
United States. Stephen Harper and the Official Opposition 
were strongly in favour of going to war. So was virtually all 
of the powerful and influential big-business community in 
Canada – much of it foreign-owned and controlled.
Over and over, Canadians were warned about our 
vulnerability if we chose not to go to war. Our exports would 
be threatened; the border would be closed; further planned 
and anticipated integration in the form of “The Big Idea” and 
“The Grand Bargain” would be in danger. Our standard of 
living would be sure to plummet. What was so remarkable 
about the Chrétien decision was that, since its election in 
1993, the government had been the most continentalist, 
conservative Liberal government in modern Canadian history. 
With so many staunch American sycophants in the cabinet 
and on the backbenches, and with a foreign affairs department 
that long ago forgot the meaning of words like “sovereignty,” 
“independence” and “self-respect,” it seemed that most likely 
“ready, aye ready!” would be the Canadian response. Is there 
much doubt that that would indeed have been the Canadian 
response if Jean Chrétien were not entering the last months 
of his reign as prime minister? I think not. Is there any doubt 
about what Paul Martin would have done? Once again I think 
not.
The public opinion polls continue to be revealing (despite 
some silly headlines in the National Post). Most Canadians 
want us to be independent of American domination, want 
us to support multilateralism, want us to preserve our own 
standards, values and quality of life. Yet, whatever pride 
we can take in relation to our principled decision regarding 
Iraq, will be quickly trampled by a Paul Martin government’s 
uncompromising rush to join Bush’s National Missile Defence 
(NMD) plan, to integrate our military with the U.S. military, 
to place us behind the North American Security Perimeter, 
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while selling off even more of the ownership and control of our 
country. Anyone who is familiar with Bush’s new Star Wars 
plan knows that it will result in the weaponizing of space, 
the de-stabilization of arms agreements, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, the rapid development of more powerful 
nuclear weapons, and improved multiple-warhead missile 
delivery systems. For Canada to adopt a fawning, obsequious 
behaviour in the face of such potential disaster will certainly 
end our ability to ever again demonstrate foreign and defence 
policy independence.
What agreements that Canada supports and in some 
cases helped initiate will have to be abandoned because the 
United States doesn’t like them? Will it be the Land Mines 
Treaty? The International Criminal Court? The Small Arms 
Treaty? The UN Protocol on Developing, Producing or 
Stockpiling Biological or Toxic Weapons, or a long list of 
other international agreements the rogue Bush administration 
detests? If Canada abandons its long-standing opposition to 
the weaponizing of space by supporting the NMD, and if we 
further integrate our military with the U.S. military, any proud 
remnant of our foreign policy legacy will be swept down the 
drain forever. Paul Martin is a strong supporter of the WTO 
Doha Round, the FTAA, the GATT, the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund, all with their mantras of 
privatization, deregulation, and the “free flow of capital” (the 
euphemism for selling off the ownership and control of our 
country that is not already foreign-controlled).
A Canadian Council on National Unity poll has shown that 
two-thirds of Canadians say that maintaining the sovereignty 
of Canada is the most important challenge facing our country, 
while only 8 per cent want us to become more like the United 
States, and three in five say that we are losing our independence 
from the United States. A full 89 per cent say that the quality 
of life is better in Canada than it is in the United States. Yet, 
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with the Paul Martin government, we’re going to be rapidly 
heading to even more integration, more harmonization, and 
more Americanizied policies, standards, and values.
Timid Canadian continentalists (and there are many 
of them in the federal government and in our business 
community) claim that we are so vulnerable to the United 
States that we really must toe the American line, or else. This 
is nonsense. Fifty-four per cent of our entire trade surplus 
with the United States comes from our exports of oil, natural 
gas, and electricity. We supply 99 per cent of U.S. electricity 
imports, 94 per cent of their natural gas imports, 17 per cent of 
oil, and 35 per cent of their uranium used for power generation. 
To suggest that these exports are in any way vulnerable is 
absurd. Then, if you subtract the huge annual U.S. surplus in 
services, which are mostly imports into Canada by American 
branch plants from their parent companies at inflated and very 
profitable non-arm’s-length prices, and then subtract the huge 
$30 billion-plus annual U.S. investment income surplus with 
Canada, our overall net surplus with the United States shrinks 
to well under 1 per cent of GDP. Consider, too, that Canada 
is the number one customer of U.S. corporations and has been 
for the past forty-eight consecutive years. We buy more goods 
and services from the United States than all fifteen European 
Union countries combined. U.S. exports to Canada, plus their 
investment income from Canada, exceed their income from 
any other country by an enormous $177 billion!
A proud, independent, self-confident Canada should be 
playing a much greater role in the United Nations, should 
be joining the post-Cancun group of nations (China, India, 
Brazil, etc.) to counter the WTO establishment vision of 
corporate globalization, should quickly step up its foreign aid, 
should strongly support multilateral agreements to promote 
peace and disarmament, and should reject imperialism in 
all its forms – and say so without reservation. We can’t do 
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any of these things unless we stop the growth of the foreign 
ownership and control of our country. A colony doesn’t have an 
independent foreign or defence policy. A colony’s young men 
and women go off to fight imperial wars, be it in the Middle 
East or in North Korea, or where have you.
Those of us who love our country, value our freedom to 
chart our own future, and have children and grandchildren 
that we want to grow up to be Canadian must do much more 
in the future if our wonderful country, so full of promise and 
opportunity, is to survive for our future generations. And what 
a shining example we could be for other democracies. And 
what a tragedy it would be if we fail.
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